

K113.107-157

Vol. 3

1955

RETURN TO

Air Force
Historical Research Center
Maxwell AFB, AL 36112-6678

8-1115-7

0468156

SEARCHED BY TMR

SCANNED BY ACD
2005

- 1 -

List of Appendixes

No. :	Date :	Contents :	Pages :
1	1 August 1940	- Excerpts from the war diary of 24 March 1941 the Wehrmacht High Command - Wehrmacht Operations Staff/Branch of National Defense	68
2	8 August 1940	- Excerpts from the notes on the	42
	25 June 1941	discussions of the situation at the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/Branch of National Defense	
3	25 June 1940	- Excerpts from the official diaries of 101	
	22 June 1941	the Chief of the Army General Staff, Generaloberst Halder	
4	21 May 1940	- Excerpts from the notes of the Com-	36
	26 August 1941	mander in Chief of the Navy on his conferences with Hitler	
5	29 November 1939	- Directive No. 5 of the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht: Gui-	4
		ding principles for warfare against the enemy economy	
6	Winter 1939/40	- Preliminary considerations of the Naval Operations Staff on a landing in England	

0468156

8-115-7

- 2 -

7 25 June 1940 - Letter of Major (GSC) Freiherr von

2

Falkenstein (Wehrmacht High Command/

Office
Wehrmacht Operations ~~Office~~/L I L)

to Colonel (GSC) von Waldau with the

appendix: Basic Requirements for a Lan-

ding in England as far as the Luftwaffe

is concerned

8 30 June 1940 - Memorandum of Generalmajor Jodl (Chief

3

of the Wehrmacht Operations Office) on

the continuation of the warfare against Eng-

land

9 2 July 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command

2

on the preparations for a landing in

England

10 10 July 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command

2

on the artillery cover for the transport

operations to England

11 12 July 1940 - Memorandum of Generalmajor Jodl (Chief of

5

the Wehrmacht Operations Office) on a landing

in England

16 July 1940 - Directive No. 16 of the Supreme Commander On Pages

76 and 81

of the Wehrmacht on the preparations of

of the text

a landing operation in England

- 3 -

- 12 29 July 1940 - Memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff on the conduct of the operation "Seeloewe" (sea lion) 8
- 13 30 July 1940 - Teletype message of the Wehrmacht High Command to the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe regarding the preparations for the commitment of the Luftwaffe against England 1
- 14 30 July 1940 - Notes of the Naval Operations Staff on the progress of the preparations of the operation "Seeloewe" (the notes were taken for use in a verbal report). Prefatory notes and a list of the conditions made by the Army General Staff for the conduct of the operation 8
- 1 August 1940 - Directive No. 17 of the Supreme Commander of the Wehrmacht for the conduct of the air and sea war against England On Pages
..... in the text of the study 2
- 15 1 August 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command for the conduct of the operation "Seeloewe"

- 4 -

- 16 5 August 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command regarding the support of the Luftwaffe operations against England by the Army and the Navy 2
- 17 7 August 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command regarding the deception of the enemy 2
- 18 9 August 1940 - Notes of the Naval Operations Staff on the conference of the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff and the Chief of the Army General Staff on 7 August 1940 4
- 19 10 August 1940 - Letter of the Army High Command to Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command 5
- 20 12 August 1940 - Letter of the Wehrmacht High Command to the Army and Navy High Commands regarding the commitment of German forces in North Africa in the case of a postponement of the operation "Seelöwe" (This letter was not directed to the Commander-in-Chief of the Luftwaffe !) 2
- 21 13 August 1940 - Evaluation of the situation ~~by~~ by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, 3

- 5 -

- General der Artillery Joil, for the
landing in England
- 22 16 August 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High 2
Command regarding the preparation
of the operation "Seelowe"
- 23 27 August 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High 2
Command regarding the operation "Seelowe",
the Group XXI, and the transfer of forces
into the Government General
- 24 30 August 1940 - Directive of the Commander in Chief 9
of the Army for the preparation of
the operation "Seelowe"
- 25 3 September 1940- Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command 1
on target-dates for the operation "Seelowe"
- 26 5 September 1940- Order of the Coomander in Chief of the 3
Luftwaffe for the commitment of the Luftwaffe
during the operation "Seelowe"
- 27 14 September 1940- Directives of the Wehrmacht High Command 2
regarding decisions of Hitler on the ope-
ration "Seelowe" and on air attacks against
London
- 28 14 September 1940- Order of the Army Group A for the conduct of 8
the operation "Seelowe"

- 6 -

- 29 14 September 1940 - Operational order of the Naval 10
Commander West for the conduct of
the transport activities for the
operation "Seeloewe"
- 30 15 September 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High 2
Command on planned deception for
the operation "Seeloewe"
- 31 17 September 1940 - Preliminary combat directive of 5
the Second Air Fleet Command for the
conduct of the operation "Seeloewe"
- 32 18 September 1940 - Directive of the Second Air Fleet 2
Command for the commitment of the
7th Air Division in the case of the
operation "Seeloewe"
- 33 19 September 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command 1
regarding the operation "Seeloewe"
- 34 29 September 1940 - Special directives of the Second Air Fleet 4
Command for the time-schedule of the operation
"Seeloewe" up to and including S-Day
- 35 12 October 1940 - Directive of the Wehrmacht High Command 2
for the postponement of the operation
"Seeloewe" ^{until} ~~to~~ the spring of 1941

- 7 -

No. 1

Wehrmacht High Command. War Diary of the Wehrmacht

Operations Staff/National Defense Branch

Copies of Excerpts covering the Period from 1 August 1940

to 24 March 1941.

The War Diary was kept by Ministerialrat (Civil Service Rank equivalent to the Rank of a Colonel) Helmuth Greiner.

Prefatory Notes:

- 1) In the following excerpts, only those passages are quoted which refer to entries relating directly
 - a) immediately to the operation "Seelowe" and the "Air Battle of Britain", and
 - b) being of general political and military interest in connection with the topic of the study concerned.
- 2) Only ~~the~~ dates are quoted under which the entries contained in the excerpts had been made.

- 8 -

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehr-

macht Operations Staff/Branch of National

Defense, 1 August 1940

1 August 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch ~~mixtum~~, Generalmajor Warli-

the desired
mont, hands over ~~x~~ report evaluating the overall situation to the Chief

of the Wehrmacht Operations Office, General der Artillery Jodl, and

suggests to the latter that the new directive in preparation for the

overall warfare be confined to general guiding principles, since a de-

tailed directive cannot be drawn up until the studies, in particular

those of the Army, are available for evaluation. The Chief of the Wehr-

macht Operations Office accepts this suggestion. Then he reports on the

the conferences of the Fuehrer with the Commanders in Chief of the Navy

and the Army held on 31 July:

The Commander in Chief of the Navy reported that the prepara-

tions for the providing of shipping space for the operation "Seeloewe"

(sea lion) could be completed by(date not entered in the

original copy). The other preparations, especially the mine sweeping and

mine laying, could not be completed until 13 September. The mine sweep-

ping and mine laying could be completed by that date only if in the case

of favorable weather conditions and friendly air supremacy. At this occa-

sion, the Commander in Chief of the Navy again pointed out urgently the

the effects which would be brought about by the intended measures on the

- 9 -

German inland navigation which would suffer a reduction of 30 per cent. In addition, all fishing steamers would also have to be employed in this action. In conclusion, he termed the fall as the season generally less favorable than the spring for the conduct of such a landing operation. He did not have a chance to express his opinion on the strategic sea situation.

The Fuehrer decided that the preparations for the landing operation should, for the time being, be based on 15 September as target date.

During the further discussion the Commander in Chief of the Navy pointed out that the views of the Army and the Navy were controversial in respect to a number of essential points such as:

- 1.) The organization of the chain of command during the crossing operation,
- 2.) the expansion of the landing sector,
- 3.) the time-schedule for the consecutive landing of the 2nd, 3rd, and 4th waves, and
- 4.) the selection of the hour at which the landing of the 1st wave should be carried out.

Finally, the Fuehrer approved the submarine program also for the year 1942.

As a result of the verbal report of the Commander in Chief of

- 10 -

the Army on the progress of the preparations for the operation "Seeloewe" (sea lion) the Fuehrer decided that the planning for a landing on a broad front were to be continued. Reductions of the scale of the landing which might become necessary could be ordered in the course of the operation.

For further statements of the Fuehrer made during the conference with the Commander in Chief of the Army see the notes of the Chief of the National Defense Branch ~~submitted~~ of 1 August.

These notes are not attached.

During the verbal report of the Chief of the National Defense Branch to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office, the Chief of the Group I (Luftwaffe), Major Freiherr von Falkenstein, reported on his communication with the Luftwaffe on 31 July at "Kurfuerst" (code name for the headquarters of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff in Wildpark near Potsdam) on the intentions of the ~~K~~ Luftwaffe regarding the time and conduct of the intensified air warfare against England (see Directive No. 17). He commented on the reasons for the postponement of the air war against England as ~~as~~ had been for quite a follows: The Luftwaffe ~~was~~ prepared ~~for~~ long time for the intensified air war against England as far as the operational condition of its units and its supply situation was concerned. However, the controversial suggestions of the air fleet commanders for a new tactical method to be employed in the operations against

- 11 -

England could not be reconciled to each other so far since the Reichsmarschall had not made any decision on this question. The latter had thought, owing to remarks made by Hitler, that ~~maximizes~~ the intensified air war against England would not begin until about 8 days later. After the Reichsmarschall had decided on 31 July that, at first, a large-scale air attack against London was to be simulated during which the British fighter defenses were to be severely hit by the commitment of strong fighter forces, further 5 to 6 days would be needed to familiarize the crews with the new tactics in detailed discussions with the commanders down to group level and in map games.

The following directives were issued as a result of the information released by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office:

- 1.) The decisions made by the Fuehrer will be summarized in a directive of the Wehrmacht High Command under the date of 1 August.
- 2.) Directive No. 17 for the intensified sea and air war against England.
- 3.) Compilation of the controversial points in the views of the Army and the Navy in respect to the operation "Seeloewe" (sea lion).
- 4.) Order for deception measures in connection with the operation "Seeloewe" (sea lion). Suggestion on such measures submitted by the Army High Command.
- 5.) Guiding principles for propaganda activities in connection with the operation "Seeloewe" (sea lion).
- 6.) List of the measures to be taken for the warfare against England

- 12 -

during the winter months in case the operation "Seeloewe" should be carried out this year. In such case, the following measures are planned:

a) According to suggestions submitted by the National Defense Branch and the Commander in Chief of the Army the detachment of armored units for supporting the Italian ~~Frontex~~ advance toward Egypt and the support of Italy by the Luftwaffe in the capture of Gibraltar and during operations against Alexandria.

b) Measures in Syria and against the Arabian countries.

c) Use of Japanese support for the sea war.

7.) Order for concealment of the build-up in the East.

in
8.) Compilation of material for use ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ the outline of an order for preparations^y conducted on a long-range basis (subject: preparations for a campaign against the Soviet Union).

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehr-

macht Operations Staff/ National Defense Branch

2 August 1940

2 August 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command (Generalfeldmarschall Keitel) the Directive No. 17 and the compilation of the decisions taken by the Fuehrer as a result of the verbal reports of the Commanders in Chief of the

- 13 -

Navy and the Army. The former is signed by the Fuehrer, the latter by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command.

Moreover, the Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command the directive on deception measures in connection with the operation "Seeloewe" (sea lion) and the outline of an order for the build-up in the East. The latter is approved on principle and will^{then} be further developed.

(.....)

In the afternoon, the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command confers with the Chief of the Economic and Armament Office in the presence of the Chief of the National Defense Branch on the preparation of new decisions to be made by the Fuehrer regarding the arms and ammunition program in accordance with the ~~present~~ now planned strength of the wartime army and with the other conversions (stepping-up of the antiaircraft artillery production, approval of the submarine program for the year 1942).

(.....)

For the preparation of the work leave which is to be granted, if possible, on a large scale during the winter of 1941/1942, the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command ordered that this leave be granted, on principle, immediately after a negative decision which ~~might~~ might be taken by the Fuehrer regarding the operation "Seeloewe" (sea lion). All forces available should be used and the home leave not be used for work should be reduced.

- 14 -

The Chief of the National Defense Branch sends a directive drawn up by himself and regarding the "buildup in the East" to the Chiefs of the Groups IH(Army), IK (Navy), ~~and~~ II (Luftwaffe), II, and IV, as well as to the liaison officer of the Economic and Armament Office requesting their opinion and, if under circumstances, their ~~suggested~~ suggestions for complementation.

This outline says that the Fuehrer had decided not to create an independent state in the remaining territory of Poland but to annex the occupied eastern areas to the Greater German Reich. Consequently, the Wehrmacht would have to build up all necessary defenses in this newly gained eastern territory. An additional factor to be considered ~~was~~ is in the West that the air threat which would increase in the course ~~of~~ of the war will, to an increasing extent, necessitate the military exploitation of the safe eastern territories.

The following guiding principles should be adhered to in this action: (.....)

5 August 1940

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office summons, in the absence of the Chief of the National Defense Branch, the group chiefs of Group I for a conference to be held in the Reich's Chancellery in the morning and make the following statements:

During the conference with the Fuehrer on 31 July (see 1 August) the Commander in Chief of the Navy suggested, as already known, that the

- 15 -

preparations for the operation "Seeloewe" (sea lion) be based on a ~~plan~~ plan for a crossing on the small sector Ostend - Deal/Somme Estuary-East Burne. The Commander in Chief who also attended the conference did not contradict ~~in~~ this suggestion and the Fuehrer noted it without any comment. From this, the Commander in Chief of the Navy got the impression that the Fuehrer and the Commander in Chief of the Army concurred in his opinion and the Naval Operations Staff continued its work on the basis of this assumption.

The fact was, however, that the Commander in Chief of the Army voiced, after the Commander in Chief of the Navy had left, considerable misgivings to the Fuehrer about the crossing on this small basis upon which the Fuehrer ordered to carry on the preparations on the basis of a plan for a crossing in the broad sector Ostend - Margate/Cherbourg - Lyme Bay. The ~~possibility and success of~~ definite decision whether the crossing was to operation ~~should~~ be conducted on the small or the broad basis, however, should be reserved.

In the meantime, the Chief of the Naval Staff declared again in letters sent to the Army General Staff and the Luftwaffe Operations Staff that the transportation of the troops could be insured only in and on both sides of the Strait of Dover which was limited by the lines Ostend - North Foreland and Etaples - Beachy Head as long as ports were not yet available and the Channel was not yet cleared of the enemy ~~by~~ naval forces by measures taken by the Luftwaffe and Navy.

- 16 -

In this narrow sector, the crossing will now - in contrast to the crossing in several waves as hitherto planned - be possible in the form of a steady flow of transport units. During this operation, the ports located on the eastern and western sides and the waterways along the continental coast which are covered by coast artillery will also be used. In addition, a more effective protection of the flanks of this narrow crossing sector by mines and other naval action (employment of submarines, motor torpedo boats, artillery cover) seemed to be possible.

To reconcile the controversial views on the expansion of the landing sector which are shown again in this letter, a conference will be held this morning between the Commanders in Chief of the Army and Navy. He, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office, has not yet been informed on the result of this conference.

A telephone inquiry of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command with the Commander in Chief of the Navy revealed that the latter reached an agreement with the Commander in Chief of the Army to the effect that still today the Chief of the Naval Staff ~~should be present~~ specialized in the fields concerned should sent to the headquarters of the Army High Command in Fontainebleau to work out a solution of the controversial problem. At the same time, the Commander in Chief of the Navy assures the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command that the preparations for a crossing on the broad basis are continued for the time being.

- 17 -

As a result of this information, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office issues, to supplement the Directive No.17, some other _____ to be provided by the Army and Luftwaffe for orders for the support ~~in~~ the imminent large-scale commitment of the Luftwaffe against England.

The Army is to commit machine-gun battalions and antiaircraft machine-gun units to provide additional protection for the ground installations of the Luftwaffe in the endangered areas. The suitable Navy is to employ all^v naval craft to reinforce the sea rescue service in^v limited outpost area ~~in~~ the Channel during the large-scale operation to an extent possible in view of the preparations for the landing. Another mission of the Navy ~~will~~ is to provide for the possibility that the enemy recognizes the commitment of the Luftwaffe as a preparation for a landing and, consequently, employs stronger naval forces in the Channel area, by committing submarines and by other combat action to an extent permitted by the "Kriegsmarine" of England which is to be maintained also during this period of time.

The Chief of the Group I (Army) of the National Defense Branch suggests that use ~~should~~ be made of the large-scale commitment of the Luftwaffe for the adjustment fire of the batteries (K 5 and K 12) which are located at the Channel coast and have a range reaching up to England. However, a limited amount of ammunition only is to be fired in view of the support to be provided for a later landing operation. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office approves this suggestion.

- 18 -

A corresponding directive will be issued on the same day to the high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht (Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Office/National Defense Branch 33199/40 Restricted Top Secret of 5 August).

(.....)

6 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/

National Defense Branch

5 August 1940

(.....)

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office forwards a letter of the Army High Command (Commander in Chief of the Army - Army General Staff - Chief of Supply and Administration 0183/40 Restricted Top Secret of 30 July) which was received by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command on 4 August. This letter contains a request for approval of the intention of the Army High Command to have the administration of the British territory to be occupied conducted by, in general by military authorities available(such as the Commander of the Rear Army Area, the regional or garrison administration headquarters) for the purpose of the full exploitation of the auxiliary resources of the country ~~for~~ to cover the needs of the troops, and to delegate the executive power to the headquarters of the field armies which pursue a uniform policy laid down by the Army High Command are to ~~be~~ ^{be} ~~given~~ ^{given} (Army General Staff/Chief of Supply and Administration).

- 19 -

The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command ordered that a brief
directive directive be issued on this
~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ question.
~~xxxxxx~~

7 August 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch directs the Chief of the Group
Colonel
I H, Lieutenant^v von Lossberg, in view of the suggestion submitted by the
Commander in Chief of the Army at the occasion of his verbal report to
the Fuehrer on 31 July that the planned Italian offensive against Egypt
be supported by a German expeditionary corps, and in consequence of the
suggestion made by the National Defense Branch in its "Evaluation of
the overall Situation" of 30 July to the effect that ~~xxx~~ an armored corp
should placed at the disposal of the Italians for this offensive, to
prepare a brief study on the seasonal conditions for such action, the
forces required
~~requirement~~, and the conditions regarding transportation. This study
is to be submitted to the Fuehrer together with the other suggestions
has to be
for measures to be taken in case the operation "Seeloewe" ~~is~~ called off
(.....)

The Chief of the Group I (Luftwaffe) of the National Defense Branch re-
ports on the intensification of the air war against England. It is in-
tended to crush the British air force by having the Second and Third
Air Fleets commit strong fighter forces in intruding operations and
commit bomber forces in a strength varying according to the development
of the situation. The attacks should be directed against the area of
London without hitting London itself.

- 20 -

By these operations, the enemy should be forced to employ strong fighter forces. An exact plan has been prepared for the first day of this air action, the subsequent operations should be conducted according to the situation. The exact date for the beginning of the attacks has not yet been established. The decisive factor for this date is the weather situation which is still unfavorable at the moment.

The prospects for success can be considered as absolutely favorable. The only difficulty which may be expected consists in the possibility that the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe might deem it necessary to discontinue the offensive action prematurely if the friendly losses during the first days should be considerable, as may be expected, and, on the other hand, only inadequate information is obtained on the successes of the attacks and the enemy losses.

~~The~~
The Chief of the Group H (Army) of the National Defense Branch re-
to the Chief of the National Defense Branch
ports on the result of the conference of ~~the~~ Captain Fett who had returned from Fontainebleau on 6 August with the Operations Officer of the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff, Colonel Heusinger, on 3 August.

The conference is said to have been a mere exchange of views ~~between~~
Colonel
between him (Lieutenant von Lossberg) and Colonel Heusinger ~~and~~ on the controversial opinions of the Commanders in Chief of the Army and Navy regarding the conduct of the operation "Seeloewe" which had become evident during the conference with the Fuehrer on 31 July.

- 21 -

At first, Captain Fett informed Colonel Heusinger on the Directive No. 17 issued on 2 August and the directive simultaneously issued by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command which stipulated that the strategic preparations for the operation "Seeloewe" should be continued on the broad basis hitherto planned. Colonel Heusinger had already received the letter dated 2 August and directed by the Naval Operations Staff to the Army General Staff and the Luftwaffe Operations Staff. In this letter it was ~~said~~ made clear that the transportation of the forces could be insured only within the sector in and on both sides of the Strait of Dover.

Regarding the date of the landing, Colonel Heusinger said that according to reports ~~by~~ the Navy the weather conditions in the first ~~half~~ of October ~~were~~ mostly good in the Channel. As regards the time required for the accomplishment of the crossing, ~~the~~ ^{14 days} long period of ~~time~~ calculated by the Navy as necessary for the crossing operation ~~which was demanded~~ of ~~two days for the transportation of~~ 13 infantry, 6 armored, and 3 motorized divisions ~~which could be delayed for several days owing to enemy action and bad weather, was sharply rejected by the Army which argued that in such case the overall operation would be unfeasible.~~

The views of the Army and the Luftwaffe on the commitment of parachute and air landing forces were controversial. The Luftwaffe planned to commit these forces as late as after the establishment of a bridgehead as mobile reserves. According to the statement of Colonel Heusinger, the Army rejected this idea and called for the participation of these forces in the

- 22 -

efforts to establish the bridgehead. If the Luftwaffe had not at its disposal sufficient ~~parachutist~~ personnel, the Army would be ready at any time to transfer ~~available~~ men to the Luftwaffe for parachute training. The ideal case would be the availability of at least 7000 paratroopers. The employment of air landing forces in the establishment of the bridgehead should not be taken into consideration because of the considerable preparedness of the British for defensive action. Utmost importance was attached by the Army High Command to the consideration of its desire that the command authority regarding the measures to be taken in the ~~areas~~ near the coast be reserved to the field commanders. The time ~~table~~ schedule of the Army High Command provided only for the concentration of the first echelon of the first wave during the period up to 3 August. A warning order about 12 days prior to the landing would be needed for the conduct of the concentration of the second echelon of the first wave and of the entire second wave. The order for the embarkation of the equipment should be issued 2 days prior to the take-off and ~~should be completed by~~ the embarkation of the troops ~~as day~~ should be carried out a day before.

A tight control should be exercised by the Wehrmacht High Command over the measures to be taken for deception purposes.

Finally, the data on England submitted by Major von Necker and the instruction film on the contours of the British southern coast were handed over to Colonel Heusinger.

(.....)

- 23 -

8 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/

National Defense Branch, 7 August 1940

In the afternoon, the Chief of the National Defense Branch reports to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on the result effected through of the exchange of views ~~made~~ ^{possibly} ~~possibly~~ by the mediation of Captain Fett. The exchange of views had taken place between the Chief of the Group I Army, Lieutenant Colonel von Lossberg and the Operations Officer of the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff, Colonel Heusinger (See under 7 August).

The Chief of the National Defense Branch jointly with the Chief of the Group I Luftwaffe then pointed out that, upon orders by ~~General~~ the Reichsmarschall, the Luftwaffe has not yet taken any preparatory measures for the landing operation "Seelowe" planned according to Directive No. 16. For this reason, the Wehrmacht High Command must now tighten its reins of command in respect to these preparations. ~~and~~ The controversial views of the Army and Navy on the conduct of the operation on a small or broad basis caused the Luftwaffe to direct again air attacks against ports in West and South England.

The problem of the employment of parachute forces during the operation "Seelowe" should be clarified, too, since, as the report of Captain Fett revealed, the views ~~and this question~~ of the Army and Luftwaffe on this question were controversial.

- 24 -

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office declares that he
will contact the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff directly on this
question.

According to the directive by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office a letter directed to the Army High Command (Chief of Supply and Administration) (Wehrmacht High Command - Wehrmacht Operations Office - National Defense Branch IV 33200/40 Restricted Top Secret, dated 7 August). By this letter it is communicated to the Army High Command that the form of administration planned by the Army High Command for those areas of England to be occupied conforms to the directive expected to be issued by the Fuehrer after the decision on the conduct of the operation "Seelöwe" and that, therefore, the preparatory necessary ~~preliminary~~ measures may be taken by the Army High Command on this basis.

Subsequently, the Chief of the Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch reports verbally to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Office on the planned conduct of the intensified air war against England and on the prospects for success of these operations. (See under 7 August).

(.....)

The Chief of the National Defense Branch asks the Chief of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence for information on the present Russian

- 25 -

war potential and for an examination to establish which ~~points~~ spots of the British Empire except Gibraltar and Egypt can be attacked with a good prospect for success in case the operation "Seeloewe" should ~~work~~ ~~be~~ be postponed until next spring.

(.....)

At the present time, the following numbers of aircraft are available to the German Luftwaffe:

949 bomber aircraft in operational condition,

336 dive-bomber aircraft in operational condition,

869 fighter-aircraft in operational condition, and

268 twin-engine fighter aircraft in operational condition.

These figures ~~amount~~ add up to a total number of

2422 aircraft.

The Wehrmacht Operations Office is renamed Wehrmacht Operations Staff as of this date.

9 August 1940

The Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Schniewind, returned from Fontainebleau on 8 August without having reached an agreement with the Chief of the Army General Staff during the conference in the evening of 7 August on the crossing sector to be selected for the operation "Seeloewe".

As is revealed by the notes of the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Naval Staff, Admiral Fricke, who attended the conference,

- 26 -

the Chief of the Army General Staff had declared that he could by no means accept the idea of concentrating the landing within the area Folkestone - Beachy Head, since this ~~xxx~~ area would be too small and the terrain too unsuitable for the employment of "wedge tactics" to break through the considerably superior enemy defenses. An additional factor to be considered
national ~~consideration~~ is, according to the opinion of the Naval Staff that owing to the peculiar character of the transportation of the landing forces any tactical surprise of the enemy cannot be expected.

On the other hand, the Chief of the Naval Staff made it clear again that a landing ~~in a wide sector~~ on a broad front would not be possible for technical as well as military reasons. The same would be true of a simultaneous landing at Deal.

In a conference with the group chiefs of Group I the Chief of the National Defense Branch points out that in view of these controversial views of the Army and the Navy it must be the mission of the Wehrmacht High Command to prepare a decision to be made by the Fuehrer. For this purpose he directs that a memorandum be prepared in which the reasons for the controversial views of both high commands be presented in outlines. Data of the Navy are already on hand for this memorandum while the opinion of the Army cannot be clarified until the Colonel von Witzleben has ~~returned~~ arrived from Fontainebleau. On the basis of these data a suggestion for the decision of the Fuehrer ~~must~~ is to be prepared which should be largely in conformance with what the Fuehrer
Commanders
had ordered as a result of the verbal reports of the ~~Geometers~~ in Chie

- 27 -

of the Navy and Army on 31 July. The then order of the Fuehrer provided for the continuation of the preparations for the launching and the disembarkation ~~of~~ the first echelon of the first wave on the broad basis hitherto planned. Any reduction of the extension of this basis which might become necessary should not be effected until later.

The results of the consideration of the suggestion of the Army High Command that the planned Italian move against Egypt be supported noted down for by German armored forces are ~~immediately~~ the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. In ~~this~~ this ~~#~~ note the suggestion submitted by the National Defense Branch in the "Evaluation of the overall Situation" , dated 30 July, that armored forces should be offered to the Italians for their ~~attack~~ offensive action against the Suez-Canal in ~~the~~ case the operation "Seelöwe" would be called off is renewed and reasons for it are given. The reason given is the fact that armored forces will be dispensable up to the spring of 1941 and the detachment of an armored corps will be worth while particularly if at the same time an operation against Gibraltar is prepared. In such case there would be a good prospect for crushing the British position in the Mediterranean in the winter months, (.....).

- 28 -

On the basis of the reconnaissance results provided by the reconnaissance staff of the Admiral Canaris in respect to Gibraltar, the National Defense Branch ~~xxxxxxxx~~ conducts studies in which the operational possibilities for action against Gibraltar and the political prerequisites regarding Spain are examined. The result of these studies is outlined in a note to be used in a verbal report to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. This note suggests that, in case the operation "Seeloewe" will not be carried out during this fall, not only the port be destroyed and the British fleet be routed but that Gibraltar be captured. (.....).

10 August 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch discusses with the group chiefs of Group I and with the Chief of Group III, Major von Tippelskirch, the problem of organizing the provision and transportation of supplies during the operation "Seeloewe". Particular attention was devoted to the question whether a special organization would have to be established for this purpose.

The following three solutions are taken into consideration:

- 1.) The entire provision and transportation of the supplies will be directed by a central Wehrmacht transportation and Supply Authority established especially for this purpose. This authority will decide on the urgency of the various supplies and on the order of succession of the supply transports by sea and by air.

- 29 -

2.) The provision and transportation of the supplies for the individual branches of the Wehrmacht will be the responsibility of the individual branches of the Wehrmacht. In this case, the required means of transportation would have to be made available to each branch of the Wehrmacht and special ports would have to be assigned to each branch.

3.) The branches of the Wehrmacht will report the necessary sea transports to the Navy and the required air transports to the Luftwaffe. The Navy and the Luftwaffe will then decide on the order of succession ~~x~~ of the transportation.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch decides that no new organization should be established but that the branches of the Wehrmacht are to regulate their supply activities independently according to the principle of ~~the~~ decentralization. The uniform control of the transport operations, however, should ~~be~~, as far as necessary, be exercised by the Chief of ~~the~~ Wehrmacht Transportation.

During his verbal report in the afternoon, the Chief of the National Defense Branch made a corresponding suggestion to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff approves the principle of decentralization. However, ~~he~~ he thinks it necessary that the armies to be committed in the landing operations be assigned the mission of independently ~~conducting~~ providing and transporting the supplies for their own forces as well as for the Luftwaffe elements employed in their sectors.

- 30 -

For this purpose, the sea transport authorities of the Navy should be closely connected with the respective armies and liaison officers of the Army and Luftwaffe should be detailed to these transport authorities.

On the basis of these directives, the Chief of Group III of the National Defense Branch contacts the Navy on 12 August and prepares a corresponding order.

(.....)

12 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/ Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 10 August

1940

(.....)

In the afternoon, the liaison officer of the Army High Command with the Naval Operations Staff, Colonel von Witzleben, calls on the Chief of the National Defense Branch in the train "Atlas" and hands over to him a letter directed by the Commander in Chief of the Army to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command. In this letter, the controversial views of the Army and Navy High Commands on the conduct of the operation "Seelöwe" are again set forth in detail and it is requested that the definite decision of the Wehrmacht High Command be taken soon.

The Army High Command rejects in this letter the view taken by the Navy High Command that a landing operation could be conducted

- 31 -

only within the area limited by the lines Dunkirk - Folkestone and Boulogne - Beachy Head. The following reasons are given for this rejection: The landed troops would encounter considerably superior forces. The marshy terrain of the coastal area which is interspersed with innumerable streams is extremely unfavorable for the employment of this applies of the armament of the friendly forces, especially to the mobile forces. For ~~the~~ enemy defensive action, however, this type of terrain is ideal. The hills surrounding the entire landing front in ~~the form of a~~ ^{a semi-cir-} cular form provide favorable positions for the enemy, the long time required for the crossing operation - 6 days for the 6 landing divisions of the first wave including certain GHQ-troops, further 7 days for further 6 divisions with GHQ-troops and antiaircraft artillery units - offers to the enemy the possibility of establishing ^{the} such a strong defense front that ~~any~~ prospect for any breakthrough would no longer exist, which would mean that an important factor for a quick success in England would be eliminated.

Therefore, the Army High Command demands that simultaneously another landing be carried out at and west of Brighton where the terrain is especially favorable for the employment of mobile units. Furthermore, the Army wants that forces be landed at Deal very early, which is necessary for the rapid ~~expulsion~~ occupation of the hills north of Dover and that within 4 days the first waves of a total strength of 10 divisions with the corresponding equipment be landed on the

- 32 -

coast of England between Ramsgate and west of Brighton. ~~Embarkation~~
~~landing would offer~~ A prospect for reaching the first objective of
the operations (Thames Estuary - Southampton) in due time, would
exist only if forces of adequate strength and provided with a rapid
flow of supplies would be employed simultaneously on this broad
front.

During the ensuing discussion Colonel von Witzleben points
out that ~~in~~ at the conference of the Chief of the Army General Staff
with the Chief of the Naval Staff in Fontainebleau on 7 August
(See under 9 August) no possibility presented itself for a reconcili-
ation of the conflicting views. Both high commands now considered
a decision of the Fuehrer as necessary. No more time should be was-
ted.

The further examination of this
~~During the further discussions~~ problem conducted by the Chief
of the National Defense Branch together with the Chiefs of Groups
I Army and I Navy in the presence of Colonel von Witzleben seems
to offer a possibility of a partial fulfilment of the demands rai-
sed by the Army. It should be established whether the landing of
a combat team of adequate strength and consisting of various types
of arms would be feasible in the Bay of Brighton by using only
small motor boats or air transportation. Colonel von Witzleben
Holds that these forces should contain at least 4 reinforced regi-
mental combat groups. For this purpose, about 500 motor boats with

- 33 -

a capacity of 6 to 20 men ~~each~~ with light infantry armament each
are available.

At 16:00 hours, the Chief of the National Defense Branch
communicates this suggestion by telephone to the Chief of the
Wehrmacht Operations Staff and says that corresponding data in
writing will be submitted. He points out in particular that a ver-
bal report of the Commander in Chief of the Navy to the Fuehrer
on the attitude taken by the Naval Operations Staff on this sugges-
tion would have no prospect for success until these data have been
submitted.

A memorandum prepared by the National Defense Branch which
provides a presentation of the conflicting views of the Army and
Navy High Commands on the question of the lateral extension of the
area in which the landing operation is to take place is submitted
to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff in the same evening
for use as a basis for the decision of the Fuehrer (See 13 August).

As regards the problem of the support of the warfare against
England to be provided by Italian naval and air forces (See ver-
bal report of the Commander in Chief of the Navy to the Fuehrer on
25 July), the Fuehrer approved the idea of having Italian submari-
nes participate in the German naval warfare in the Atlantic and of
having
Italian air forces participate in the air war against the British
homeland.

- 34 -

Moreover, the Fuehrer has agreed to the following intentions of
the Commanders in Chief of the Navy and Luftwaffe regarding this ques-
tion:

The uniform planning for ~~a~~ combined submarine operations in the
Atlantic is to be insured by a German liaison staff detailed to the
commander of the Italian submarine forces. A port at the Atlantic coas-
t of South France which is suitable for use as a naval base will be pla-
ced at the disposal of the Italians. Providing supplies for this base
and for the Italian submarines will be the responsibility of the Ita-
lians, while the protection to be provided by antiaircraft artillery
will be the responsibility of the Commander in Chief of ~~the~~ Luftwaffe.

The Italian units taking part in the air operations against the
British homeland will be organized in a division which should be as
independent as possible also in respect to its ground organization.

Chief of the
A corresponding directive of the Wehrmacht High Command will be
issued to the commanders in chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht
on 12 August.

Bomber and dive-bomber units of the Third and Second Air Fleets
protected by strong twin-engine and single-engine fighter forces, at-
tacked the harbor installations of Portland and Weymouth as well as
several convoys off the coast of South and East England on 11 August.

During these operations, air combat with enemy fighter aircraft
developed at several occasions in the afternoon during which the enemy
suffered heavy losses.

- 35 -

Among other targets, the harbor installations of Bristol, Cardiff and Middlesbrough were attacked in the night of 11 to 12 August. A total force of 230 bomber and 620 twin-engine and single-engine fighter aircraft was committed. The enemy losses amounted to 90 aircraft and 8 barrage balloons while the losses of the friendly forces amounted to 28 aircraft.

Towards 17:00 hours, the Luftwaffe Operations Staff serves notice that the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe has decided to launch the intensified air war against England on 13 August, since the prospects for favorable weather conditions during the next days are good.

(The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe reported to the Fuehrer on 11 August that it was his intention to launch the intensified air war against England as soon as there would be a prospect for good weather lasting three days. The Fuehrer agreed to this intention.)

(.....)

13 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 13 August 1940

and during the night of 12 to 13 On 12 August, ~~the command units of the Luftwaffe~~ August, bomber units of the Luftwaffe successfully raided the harbor installations of Portsmouth, Ramsgate, Middlesbrough, Newcastle, and Shields; moreover, they attacked industrial installations, radio stations, airfield ^s~~over~~ and water-borne targets.

- 36 -

A total force of 300 bomber and 1160 twin-engine and single-engine fighter aircraft was committed. The enemy losses amounted to 86, the friendly losses to 25 aircraft.

According to a report of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff the Third Air Fleet carried out an attack against the area north of Portsmouth at 07:00 hours ~~inxthe morning~~. The attack of the Second Air Fleet planned to be carried out simultaneously had to be broken off owing to weather conditions. The Reichsmarschall reserved to himself the right to decide on further attacks to be conducted by both these air fleets until 14:00 hours.

At about noontime the Fuehrer returns from the Berghof to Berlin.

At 17:30 hours, he receives the Commander in Chief of the Navy together with the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff for verbal report and consultation. This conference is also attended by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, and Commander von Puttkamer.

During this conference, the Commander in Chief of the Navy requests an early decision whether the operation "Seeloewe" is to be carried out on the broad or the small basis since otherwise the preparations would suffer delays. He comments on the memorandum of the Commander in Chief of the Army, dated 10 August and submitted by Colonel von Witzleben (See under 12 August), as follows:

The Naval Operations Staff recognizes the necessity of the demands raised by the Army High Command but does not see any possibility

- 37 -

to meet them on the part of the Navy. A simultaneous landing in the Bay of Brighton and at Deal would be unfeasible. The prospects for success in respect to the initial landing and, in particular, to the moving up of reinforcements are so slight that the conduct of such operations would be irresponsible. Further means of transportation in excess of the figures submitted on 2 August can neither be made available nor be accommodated in the launching bases. Consequently, the demand raised by the Army High Command that a total force of 10 divisions with the corresponding equipment be landed on the coast between Ramsgate and west of Brighton would be unfeasible. A rapid transportation of reinforcements and supplies would be impossible on the same grounds. These demands of the Army make it even more difficult to make available additional shipping space for a landing in the Bay of Lyme.

To summarize, it can be said that, in view of the limited naval combat and transport forces, the conduct of the operation "Seelowe" could be only the "ultima ratio" as has been pointed out ~~repeatedly~~ by the Navy High Command. Such an operation should be conducted only if all the other efforts to make England ready for peace should fail.

The Fuehrer fully shares this opinion. A failure of the landing operation would considerably increase British prestige. The effects of the intensified air war should be waited for. He (the Fuehrer) will make the decision on 14 August after consultation with the Commander in Chief of the Army.

- 38 -

The Fuehrer then broaches the question of the growing tensions between Finland and the Soviet Union. In view of these tensions, he wants a stronger fortification of the area of North Norway, especially of the fjords located in that area. Mainly the road crossing points should be fortified so that Russian attacks in that area would have no prospect for success and a basis for the occupation of Petsamo would be established. In this connection, the appointment of a Navy Commander in this area should be taken into consideration.

/ /

In the evening, the National Defense Branch submits its suggestion on a landing at Brighton to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. The latter had been informed on 12 August at 16:00 hours that such a suggestion would be submitted.

While the view taken by the Navy that the wide Channel sector at Brighton cannot be defended against the British Navy and that the surf of the Atlantic would frustrate the approach of loaded barges, is recognized, it is suggested that two regimental combat groups each ~~2100 men strong~~ with a strength of 2100 men (3 battalions, one half of an infantry gun company and one half of an antitank company, and 1 signal, 1 engineer, 1 bicycle platoon each) be shipped to the Bay of Brighton in 500 motor boats with a capacity of 10 men with equipment each. At the same time, two regimental combat groups (with a total strength of about 5000 men) of the 7th Air Division should be dropped with parachutes over the southern ~~part~~ of downs. The latter should be assigned the

- 39 -

mission of covering the their northern steep slopes against British
from the shore reserves and of supporting the landing of the motor boats. Artillery,

further reinforcements, and supplies would have to be moved in by air
large enough ~~rankt die ersten Stützpunkte~~
as soon as a ~~Wirkung~~ beachhead ~~wurde aufgestellt~~ would have been established.

It would be the mission of the Luftwaffe during the initial phase
serve as
to ~~unterstützen~~ artillery and to destroy forces approaching across the ~~Weser~~
line Southampton-London. In this connection, a reckless air attack on
London if possible on the day preceding landing may be especially ef-
fective, since such an attack would certainly cause innumerable inhabi-
tants ~~die Möglichkeit~~ to leave the city ~~in~~ all directions which would re-
sult in the blocking of the roads and, in a demoralization of the popu-
lation.

(.....)

14 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/

National Defense Branch/, 14 August

1940

The large-scale attack of the ~~sieben~~ Second and Third Air Fleet
scheduled to start on 13 August began according to plan. The Third Air
conducted its operations successfully over the area north of Portsmouth
while the Second Air Fleet had to break off their operations immediate-
ly after take-off owing to bad weather. Only one bomber wing of the Se-
cond Air Fleet which was no more reached by the order for breaking off

- 40 -

the operations attacked the enemy ground organization at East-church east of London.

At 11:00 hours, the Reichsmarschall ordered again both air fleets to attack the area south-east of London and the area of Bournemouth in the course of the afternoon. However, he reserved to himself the right to decide on the definite conduct of the attacks until 14:00 hours because of the weather situation. The attack which was launched at 17:00 hours had to be broken off prematurely by the Second Air Fleet owing to unfavorable weather conditions.

At 19:12 hours, the following warning order of the Reichsmarschall for the 14 August was issued:

The principal mission ~~XXXX~~ will be the further destruction of the enemy fighter forces in the territory of South England. For this purpose, the Second and Third Air Fleets should raid, during their first attack, British fighter units in the air as well as the enemy ground organization east and south of London or in the area at and east of Southampton and ~~XXXX~~ north-east of Plymouth. The attempt ~~XXXX~~ should be made to carry out the attacks ~~about 09:00 hours~~ simultaneously flying across the British coast at 09:00 hours. No attacks should be directed against naval ports and warships because of ~~the~~ great defensive power during the approach and return flight. If weather conditions would not permit flying across the coast until 10:00 hours, a new time schedule for the attacks would be established by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe

- 41 -

The prepared operation "Lichtermeer" (sea of lights) is to be conducted as the second attack (attack against the area surrounding London). The order for this operation will be issued by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe by 13:00 hours at the latest.

At 22:10 hours, ~~The Reichsmarschall~~ issued the following directive to the Second, Third, and Fifth Air Fleets:

It is still planned to commit the Second and Third Air Fleet simultaneously for striking a common blow. Only in case the weather situation would not permit the ~~maxxit~~ conduct of such an operation, independently the ordered targets of the air fleets would be free to raid^y the enemy ground organization in their operational sector whenever weather conditions would permit such operations. Extremely strong fighter forces should be committed to cover these attacks. The main objective should be, for the time being, to inflict considerable damage on the enemy fighter arm. In case the weather situation should not permit the commitment of strong units protected by single-engine and twin-engine fighter forces, both air fleets would have to commit extremely small units and single aircraft in their operational sectors for^{surprise} attacks against the targets of the enemy aircraft industry and ground organization. Fighter forces for providing escort cover could not be committed owing to weather conditions.

Warships should be attacked only in cases when the presence of heavy units has been reported and weather conditions permit the

- 42 -

provision of extremely strong fighter protection. The Reichsmarschall approved the request of the Third Air Fleet to direct its first attack again against the area north and north-west of Southampton. This attack is scheduled to be conducted on 14 August.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff sends the Chief of the National Defense Branch an evaluation of the situation prepared by the former and based on the views of the Army and Navy High Commands on the feasibility of a landing in England.

In this evaluation of the situation the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff makes the following statements:

The planned landing operation should by no means fail, since such a failure could have political consequences far exceeding the military ones.

To take all measures humanly possible to prevent a failure, he, like the Army High Command, thinks it necessary to gain a footing ~~simultaneously~~ on the coast from Folkestone to Brighton simultaneously. It would be necessary to land 10 divisions in this sector within 4 days and to have at least 3 divisions with full equipment follow up within 4 more days through the Strait of Dover even if the motion of the sea would not permit the use of barges. The troops landed further to the West should, in such case, be reinforced by the air landing forces. Furthermore, the coast of South England should be cleared of all British ~~military~~ naval craft and any counteraction

- 43 -

by the British air forces should be almost neutralized or it should at least be possible to neutralize such counteraction.

He thinks it possible for the Luftwaffe to accomplish both latter missions. If, however, the Navy would not be able to meet the first three demands, which must be clarified now, he would consider the landing a desperate act which must be attempted in a desperate situation. At present, however, there is no reason for Germany to conduct such a landing operation at all.

There are other ways to force England down to her knees. For such purpose, however, a cooperation of the Axis-powers considerably closer than hitherto would be required. The objective could be achieved by the following measures:

- 1.) The continuation of the air war until the war economy of South England is destroyed. For this mission, all Italian air forces not in action at the present time would also have to committed.
- 2.) The intensification of the submarine warfare from the French base by employing half of the Italian submarine force.
- 3.) The capture of ~~The exodus of~~ Egypt, if necessary with German support.
- 4.) The capture of Gibraltar after having reached an agreement with Italy and Spain.
- 5.) The avoidance of operations not necessary for ~~the~~ gaining the victory over England but which ~~are~~ only desirable aim at objectives which are just desirable and could be easily achieved after

- 44 -

the victory over England (Yugoslavia).

but

The efforts should not be made to achieve objectives^v to gain the victory. England's will to resist should be broken by next Spring.

Unless this could be achieved by a landing, all other means available should be employed. During the decisive stage of the warfare against

England which is beginning now all forces should be concentrated ~~xx~~ ^{for}

the decisive ~~xx~~ effort which is the air and submarine war against the British homeland. The Italians have shown a certain readiness to

realized that cooperate in these efforts since they had ~~xx~~ they could em-

ploy only a part of their forces in their own theater of war. This right concept should be energetically put to practical use. By discussing this problem with the Duce it will be insured that in the final stage the operations will not be conducted separately but side by side

During the verbal report of the Chief of the National Defense

Branch the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff ~~xx~~ ^{mentions that}

~~xx~~ when ^{when} in the morning^v the marshal batons were given to the ~~xx~~ field marshals promoted to that rank on 19 July the Fuehrer briefly

talked to the Commander in Chief of the Army about the pre-parations

for the operation "Seelöwe" and confirmed again that these prepara-

tions should be continued and ~~xx~~ completed by the established target

date. The Fuehrer reserved to himself the right to decide on the con-

duct of the operation pending the further clarification of the overall

situation.

- 45 -

Moreover the Fuehrer ordered that the preparations for a landing in the Lyme Bay be discontinued on account of the lack of possibilities to provide adequate cover. However, ~~xxxxxx~~ the plans were to provide for a launching of the operation from the coastal sector from Ostend to Le Havre to avoid any concentration of shipping space in a few ports near the enemy coast and to conceal the point of main effort of the landing operation. If a crossing of the Channel from this coastal sector on the full scale cannot be protected by the Navy in the form hitherto planned, the possibilities of a single crossing ~~xxxxxxxx~~ of forces of adequate strength without heavy equipment carried out by utilizing makeshift equipment of the Navy should be examined. In such case, the Luftwaffe might be assigned the additional mission to support the landing by parachute and air landing troops, The main effort of the commitment of the latter should be directed to the western sector of the area of attack (~~xxxx~~ at and west of Brighton).

These directives of the Fuehrer were to be sent to the commanders in chief of the three branches of the Wehrmacht to render a opinion.

Regarding the question of the combined German-Italian sea warfare against England the Chief of the National Defense Branch reports that the Italian Air Force has planned the commitment of two bomber and two fighter wings with a total strength of 80 aircraft against the British homeland. As regards the combined sea warfare, the Italian Navy selected Bordeaux as submarine base and served notice that initially 10 submarines would be committed in about two weeks.

- 46 -

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff then mentions that
the Fuehrer declared himself in favor of the great solution (capture
of Gibraltar), see under 9 August) as a result of the study on possi-
bilities for operations against Gibraltar submitted to him by the Na-
tional Defense Branch on 10 August. The Fuehrer made this decision, ~~and~~
since Spain could be interested only in this solution. Accordingly,
the National Defense Branch is to submit now a detailed operational
study which, after being approved by the Fuehrer, should above all
meet with the approval of General Franco.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff relates further that
the Fuehrer summoned the Commander in Chief of the Group XXI, General-
oberst von Falkenhorst, for a conference and discussed with him the
stronger protection to be provided for North Norway (see under 13 Au-
gust). During this conference, Generaloberst von Falkenhorst suggested
to ~~Hitler~~ the Fuehrer the transfer of the entire maountain corps into
the area Narvik - Kirkenes. This suggestion was approved by the Fueh-
rer. The National Defense Branch now is to submit a corresponding
directive, which must ~~mainly~~ make allowance ~~in~~ the desires of the
Fuehrer voiced to the Commander in Chief of the Navy on 13 August,
and a directive to the Luftwaffe for the preparation of a base in
North Norway ~~which~~ had the Fuehrer already discussed with the Commander in
Chief of the Luftwaffe.

(.....)

15 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 15 August 1940

Owing to bad weather the Second and Third Air Fleets did not carry out their operations scheduled to be conducted in the morning. The Reichsmarschall decided at 12:00 hours that the air fleets were to commit, according to weather conditions, their units in a concentrated effort protected by strong fighter forces or in missions flown by single aircraft. Therefore, the Second Air Fleet conducted concentrated attacks carried out by units of ^{about} group strength against the airfields of Dover and Manston in the afternoon, while the Third Air Fleet ~~had~~ committed single aircraft to attack airfields, port, industrial, and radio transmitting installations as well as ~~maxx~~ public utilities and camps in its area of attack. At 19:00 hours, the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe issued a directive to the effect that on 15 August attacks should be carried out by single aircraft or by whole units according to weather conditions. The attacking units should be protected by strong fighter forces. The Reichsmarschall will order the simultaneous commitment of both air fleets provided the weather conditions will permit such an operation. ^VThe Fifth Air Fleet was given permission to commit its forces operationally.

In the afternoon of 15 August, ~~in the afternoon of 15~~

THIS PAGE DECLASSIFIED IAW EO12958

- 48 -

A total force of 91 bomber and 398 single and twin-engine fighter aircraft was committed on 14 August and during the night of 14/15 August. The enemy losses amounted to 18 aircraft and 7 barrage balloons, while the friendly forces lost 16 aircraft.

The Armistice Commission submits a compilation of ~~the aspirations~~ information

on the aspirations of the French General de Gaulle. The information gives the following picture:

After certain initial success resulting from intensive British propaganda the action of ~~the~~ General de Gaulle seemed to have lost a lot of popular appeal. His influence in the French colonies is negligible at the present time. No politicians of high standing have placed themselves at his disposal ~~joined him~~ so far. He admittedly has under his command weak ground forces (2000 to 3000 men in England and small forces defected from Syria to Palestine according to a report of the German Embassy in Madrid), moreover weak naval forces (consisting of the obsolete battleships "Paris" and "Courbet" and some modern light units the exact number of which is not exactly known) and negligible air forces (the number of aircraft and pilots is not known), but these forces are too weak to be considered as a considerable reinforcement of the British war effort.

The Armistice Commission gives two reasons for the negligible successes achieved by the movement of de Gaulle:

On one hand the great war fatigue and the loss of self-confidence

- 49 -

of the French armed forces also outside the homeland, on the other hand the prestige of ~~the~~ Marshal Pétain and General Weygand. It would be possible that de Gaulle's ~~successor~~'s popularity might be greater with the nationalist French circles had ~~it~~ not been identified as treason towards ~~the~~ two military leaders who were so high in public esteem.

(.....)

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff communicates to the Chief of the National Defense Branch the following decision taken by the Fuehrer today:

- 1.) The orders issued by the Fuehrer yesterday in respect to operation "Seeloewe" should be summarized in an outline for a directive (see 14 August).
- 2.) As regards the Italian desires in respect to an attack on Yugoslavia, (see under 14 August), the Fuehrer is not interested in such an operation. He wants quietness at the southern frontier of Germany and warns against giving the British any opportunity to establish themselves in Yugoslavia with their air forces. For this reason, German-Italian General Staff conferences would be superfluous. The data on the Yugoslavian fortifications at the German frontier which had been submitted by the Army High Command should not be handed over to the Italians.

- 50 -

3.) The air war against England must not be broken off but should be

continued utilizing weather conditions.

4.) (.....)

5.) (.....)

The Chief of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence is informed

of the decision of the Fuehrer regarding Yugoslavia (.....).

The order of the Fuehrer for the continuation of the air war is

forwarded by Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch to

the Luftwaffe Operations Staff.

17 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staf

National Defense Branch, 17 Au

gust 1940

At 09:00 hours, the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command holds a confe

rence with the Chief of the Economic and Armament Office, the Chief of

Commander of the
Staff of the ~~Replacement~~ Replacement Army, and the Chief of Group II

of the National Defense Branch, Lieutenant Colonel Muench, on the ad-

justment of the armament to the strength of 180 divisions^{up} to which the

wartime army is to be brought. The results of the conference are con-

tained in the notes of the Chief of Group II of the National Defense

Branch, dated 18 August. The most important results are that:

1.) in the field of ammunitions production the ~~consumption~~ expenditure of ammu-

nitions

- 51 -

during the period from 10 May to 20 June plus 10 per cent of that amount to cover production shortcomings that might occur should be established as monthly wartime capacity and that an amount of twelve times the expenditure plus ~~the~~ first issue should be kept as reserve stock,

2.) the production of antiaircraft ammunition for the Luftwaffe is to be increased from 400 000 to 1 000 000 ~~rounds~~ shells per month,

3.) the submarine program ~~Kriegsmarine~~ is to be continued without any limitation by a target date,

4.) top priority in the overall program should be given to very small group of ~~important~~ branches production ~~including~~ such as submarine construction, ^atorpedo tubes, the construction of those aircraft types which suffered most losses, and the construction of Mark III and Mark IV tanks including guns.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command approved the production

of arms and military equipment, especially tanks - not including ammunition, however, - in Holland, Belgium, and in the occupied territory of France. However, the production should be limited to the manufacture of individual parts as far as possible.

According to a directive of the Wehrmacht High Command/General Army Office (2763/40g) of 17 August the following classes of ~~newcomers~~ personnel will be called up for active duty ~~beginning next October~~ 1940 for a term of two years:

- 52 -

- 1.) The replacement reserves of Class I of the age classes 1919 (last third) and 1920 (about 90 000 plus 417 000 men).
- 2.) The replacement reserves of Class I of the age classes 1914 to 1919 (first and second thirds) available on 1 October.
- 3.) Wartime volunteers and long-term soldiers who had volunteered for service of the age classes mentioned first and of younger age classes.

20 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/ Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

20 August 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief

of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff the operational plan drawn up by

the National Defense Branch for the attack on Gibraltar. This plan
basic material
is to be used as ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ for

1.) Military agreements with Spain, and for

2.) use by the German commander who is to command the Gibraltar for-

ces and is to be committed after a clear basis for action has
been established by ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ agreement with Spain.

According to the attached note prepared for the verbal report
the Chief of the National Defense Branch places particular empha-
sis on the following facts: During the German-Spanish conferences ~~in~~

- 53 -

conducted so far the Spanish appeared to ~~have inclined~~ favor the idea of being pushed into the war by Germany. The Spanish intended to react on a German air attack against Gibraltar initially with a formal protest which, however, was to be followed by ~~an~~ combined offensive action.

Such a solution would not correspond to the German interests. Germany would thus deliver cheap propaganda material to her enemies ~~noway~~ including the United States and appear in the role of a peace breaker even in the eyes of wide circles of the Spanish people. On this ground, it should be demanded that Spain would overtly side with Germany from the very outset of the operation.

Moreover, the attempt should be made to have Spain ~~hasten~~ deepen its relations with Portugal to such an extent that the British would not obtain any naval base in that country after the loss of Gibraltar and that Portugal would, if necessary call for Spanish help.

Material from captured French equipment could be offered to the Spanish as an immediate German compensation.

Italy whose participation in the action cannot be availed because of her important position in the Mediterranean must already be invited to take part in the preliminary political talks. This is especially so whenever the Spanish war objectives in North Africa ~~are~~ discussed.

- 54 -

(.....)

Defense

Moreover, the Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff a map showing the ~~exact~~ location of the coastal battery position at the Channel coast. He suggests the participation of these batteries in the action against England whenever the air operations against England have reached a climax and the propagandistic exploitation of the psychological effect which can be expected of such participation. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff agrees to this suggestion.

In this connection, the Chief of the National Defense Branch points out that the ~~anti~~ anti-British propaganda still raises excessive hope in public by ~~mentioning~~ mentioning a retaliatory battle over and over again. Instead, the air operations conducted at the present time should be identified as this retaliatory action by the propaganda. As regards this question, the Chief of the National Defense Branch declares that he will submit a written ~~suggestion~~ report containing, in addition, further suggestions in the field of propaganda.

21 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command,

Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch,

21 August 1940

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff communicates to the Chief of the National Defense Branch ~~new~~ ideas expressed by the

- 55 -

Fuehrer on 20 August. These ideas are to be communicated to the

Commander in Chief of the Army who is to give his opinion on them
during his verbal report scheduled to take place ~~xxxxx~~ ^{one} of these
days.

1.) The Fuehrer wants to have a mountain division again be ~~xxx~~
transferred into the area of Drontheim to take the place of the
2nd Mountain Division. It had been reported to him that trans-
port space for such a transfer would be available only if the
operation "Seeloewe" would be called off.

2.) The Fuehrer thinks it necessary ~~to have the consideration~~
~~of~~
~~x German support~~ ^{for} an Italian offensive against
the provision of
the Suez-Canal, ~~to~~ ^{including} a mixed armored
brigade (not an armored corps) should be considered. This ar-
mored brigade should be equipped with all modern ~~xxxxxx~~
arms.

Prior to discussing this question with the Italians; the Com-
mander in Chief of the Army should submit a suggestion regard-
ing the composition, equipment, and supply of such unit.

This suggestion should make allowance for the allocation of
modern types of offensive and antitank armament and ~~xxxxxx~~
give the date by which ~~xxxxxx~~ the armored unit could
be detached.

3.) The Fuehrer pointed out that arming the Baltic Sea coast ^{with batteries} was
urgent already now. The Navy is requested to submit an opinion
on the date and extent of such measure.

- 56 -

4.) For political reasons the Fuehrer is in favor of the transfer of an armored unit to East Prussia already at the present time.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff points out the necessity to lift the limitations hitherto imposed on the air and naval operations against England after the total blockade of the British Isles was announced on 17 August. He ~~directed~~ that a corresponding directive be submitted
(.....)

According to
RAF report of the Military Attaché in Rom dated 16 August
(No. 136/40 Top Military Secret) which forwarded by the Foreign Group/
Counter Intelligence the primary war objective of Italy is ~~to extend~~
with
ment of the mastery of the Mediterranean. Her territorial claims ~~are~~
respect to pertain
~~existing~~ France ~~from~~ to Nice, Corse, Tunisia, a part of Algeria with
at Constantine
its ore deposits, and French Somaliland. In addition, the predominant
position in the Near East is desired. Further Italian war objectives
pertain to the Balkans. In the future, the Adriatic Sea should be ruled
entirely by Italy and the Italian sphere of influence in the Balkans
should be expanded. For this purpose, the destruction of Yugoslavia,
the ~~possible~~ creation of an independent Croatia subjected to Italian in-
fluence, and
the extension of Albania by annexation of ~~territory~~ South Yugoslav-
ian areas inhabited by Albanians as well as of such areas hitherto
belonging to Greece and of Corfu and of perhaps some of the Ionic is-
lands ~~are~~ considered necessary.

- 57 -

The situation at the Yugoslavian frontier has been so tense for several weeks that border incidents even of a grave nature can occur reproached with at any time. Greece is ~~misusing~~ providing support to British war and merchant ships. Such reproaches are absolutely baseless. Now, ~~terror~~ terror acts against irredentists are manufactured and Greek consuls are expelled from Italy. In brief, an atmosphere is created which can be brought to an explosion before long. No military preparations directed against Greece have been observed yet. On the other hand, the Duce demanded that preparatory measures for military action against Yugoslavia be rapidly taken, so that he would not have to miss^a again a good political opportunity as had been the case in June at the French front.

22 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 21 August 1940

In the morning, the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff, Generalmajor von Greiffenberg, calls on the Chief of the National Defense Branch in the train "Atlas" and requests the decision of the Wehrmacht High Command on the transport space to be provided by the Navy during the operation "Seeloewe" for the "green movement" (landing operation in the Bay of Brighton launched from Le Havre).

- 58 -

For this purpose, the Navy has planned to provide 25 Steamers in addition to the 200 motor boats and 100 coastal motor-sailing vessels by means of which the two regimental combat groups were to be transported. However, the Army would need 70 steamers for the transportation of the four divisions (8th, 28th, 6th Mountain Divisions, and 30th Division) stationed in the area ~~of~~ around Le Havre. The Navy bluntly rejected this demand claiming that ~~adequate~~ protection of such a strong transportation movement could not be provided and the loss of the steamships would endanger the overall movement.

On the other hand, it would be impossible for the Army to ship the major part of the divisions stationed in the area around Le Havre to the Dutch ports as planned by the Navy, since such action would involve further major transport movements and it would in such case be impossible to exercise operational control over these divisions on this as well as on the other side of the Channel.

A meeting with the ~~the~~ conference ~~xxviii~~ Chief of the Operations Branch of the Luftwaffe General Staff on the participation of the Luftwaffe in the operation resulted in the decision that the Luftwaffe will in the initial stage of the operation play the role of the artillery by raiding ~~the~~ British positions and the British communications in the rear. In addition, the Luftwaffe will commit the parachute forces of the 7th Air Division. Small elements of these forces will be committed on the hills north of Dover while the major part of them will operate in the area of Brighton.

- 59 -

The details of the parachute jumping action still have to be examined. It would be the mission of the parachute forces to facilitate the landing of the ground forces at the previously mentioned points. In the area of Dover, the right flank of the overall operation would have to be protected while in the area of Brighton the forces would have to push forward to the North in coordinated action with the landed Army forces.

After the discussions about the operation "Seeloewe" the Chief of the National Defense Branch confers with General von Greiffenberg on the regrouping of the Army forces in Norway and on the desires of forwarded Wehrmacht the Fuehrer ~~submitted~~ by the Chief of ~~the~~ Operations Staff on 21 August. Only those desires regarding the Army were discussed, (see letter of the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff of 21 August, items 1, 2, and 4). Moreover, he lets him know that the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command has permitted the Army High Command ~~to have the long-range artillery stationed at the Channel coast fire whenever the air operations against England have reached a climax.~~

Following his conference with General von Greiffenberg the Chief of the National Defense Branch makes a new attempt to mediate between the controversial views of the Army and Navy High Commands on the problem of the transport space to be provided by the Navy for the "green movement".

- 60 -

This mediation attempt is based on the basic idea that, according to the will of the Fuehrer, the operation "Seelöwe" is to be carried out only if especially favorable conditions right before the beginning of the operation would offer a safe prospect for success.

If such conditions exist, the risk run by the Navy during the "green movement" can be considered as reduced. Under such circumstances, the Navy should be able to provide sufficient shipping space at and near Le Havre for the transportation of combat-efficient units from there to the Bay of Brighton. The forward echelons of the four divisions stationed in the area around Le Havre are primarily taken into consideration in this connection. The rear echelons of these divisions and further divisions which might be employed, however, would have to transferred to more suitable jump-off bases either as early as during the period of preparation or after the beginning of the operation as soon as a clear picture can be formed of the situation.

On the basis of this concept, the Navy can, by continual conferences in the course of the day, be made to concede that 50 steamships should be employed at Le Havre. 25 of them are to move directly towards the British coast in the framework of the landing operation of the motor-boats, provided weather conditions permit such action, while the remaining 25 steamers are to move initially off the French coast in north-eastern direction. Later, they are

- 61 -

they to move at the left wing of the "blue movement" (transport

movement from Dunkirk - Boulogne to Folkestone - Beachy Head).

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch,

Lieutenant Commander Junge, and the Liaison Officer of the Army

High Command with the Naval Operations Staff, Colonel von Witzle-

ben, report jointly, in the afternoon of 22 August, the previously

quoted result of their conferences with the Naval Operations Staff

as a mutual agreement which, however, is still subject to the ap-

proval by the Commander in Chief of the Navy.

reports

The Chief of the National Defense Branch thereupon ~~examines~~

him by telephone ~~telephones~~ to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operation

Staff on this mediation attempt and at the same time on the agree-

ments arrived at by the Army and the Luftwaffe.

23 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 23 August 1940

In the morning, the Chief of the Naval Staff, Konter-admiral Fricke, reports by telephone to the Chief of the National

Defense Branch that the Navy ~~will~~ will now continue its prepara-

tions for the operation "Seelowe" on the basis agreed upon by the

Liaison Officer of the Army and the Chief of Group I Navy of the

National Defense Branch in the afternoon of 22 August and which

was approved by the Commander in Chief of the Navy.

the National Defense

In the course of the day, the Chief of Naval Operations Branch
repeatedly attempted to find out whether the Commander in Chief of the
Army had definitely ~~agreed~~ approved this
by the Army accordingly. His attempts, however, brought no results,
since the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff,
General von Greiffenberg, had not yet arrived at Fontainebleau again.

24 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

23 August 1940

After the vain telephone calls the Chief of the National
Defense Branch
~~had~~ made yesterday, the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Army Ge-

neral Staff serves notice by telephone in the afternoon that the new

suggestions made by the Commander in Chief of the Navy for the conduct

of the "green movement" of the operation "Seeloewe" have not met the

approval of the Commander in Chief of the Army. On the contrary, the

Army High Command ~~maximally~~ maintains its demand that the major part of the four

divisions concentrated around Le Havre would also have to be shipped

across the Channel from this area. For this reason, General von Greif-

fenberg requests again the decision of the Wehrmacht High Command and

serves notice that the Commander in Chief of the Army intends to cla-

rify this question during his verbal report to the Fuehrer on 26 Au-
gust.

- 63 -

The Chief of the National Defense Branch points out again the
the general prerequisites for the conduct of the operation "Seeloewe"
which also the Army has to take into account in its demands. The inter-
ference of the British Navy, however, would have to be expected even
in the most favorable situation. If the 70 steamships demanded by the
for the transportation
Army ~~were exposed~~ of the forces from Le havre were exposed to this
danger, these ships would be missing later during the decisive "blue
movement" and the subsequent supply operations. The overall operation
would thus be jeopardized. Therefore, he himself is of the opinion
that any further reinforcement of the shipping space to be made avail-
able at Le Havre would be absolutely unadvisable. He is going to ad-
vise the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command accordingly.

The Chief of the Group I Army of the National Defense Branch sub-
mits a study on a landing in the Isle of Wight. In this study, the
conclusion is drawn that a single operation with this objective should
not be taken into consideration and that the capture of this island
preliminary
as a ~~first~~ step of the operation "Seeloewe" would be unfeasible becau-
se such action cannot be included in the time-schedule any more.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff serves notice that the
Fuehrer has approved the study on the capture of Gibraltar and that
expressed intention
General Franco ~~voiced~~ the ~~opinion~~ in political discussions with the
German ambassador in Madrid, Mr. Stohrer, to enter the war provided
Germany will give military support and supply fuel as well as grain.

- 64 -

25 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 25 August

1940

In the morning, the Chief of the Naval Staff communicates by telephone to the Chief of the National Defense Branch that he has also been informed on the disapproval of the latest suggestions of the Navy by the Army High Command. These suggestions were made in relation to the shipping space to be provided for the "green movement". He urgently requests the decision of the Wehrmacht High Command.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch replies that the Navy should continue its preparations on the basis of the agreement arrived at on 22 August and that it can be expected that the Fuehrer will make a decision in this sense at the occasion of the verbal report of the Commander in Chief of the Army on 26 August. The Navy High Command will be informed on the decision of the Fuehrer immediately.

26 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 25 August

1940

Following the verbal report of the Commander in Chief of the Army the Fuehrer takes the following decision:

During the operation "Seelowe", the operations conducted by the Army will have to be adjusted to the existing facts in respect to the shipping space available and to the possibilities of providing cover for the embarkation and the crossing action. Therefore, the Army forces intended for the crossing including the antiaircraft artillery units provided by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe must be regrouped in such a manner that the embarkation can be carried out at Rotterdam and ~~known~~ Antwerp on a scale planned by the Navy and that only 25 steamers, in addition to motor-boats and coastal motor-sailing vessels, would ~~have~~ be needed for a single direct trip from Le Havre to Landing Area E (Bay of Brighton), for which an especially favorable enemy situation would be the prerequisite. Further 25 steamships, also loaded at Le Havre, will be directed along the French coast into the area south of Boulogne and from there into the Landing Area D (Hastings - Eastbourne). The sea situation permitting, these 25 steamers should then move along the British coast also into the Landing Area E.

The Army High Command is to prepare a survey of the planned disposition of forces on the basis of this decision. This survey is to present a picture of the course of the movements and the objectives of the landing operation in respect to the different units, sectors, and to the time-schedule. The Fuehrer will not yet decide on the time when the operation "Seelowe" is to be launched.

Moreover, the Fuehrer issues the following directives:

- 1.) Since, according to a report of the Commander in Chief of the Army no mountain division is at present available for transfer into the area around Trondheim (see 21 August), the Army High Command is to examine whether, by applying the same method used in activating new units in the zone of the interior, a further division could be organized from the divisions stationed in Norway and could be provided with mountain equipment.
- 2.) The forces stationed at present in the Government General will be further reinforced immediately. For this purpose, about 10 ~~more~~ divisions are to be transferred to the East without considerably impairing the ~~necessary~~ transportation activities if necessary for the economy. In addition, about two armored divisions should be transferred to the south-eastern sector of the Government General after their equipment has been reconditioned in the zone of the interior. These new forces to be moved in are to be accommodated in a manner insuring that, if necessary, the forces can rapidly act to protect the oil area of Rumania.

These decisions and directives of the Fuehrer will be communicated in writing to the Commanders in Chief of the three branches of the Wehrmacht on 27 August.

(.....)

- 67 -

The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command a note to be used for a verbal report. In this note, the differences between the ~~protection~~ of the Army and the Navy for the operation "Seeloewe" are clearly pointed out and the necessity of early decisions is emphasized. It is suggested that the measures to be taken by the Army be adjusted to the potentialities of the Navy in respect to the crossing operation. In addition, the Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command documentary material for the planned activation of new divisions to bring the Army to a total strength of 180 divisions.

During the subsequent verbal report of the Commander in Chief of the Army to the Fuehrer the latter takes his decision regarding the operation "Seeloewe" ~~involving~~ the suggestion submitted by the Wehrmacht High Command (see Directive of 26 August, ~~the~~ Paragraph I). By and large, the Fuehrer approves the organizational plan of the Army. A written summary of the directives will not be issued until later.

(.....)

29 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 26 August 1940

- 68 -

(.....)

At noon, the ~~xxx~~ negotiations of the Reich's Foreign Minister and Count Ciano with the Hungarian and Rumanian delegations begin in Vienna.

(.....)

On 28 August and during the night of 28/29 August the Luftwaffe committed a total strength of 400 bomber and 576 fighter aircraft against England. Among other raids, 722 demolition and 6840 incendiary bombs were dropped on Liverpool and Birkenhead during the night. The score of hits could ~~xxx~~, however, not be exactly observed owing to ~~xxx~~ bad visibility. ~~xxx~~. The losses of the friendly forces amounted to 12 those of the enemy to about 43 aircraft. During the night of 28/29 August, British bomber aircraft raided Greater Berlin for the first time. great 8 demolition and a number of incendiary bombs were dropped. The major part of these bombs was dropped on residential areas near the Goerlitz-railroad station. 8 civilians were killed, 21 were heavily and 7 were slightly wounded.

As a result of the air raid on Greater Berlin, the Fuehrer decides to return to Berlin immediately.

The train "Atlas" leaves Salzburg at 20:45 hours and arrives at the station of Grunewald on 30 August at about 10:00 hours.

(.....)

- 69 -

30 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch/ 30 Au-

gust 1940

(.....)

After the conference, the Chief of the National Defense

Branch reports to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff that

according to information obtained sofar the decision on the conduct of

the operation "Seelowe" ~~now~~ will have to be taken by the Fuehrer about

8 to 10 days prior to the beginning of the operation. The Chief of the

Wehrmacht Operations Staff orders to prepare a time-schedule on this ba-

basis. He adds that in view of the present conditions in the air war

against England the Fuehrer does not yet feel that the ~~time-dimensional prerequisites~~

for ~~and~~ the operation "Seelowe" (Gaining of the air supremacy) have been

brought about. He expressed the intention not to decide on the conduct

of the operation until about 19 September.

In this connection, Colonel Heusinger points out again the

view taken by the Chief of the Army General Staff that an operation

of the Army on the scale planned originally would not be feasible

reached on the small basis now ordered. The only objective to be ~~maximally~~ could

be to strike the coup de grace to an enemy battered down by the air

war. Any failure of the operation must be ruled out, since the former

would entail an unacceptable setback in respect to the overall success

achieved in the war so-far.

- 70 -

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff fully agrees to this

view which he has taken himself and calls the attention to the other
means
~~which~~ which might be used to achieve the same objective, the defeat
of England.

(.....)

After the conclusion of the conferences with Colonel Heusinger
the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff notifies the Chief of the
National Defense Branch ~~who is in command~~ upon the latter's inquiry
about the further intentions in respect to the continuation of the air war against England
that the Fuehrer now wants to have ~~concentrated~~ retaliatory attacks
carried out by concentrated against London whenever weather conditions permit such action.

(.....)

2 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Ope-
rations Staff/National Defen-
se Branch, 2 September 1940

The report of the Army High Command (Operations Branch
of the Army General Staff) which was requested by the directive of
the Wehrmacht High Command of 27 August arrives at this headquarters.

This report covers the intended organization of the forces which are
to cross the Channel during the operation "Seelowe" and the probable
time-schedule of the crossing operation.

According to this report, 5 corps staffs with 10 divi-
sions

- 71 -

have
including rear echelons and corps troops could be landed in full
strength by the evening of S-day plus 16 days and about 16 ~~more~~ divi-
sions could be shipped across the Channel in the course of four weeks.

discusses
In the afternoon, the Chief of the National Defense Branch ~~reports~~
with
~~to~~ the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff the report of the Army
submits to
High Command (see above) which arrived today. He ~~sends~~ the latter a
request of the Army High Command to extend the theater of operations
in the West to include the Dutch provinces of Zeeland, Zuid-Holland,
and Noord-Brabant west and including the railroad line Neerpelt - Gel-
dermalsen. The extension should be effected in view of the operation
"Seeloewe".

(.....)

Moreover, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff serves no-
tice that the Fuehrer agrees to the opinion expressed by the Chief of
Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch in his note of 26 August
on the ratio of strength between the German-Italian and the British
fleets and on the possibilities of ~~a~~ combined German-Italian naval
warfare.

Before this concept can be realized, the planned operations
against Gibraltar and Egypt have to be carried out. These operations
thus gain in importance.

- 72 -

The economic demands Spain raised as a condition for her entry into the war should be no obstacle to the conduct of the attack on ~~military~~ Gibraltar. They would best be fulfilled by a victory. ~~and yet the same~~
~~and so far as~~ (.....)

From 3 September to 4 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehr-

macht High Command/

Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense

Branch, 3 and 4 Sep-

tember 1940

(.....)

The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the

Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff suggestions for the ~~inform~~

instruction of the German military ~~attaches~~ and air attachés in

Washington on the air war against and the landing in England to

enable them to counteract the American propaganda.

(.....)

5 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/

National Defense Branch, 5 Septembe

1940

(.....)

On 6 September, the Commander in Chief of the Navy informs

- 73 -

the Fuehrer on the progress sofar made in the preparation for the
operation "Seeloewe" and reports to him that the preparations are
conducted according to plan as far as the Navy is concerned. At
this occasion, he explains again that the Navy will most probably
be able to accomplish the missions assigned to it, provided the air
supremacy will have been gained.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the
Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff an outline of a time-sche-
dule which is now forwarded to the high commands of the branches of
the Wehrmacht for consideration and completion. In this connection,
the Chief of the National Defense Branch particularly points out
the necessity of combining the Fuehrer Headquarters and the head-
quarters of the commanders in chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht.
According
as soon as the warning order has been issued. ~~returning~~ to a state-
ment of the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, "Muehle" (Zie-
genberg) and "Gisela" (Giessen) are to be taken into consideration
for this purpose as it has been planned sofar.

Furthermore, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
serves notice that the Fuehrer expressed, in a conference with the
Commander in Chief of the Navy, the intention to restore the situa-
tion in the Mediterranean during the winter in case the operation
"Seeloewe" would have to be called off. The Fuehrer mentioned, for
the first time that also the Azores, the Canary, and the Cape Verde
Islands would have to be captured in time by German-Italian forces

- 74 -

to prevent the British and later also the Americans from establishing themselves on these islands. The National Defense Branch is to compile the data necessary for such action.

(.....)

The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff a new outline of a consummate order of the Wehrmacht High Command for the expansion of the wartime Army to a strength of 180 divisions. This ~~expansion~~ ^{order was} previously approved by the General Army Office.

6 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 6 Septem

ber 1940

(.....)

reference
With regard to the directive of the Wehrmacht High Command (Wehrmacht Operations Staff, National Defense Branch, Group IIa 2119/40, Secret, dated 24 August) according to which the distribution of the recruits to be drafted and belonging to the age classes 1919 (last thirteen and 1920 among the three branches of the Wehrmacht and the Armed SS is to be based on the strength of the wartime Wehrmacht of 1 May 1941, the General Army Office (2883/40, Secret, dated 3 September) submits a note designed for use in a verbal report on the induction of the recruits into the Wehrmacht in the autumn of 1940. This note is to be

- 75 -

forwarded to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command.

wartime

As of 1 May 1941, the Wehrmacht will have a total strength of

6 763 000 men. The Army will have a strength of 4 900 000 men which

is 72,5 per cent, the Navy 298 000 men which is 4,4 per cent, the

Luftwaffe 1 485 000 men which is 22 per cent, and the Armed SS 80 000

men which is 1,1 percent.

(.....)

10 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Branch
Staff/National Defense Staff ,

10 September 1940

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff informs the

Chief of the National Defense Branch at the occasion of the latter's

verbal report in the afternoon that, as a result of the verbal report

of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Fuehrer decided in

issue the beginning of the
the morning ~~xxxx~~ not to order the operation "Seelowe" ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~
for

at the earliest possible date (11 September), since the results of the

intensified air war against England cannot yet be adequately assessed

day (24 September)

The most favorable ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~ rather than the earliest possible

day (21 September) should be taken into consideration for the landing

A postponement of the warning order would not have as grave conse-

quences as the postponement of the final order on S-day minus 3 days.

Any postponement of the latter would offer the enemy time for clea-

ring

the obstacles laid by the Navy at the flanks in the exits of the Channel from S-day minus 10 days on. Any postponement of the issuance of the final order would adversely affect the mine-laying operations in the waters used ~~in~~ ^{for} the crossing anf the Luftwaffe operations, ~~now~~ since from S-day minus 10 days on the antiaircraft artillery provided for the operation would have to move out of its present positions and would thus be unable to serve also other purposes.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch hands the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff the basic directive ~~prepared~~ for the operation "Seeloewe" prepared by the National Defense Branch in cooperation with the high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht (No. 18). This directive is to be issued on S-day minus 10 days. Now, however, this directive is merely received by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff because of the postponement of the warning order.

Subsequently, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff discusses with the Chief of the National Defense Branch and the Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch the question of the commitment and the control of the air reconnaissance units of the Commander in Chief of the Navy. This discussion takes place as a result of a letter of the Naval Staff which was submitted to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff by the Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch today.

In this letter, the Naval Staff, referring to the preparation and conduct of the operation "Seeloewe" and the planned diversion operations "Hipper" and "Herbstreise" (autumn trip), raises the following demands regarding the commitment and the control of the air reconnaissance units of the Commander in Chief of the Navy:

- 1.) To have the reconnaissance operations over the North Sea, the Arctic Ocean, and the North Atlantic up to a line including the Orkney Islands and leading along the east coast of England, at a distance of 60 sea miles from the coast, up to the 53rd latitudinal degree conducted by the Navy Group Command North which is to employ the reconnaissance forces of the Commander of the Air Forces. The 506th Coast Air Group should be reassigned to the latter for this purpose. This group had been assigned to the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, subject to recall, at the occasion of the "Weser maneuver.
- 2.) To have the reconnaissance operations over the sea area south of the line Cape Clear - Land's End, over the Bay of Biscay and the sea area west of the latter conducted by the Navy Group Command West and to reinforce, for this purpose, the 606th Coast Air Group stationed at Brest by the Long-Range Reconnaissance Squadron 2/106 at present committed in sea rescue operations in the Channel area.
- 3.) To have the reconnaissance operations over the naval bases at the

- 78 -

north and west coast of England, over the 60-sea-mile strip along the east coast as well as over the sea areas of the Saint George's Channel, the Irish Sea, and the North Channel conducted by the reconnaissance forces of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe.

The reasons given by the Naval Staff for these demands are that the reconnaissance over the previously mentioned sea areas is of particular importance for the conduct of the planned diversion operations and, on the other hand, for the operations conducted ~~from~~ by submarines and naval surface forces from bases in West France against the enemy merchant marine and that the conduct and control of these reconnaissance operations must be assigned to those groups responsible for the sea warfare in these areas.

In contrast to this view, the Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch upholds the view of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe who claims that the intensified air war against England necessitates the concentration of all air units available for this purpose under the command of the Luftwaffe High Command to have these units committed according to a uniform plan. In particular the air reconnaissance over England and the ~~surrounding~~ surrounding sea areas should be directed by the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe to avoid that

- 79 -

the reconnaissance missions overlap each other and efficient reconnaissance forces lay idle.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch suggests ~~the adherence~~ that the

present ~~existing~~ system of assigning air reconnaissance units to the Com-

mander in Chief of the Navy be ~~disregarded~~ adhered to on principle. The over-

all air reconnaissance should ~~not~~ be placed under the control

of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe once for all, however

the assignment of the units should be governed by the respective circumstances.

(.....)

14 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations 7

Staff/National Defense Branch,

14 September 1940

informs
The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff ~~tells~~ the

Chief of the National Defense Branch during the verbal report

given by the latter in the afternoon that the Fuehrer took, du-

ring the conference with the commanders in chief of the branches

of the Wehrmacht today, the decision to further postpone the be-

ginning of the operation "Seelöwe". A new decision will be ta-

ken on 17 September. The preparations will be continued.

Moreover, the Fuehrer ordered the Luftwaffe to operate

against the British long-range batteries firing at the French

- 80 -

coast

~~XXXXXX~~. These operations of the Luftwaffe should be started as soon as the necessary preparations are complete. The air attacks against London are to be further directed primarily against ~~XXXXXX~~ targets important for the war effort and vital to the large city including the railroad stations. The areas of attack will be extended. Terror attacks against pure residential areas should be reserved as a last means of pressure and not yet be conducted.

Upon the inquiry of the Chief of the National Defense

Branch about the probable further development the Chief of the

Wehrmacht Operations Staff declares that the Fuehrer seemed to

have taken, as early as on 13 September, the decision to call off entirely the operation "Seelöwe" but then made up his mind to postpone the operation. This means in no way that the Fuehrer intends to force the operation ~~XXXXXX~~ unless the prerequisite for its conduct, the air supremacy, has been achieved. On the contrary any crossing of the Channel should be taken into consideration ~~XXXXXX~~ only to strike the coup de grâce at England already heavily battered by air attacks. Apart from this possibility, however, the moral pressure on the British should be further intensified by the continuation of the preparations. On the other hand, the withdrawal even of small elements of the shipping space concentrated in the Channel ports cannot be concealed and would thus reduce the psychological effect of the air war.

- 81 -

A far more important secondary result of the concentration of forces for the operation "Seelöwe" is the fact that the British air forces are attracted by this concentration to the Channel ports and would thus be exposed to attacks by friendly fighter aircraft under conditions favorable for the latter. After all, the commitment of the bomber units against the Channel ports necessarily reduce the enemy night operations over Germany, which will have a favorable effect on the moral of the German population.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff cautions that shipping space that might no longer be needed must soon be placed at the disposal of the Group XXI to reinforce the supply of Norway and that ample use should be made of the transport space ~~of~~ ^{provided by} the ships returning from the Channel ports.

As a result of a suggestion made by the Chief of the National Defense Branch, the stipulation that the measures necessary for counter espionage and deception purposes are to be intensified, is included in the outline of an order which was prepared by the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and is to make known the new decisions of the Fuehrer to the branches of the Wehrmacht.

(.....)

19 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

19 September 1940

The Fuehrer has ordered:

- 1.) The concentration movements of the transport fleet which have not yet been completed will be stopped.
- 2.) The concentrations of ships in the launching ports will be dispersed to reduce losses of shipping space due to enemy air attacks to a minimum. This dispersion will be effected in a manner insuring that the period of S-day minus 10 days will remain sufficient for re-concentrating the shipping space in due time in the launching bases provided weather conditions are favorable for such action.
- 3.) The 10 steamships of the Norway route intended for employment in the operation "Herbstreise" (autumn trip) will be reassigned their usual missions until further orders and 6 further steamships intended for employment in the operation "Seelöwe" will be withdrawn in phases and inconspicuously and will be employed to speed up the supply of the Group XXI until further notice.
- 4.) The antiaircraft defenses in the launching bases will be strengthened to the utmost possible extent.

The high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht will be informed correspondingly by a directive of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command.

(.....)

23 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

- 83 -

National Defense Branch, 23

September 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff ~~Kreisau~~ a report on the trip he took from 18 to 21 September to the Netherlands, Belgium, and North France.

It was the purpose of the trip to get an immediate impression of the progress of the preparations for the operation "Seelöwe" and of the success of the air war. He visited the Wehrmacht Commander Netherlands in Den Haag, the Sixteenth Army Headquarters in Tourcoing, the command post of the Second Air Fleet near Calais, as well as the Ninth Army Headquarters in Limesy north of Rouen and inspected the ports of Rotterdam, Antwerp, Calais, Boulogne, and Le Havre.

The preparations for the operation "Seelöwe" have not yet been completed which applies also to those measures not impaired by enemy interference. This is the consequence of belated decisions on numerous questions ~~involving~~ branches of the Wehrmacht. The Army High Command has put up with the restrictions imposed on its original plan. The Sixteenth and Ninth Armies conduct intensive training and exercises in preparation for the operation "Seelöwe" in the course of which, however, the training in various landing maneuvers was sometimes still in its initial stage. The staffs of both armies in the zone of the interior have been established in the planned form.

- 84 -

inspected
In the ports, there were heavy concentrations of ships and barges. Sometimes, ships and barges were accommodated in sections of the ports which were not covered against observation and sabotage by the local inhabitants. In nearby warehouses, large quantities of ammunition and other Wehrmacht equipment were often stored. Only parts of this material was actually intended for use in the operation "Seelöwe". To avoid further losses it would be necessary to disperse these concentrations which would be possible in most of the ports.

If the conduct of the operation is still actually taken into consideration, the further preparations for the transportation of the material and the troops should be adjusted to the dispersed anchorages, since any reconcentration of the shipping space for embarkation purposes would involve the same danger for the ships as well as for the troops and the equipment. The time-schedule hitherto planned for embarkation, beginning of the movements, and readiness for immediate action should be reconsidered, since in Antwerp, for instance, the beginning of the embarkation had been ~~xx~~, because of the small number of tow-boats available as well as of the sluice and navigable water conditions, scheduled to take place as early as 6 days prior to S-day and the beginning ~~xx~~ marking ~~xx~~ marks for put out to sea had been set ~~xx~~ 4 days prior to S-day. The population of the harbor cities suffers from the air raids provoked by the concentrations of shipping space even though the antiaircraft artillery ~~xx~~ defenses were designated as sufficient by the commands staffs.

It had not been until 19 September, which had been only two days before the earliest possible target date for the landing, that the Second Air Fleet had held basic conferences on the commitment of the VIII Air Corps and on numerous other questions. These conferences had been held with the Sixteenth Army and the 7th Air Division. The VIII Air Corps can support only both the corps of the Sixteenth Army at the front. Owing to the large extension of the front, which amounted to 30 kilometers, this air support can be provided only on a small scale. The neutralization of the flanks at Dover and Dungeness as well as the missions deep over enemy territory would have to be accomplished by other units.

In connection with this question, the Commanding General of the VIII Air Corps suggested that, if possible, only one army corps be shipped across the Channel in the initial stage to make it possible to provide stronger air support for this corps. The Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff who attended this conference agreed to this sug-

National Defense Branch
gestion, He (The Chief of the ~~Luftwaffe General Staff~~), however, pointed out that forces as strong as possible should be shipped with the first wave in view of the enemy fleet and the motion of the sea which cannot be foreseen and that the intervals necessarily caused by the commitment of the Luftwaffe would necessitate the shipping of combat-
efficient Army elements across the Channel ~~as early as~~ in the first operation.
~~as soon as the~~

- 86 -

After that, the suggestion made by General von Richthofen was not considered any more.

Furthermore, it was decided after a lengthy discussion that the smoke effect produced by air forces should be foregone in favor of an explosive effect. Excluded from this decision should be the reconnaissance squadrons which are to produce smoke screens over the Channel.

The major part of the 7th Air Division is to be committed ahead of the right wing of the Sixteenth Army on S-day at dawn in order to take the Downs. The remaining elements should be committed in the area of Folkestone on S-day plus 1 day.

The missions of providing close support to the Ninth Army would be assigned to the I Air Corps.

As regards the intensified air war against England, the airfields in the coastal area are excellently fitted out and camouflaged. The Commander in Chief of the Second Air Fleet and his Chief of Staff ~~squad~~ complained about the continuously bad weather which again and again necessitated the postponement of the commitment of strong units. Even now, difficulties seem to be encountered in the coordinated action of fighter and bomber units.

The Chief of Staff, Generalleutnant Speidel, made the following comment on the course the operations ~~had been~~ so far:

The outstanding feature of the initial phase was the destruction

of the enemy fighter force the strength and striking power of ~~XII~~ which was more and more reduced. When the air fleet intended to go over to a large-scale attack on London, ~~XXII~~ such action could at first not be obtained but was given only after repeated urgent requests. Then, however, weather conditions remained good for only one more day so that the attack could not be carried out in the planned form. This respite offered the British and matériel fighter a chance to draw personnel from all schools and aircraft not yet completely painted from the industry for operational employment. Consequently, the enemy fighter defenses were gradually reinforced again in the course of the following days. During this effort, the British recklessly committed fighter squadrons with poorly trained crews against the German bomber units. During these operations the enemy fighter aircraft repeatedly rammed the German ~~bomber~~ ~~method~~ aircraft as an ultimate ~~means~~ of combat. The German fighter aircraft however, were mostly attacked only by well-trained British fighters.

This development made it necessary to resume the combat operations against the enemy fighter aircraft a few days ~~ago~~, so that now, in the third phase of the air war, strong bomber units, even though mostly ~~at~~ night, and strong fighter forces are committed simultaneously. The friendly forces continued to feel considerably superior to the enemy and there was full confidence that the air

war could be further conducted with good success.

The number of enemy fighter aircraft is estimated at about 300.

This number is monthly increased by about 250 coming out of production. Regarding the number of the British bomber aircraft the opinions differ widely. The former air attache in London, General Wenninger, estimates this number at about 800 and ~~him~~ holds that the British have sofar limited the scope of their bomber action because they reserve the massed bomber commitment for the expected climax of the air war during a German landing. The Commander in Chief of the Second Air Fleet, however, doubts that such strong bomber forces actually exist.

The conferences with the Wehrmacht Commander Netherlands revealed that the cooperation with the Reich's Commissioner was satisfactory full respect and that mutual agreement existed in ~~respect~~ to decisive problems.

The accomodation of the units stationed in the Netherlands is unobjectionable, air raid protection for troops and airfields is insured.

The Dutch reconstruction service under the control of a special engineer staff of the Army is mainly employed for the ~~dismantling~~ of the former fortification lines of the Ijssel and Grabbe Rivers. The new water line will be preserved for the time being. Attempts to use, by employing improvised means, fortresses with their fronts towards the West, have been unsuccessful. The traffic conditions on the canals are well regulated; the road and railway traffic, however,

- 89 -

about
is still considerably impaired by the fact that up to the end of
exists
November only one single North-South communication across the bridge
of Moerdijk. The population complies with all orders and no organized
opposition is observed.

Everywhere, the troops are fully occupied with exercises, guard
duties, and other types of work. In conferences with line officers,
the question of
the privileges allegedly granted to the Armed SS and the problem of
the grave consequences of
the method employed in exempting individuals from military service
are repeatedly broached. The officers of a third-wave division said
it was incomprehensible that the SS-troops were equipped like a "wan-
dering armory" while the divisions of the third wave were still lackin
a lot of arms and were, for a great part, provided with old types of
weapons. Furthermore, it had been pointed out unmistakably that SS-
leaders who had never before served as a soldier and had not engaged
in combat even for a single day wore insignia of rank of the Wehrmacht
and ~~marked~~ were given titles usually connected with assignments in the
latter. The exemption from military service was considered the more
urgently
alarming the more young men were affected by it and the more ~~known~~
the troops desired to be sent home owing to lack of combat action.
For this reason, the suggestion that all young ~~men~~ age classes be sent
to the front or be engaged in training activities should be repeated.
The replacements for the industry should, on principle, be drawn from
the older age classes.

- 90 -

25 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 25 September 1940

In the afternoon,
~~Rommel~~ during his first verbal report after his

return from his trip ~~and~~ to the occupied western territories and a sub

sequent illness the Chief of the National Defense Branch asks the Chie

of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff for a general information on the mil

itary ~~situation~~ - political situation, particularly regarding the si

tuation in the Mediterranean and in West Africa. The Chief of the

Wehrmacht Operations Staff terms the overall situation unstable.

In particular, the numerous diplomatic talks held last week have not yet brought definite results.

The conferences with the Spanish Minister of the Interior, Serrano Suñer had brought satisfactory results. These conferences, which would however, mainly dealt with general political questions ~~and~~ result from Spain's participation in the war. As far as he knew, questions directly related to the combined warfare were not yet discussed. Consequently, the basis for a close military cooperation with Spain and Italy in the Mediterranean does not yet exist.

The conferences of the Reich's Foreign Minister in Rome were exclusively or, at least, mainly concerned with the imminent conclusion of the German-Italian-Japanese military and friendship treaty.

- 91 -

In addition, the questions of the warfare in the Mediterranean must, in view of the recent development, be considered in close connection with the events in West Africa (Dakar). He (the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff) has sofar availed himself of every opportunity in ~~cooperation~~ ^{concert} with the Chief of the National Defense Branch to convince the Fuehrer of the far-reaching possibilities involved in the exploitation ~~which would result from~~ of the common German and French interests regarding the warfare against England which the predominating ~~concern~~ was concern. While the Fuehrer in his decision to release French forces for the repulsion of British attacks against Dakar excluded, following the advice of the Reich's Foreign Minister, the French naval forces stationed at Toulon thus expressing his lack of faith in the French intentions, he now seems to begin to change his mind. It must be realized, however, that such a change of mind would involve a complete change of the the basic concepts on the further conduct and the objectives of the war. Above all, the difficulties should not be misjudged which would be caused by ~~by~~ Italy and Spain as the allied nations with the greatest interest in the detachment of the French possessions from France.

The engagement of France in the warfare against England, however, would doubtless involve new possibilities of considerable extent. At the same time, such an engagement would be the best countermeasure against the extension of the British influence to North Africa.

Consequently, he (the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff) further deems it extremely important to influence the Fuehrer in this sense.

Mention was already made of the Fuehrer's intention to confer with the former French ambassador in Berlin, François Poncet, and to hold a meeting with Marshal Pétain. Such a change of ~~opinion~~^{policy}, however, would doubtless be preceded by a conference with the Duce.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch declares that it is now no longer necessary for him to submit concepts and suggestions regarding the same objective. He already ordered to prepare a survey of the ~~French~~ disposition of the French forces and of the communication routes between North and West Africa to be used as first basic material. In addition, the study on the Atlantic Islands prepared by the Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch and submitted a few days ago will have to be supplemented from the angle of a cooperation with France.

(.....)

1 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 1 October

1940

In the afternoon, the Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch reports to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff in the presence of the Chief of the National Defense Branch

- 93 -

that the Naval Operations Staff does not agree to the suggestion made by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff on 28 September that the Squadron 1/106 (He-115) assigned to the Commander of the Air Forces Wilhelmshaven be exchanged, because of its longer range ~~mission~~, greater speed, and bomb-carrying capacity, for the Squadron 1/406 (Do-18) assigned to the 9th Air Division.

The naval air forces which have been weakened by transfers of elements to the Luftwaffe are fully needed in their present ~~strength~~. In particular, a further reduction of their He-115 strength would not be acceptable, since this type of aircraft is mainly used for the providing important mission of ~~the~~ "close escort cover" for ships putting out to sea or moving into coastal waters endangered by enemy submarines. The type "Do-18" cannot be employed in such missions, since its bomb-carrying capacity is very limited and ~~xxx~~ it is unable to carry water bombs.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch adds that since the Führer's decision of 13 September the conditions in this field have not changed so that no further intervention of the Luftwaffe would be justified. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff ~~expresses~~ shares this view. The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command has not yet decided on this question.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch explains

- 94 -

to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operation Staff the reasons for which the Naval Operations Staff attaches great importance to amplest possible use of ~~xxiak~~ mines.

having developed a means for sweeping ~~xxiak~~ The British ~~now~~ found ~~an~~ countermeasures against magnetic mines, a new type of ignition will be employed from now on which holds out a prospect a prospect for a great effect. For this reason aerial-delivered mines are to be employed on a large-scale for this new type before the enemy finds a new sweeping means ~~xxiak~~ of ignition.

The Naval Operations Branch considers steadily intensified mine-laying operations an effective supplementation of the air war against the enemy ports and of the submarine warfare. For this reason, the Naval Operations Staff thinks it advisable to commit the comparatively small number of aircraft suitable for mine-laying operations with their specialist personnel (9th Air Division) only for this purpose and to assign the bombing missions to the major part of the bomber units. The Naval Operations Staff maintains its right to participate in the aerial-mining operations by advocating this type of commitment.

The effects produced by the aerial-delivered mines when used as bombs are impaired by the fact that the mines can be dropped only with parachutes. The latter is easily caught whenever the mine is dropped on build-up areas thus preventing the mine from detonating. The mine is thus found ^{intact} by the enemy; this happened already

- 95 -

and is absolutely undesirable.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff serves notice that the

Fuehrer has hitherto planned to employ aerial-delivered mines at

a later date. Now, however, he ordered the immediate employment

of such mines, since aerial-delivered mines with the new type of

fuze (Fab) were already dropped. It is to be ascertained whether

they were already dropped on London (the Naval Operations Staff

had urgently requested that they not be dropped on that city; the

Luftwaffe reports upon inquiry of the Chief of the Group I Navy of

the National Defense Branch that no such mines were dropped on

London).

(.....)

Moreover, the Chief of the National Defense Branch submits a survey

of the progress made in moving up transport space for the operation

"Seeloewe" prepared by the Chief of Group I Navy of the National

Defense Branch. At this occasion, he points out that the order for

the beginning of the operation could no more be issued on 8-day

minus 10 days as provided for in the time-schedule but that the

readiness of the branches of the Wehrmacht for action has to be

restored first.

(.....)

In addition, the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff requested to counteract energetically the rumors circulating in Berlin. These rumors indicated that the British would intensify their air warfare and extend the latter by the use of chemical warfare agents and that American heavy aircraft types would be employed before long.

(.....)

Moreover, the Chief of the National Defense Branch mentions the British air raids against the Channel ports which had grave consequences. The effects of these attacks were considerably increased by hits in ammunition dumps and trains some of which contained captured enemy ammunition. The air raid protection at these places seems to be fully inadequate. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff orders the submission of a directive to be issued by the Fuehrer. According to this directive, the branches of the Wehrmacht will have to take immediate measures to obviate such grave consequences of enemy air raids.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch then broaches again the question of the information of the American military attachés in Berlin. The decision just made by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command in conformance with the views of the Army and Luftwaffe High Commands that these attachés should be occasionally informed on the military situation by qualified officers similar to the

- 97 -

information of the German military attaché in Washington but should not be permitted ~~him~~ to visit the front would, in his (Chief of the National Defense Branch) not be sufficient if any counter-propaganda conducted ~~exist~~ should be ~~exist~~ against the reports sent to Washington by the American military attachés in London. Therefore, the Chief of the National Defense Branch suggests again that the attachés be given, by corresponding measures to be taken by the Luftwaffe, a chance to get an immediate impression of the air war at the Channel coast.

(.....)

2 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 2 October 1940

In a letter to the Wehrmacht High Command/National Defense dated Branch ~~of~~ 30 September (Operations Officer 562/40 Restricted Top Secret) the Army High Command (Army General Staff/Operations Branch) points out the consequences the maintenance of the present degree of readiness for action in the operation "Seelöwe" over an extended period of time would have for the Army.

1.) The necessity to begin with the embarkation of the equipment immediately upon issuance of the code-word order after having received a warning order 10 days ~~ago~~ before requires the availability of considerable forces and equipment in the immediate vicinity of the ports.

- 98 -

This leads to steady losses of personnel and material due to the continual British air raids against the coastal areas. Even though these losses do not, at present, exceed an acceptable extent they would ~~eventually~~ inflict a tangible damage upon the troops.

2.) The organizational measures to be taken by the Army High Command in the course of the winter could not be carried out if the present degree of readiness for action in the operation "Seeloewe" should be maintained by the units intended for commitment in this operation.

In the course of November, these units would have to detach one third of their strength for the activation of new units and would receive recruits instead. Their readiness for action would thus be impaired from November to February. If the detachment of these cadres would not be possible because the degree of readiness for action should be maintained for the operation "Seeloewe" the activation of the divisions of the 12th, 13th, and 14th waves would not be feasible in the planned way.

Difficulties are encountered in
3.) The training of the troops made available for the operation "Seeloewe" is ~~extremely difficult~~, since these troops must be ready for action at a short notice.

4.) Among those forces made available for commitment in the operation "Seeloewe" there are troops (engineers etc.) which belong to

- 99 -

those divisions transferred to the East and are urgently needed by these divisions. Owing to the present degree of readiness, however, their withdrawal from the planned commitment in the operation "Seelöwe" and their replacement by other units would be impossible.

If it is intended to maintain the degree of readiness for action in the operation "Seelöwe" during the winter so that the attack ~~can~~ be carried out can begin at any time after a previous warning order as a coup de grâce for England as a nation in process of breaking down, the Army High Command would request that the ~~previous~~ warning order be issued three weeks before the beginning of the attack to provide the possibility of dispersing the troops, exchanging the units, and facilitating the training activities.

If, however, it is intended to maintain the readiness for action in the operation "Seelöwe" during the winter as a ~~mere~~ means of military and political pressure on England without actually carrying out the operation, the Army High Command would take appropriate measures to insure the military pressure on England. At the same time the units could be dispersed and exchanged, the possibilities for training improved, and the necessary organizational measures be taken to the full extent.

The Army High Command requests a decision to be made at the latest by the middle of October to be able to take the necessary measures in time.

- 100 -

At 17:30 hours, the Chief of the National Defense Branch report
to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on the letter ~~xx~~ of
the Army High Command an ~~proposes~~
~~V~~erexcerpt of which was quoted above and ~~suggests~~ to abolish the 10-
day period for the issuance of the warning order and to inform the
Army High Command that ~~xxxxx~~, should the operation "Seelöwe"
carried out in the near future, he should be consulted early enough
about the period required for the initial phase of the operation
(about 15 days).

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff agrees to this suggestion
and declares that the decision on the degree of readiness of
the units for action during the winter would be made by the middle
of October.

The Army High Command (Army General Staff/Operations Branch)
will be correspondingly informed by teletype message.

(.....)

8 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

Oper-
High Command/Wehrmacht ~~Spuren~~

tions Staff/National Defense

(.....)

Branch, 8 October

In connection with the conferences ~~with~~ the Fuehrer with
the Duce at the Brenner pass the Chief of the National Defense
Branch makes the following suggestion on the attitude to be adopted
towards France:

- 101 -

(.....)

2.) The high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht, in particular that of the Army, which consider themselves as inadequately informed on the next intentions ~~regarding~~ the conduct of the war, should be provided with the necessary guiding principles.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff agrees to these suggestions and thinks it advisable to connect a directive for the relaxation of the measures for the operation "Seeloewe" with the information of the high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht on the next intentions for the warfare, provided the Fuehrer would have taken a decision to that effect upon his return from the Obersalzberg on 9 October.

(.....)

10 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht

Operations Staff/National

Defense Branch, 10 Octo-

ber

The Cief of the German Liaison Staff with the Italian Air Force, Generalleuthant Ritter von Pohl, reports ~~xx~~, by a teletype message dated 9 October, on his conference with Marshal Badoglio held on the same day as follows:

Marshal Badoglio stressed the necessity of a conference

- 102 -

with Generalfeldmarschall Keitel at the earliest possible date to draw up the plans for the operations to be conducted in winter. He still considers a landing in England as necessary to bring the war quickly to an end. However, he does not think that such a landing operation can be carried out still in ~~this~~ fall. During the winter, the main effort of the warfare will have to be shifted to the Mediterranean in addition to the continuation of the air and submarine operations against England. This should be done to oust the British from Egypt and Gibraltar.

Moreover, Marshal Badoglio declared that he would not have approved the dispatch of the Italian air corps to Belgium if he had been asked before, because this corps was not used to the bad weather conditions in that country and would therefore be doomed to inactivity during the winter months. ~~Now~~ On the other hand, however, the best possibilities for commitment would exist in the Mediterranean during this season. For this reason, he would welcome the participation of the German Luftwaffe in the operations against Egypt and then, in spring, make half of the Italian air forces available for participation in the operations against England.

(.....)

Furthermore, Marshal Badoglio mentioned the inadequate use made of the 30 Italian submarines committed in the Atlantic. These submarines could not be effective due to lack of shipping traffic in

- 103 -

the operational areas assigned to them.

14 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 14 October 1940

The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command directs the German General assigned to the Supreme Headquarters of the Italian Armed Forces, Generalmajor von Rintelen, to inform Marshal Badoglio that he fully agrees to the suggestion of the latter that the operational plans for the winter be drawn up at a common conference to be held at the earliest possible date and that a suggestion for the place and time of this conference will be made at the latest when the political talks will have brought about a basis for the future warfare.

22 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Ope-

rations Staff/National Defen

se Branch, 22 October 1940

According to a teletype message of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff dated 21 October ~~xx~~ a lieutenant colonel of the Italian General Staff confidentially told the Chief of the German Liaison Staff with the Italian Air Force that the target date for the Italian offensive against Greece was set for ~~the~~ 25 or

- 104 -

was
26 October. The first objectives ~~were~~ to be the islands of Corfu,
Cephalonia, and Yanina. The second objective was to be Saloniki
and the third objective was to be Athens which was to be reached
by two columns. Bulgaria was allegedly supposed to occupy at the same
time the coastal strip east of the peninsula of Khalkidike.

(.....)

28 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Sta

National Defense Branch, 28 Octo

ber 1940

Discussion of the Situation

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense

Branch reports that 227 bomber and reconnaissance aircraft and 138

on 27 October
fighter aircraft were committed against England^V and that 225 bomber

aircraft were committed against England during the night of 27/28

October and dropped 52,8 tons of bombs on London in daytime and

126,7 tons of bombs and 40 BSK * during the night. Moreover, the

British night airfields were raided, apparently with good success.

On 27 October, the losses of the friendly forces amounted to 9, tho

se of the enemy to 29 aircraft. The IX Air Corps conducted mine-

laying

Note: * BSK:

- 105 -

operations along the the coast of West and South England. Two enemy aircraft intruded into the Luftgau Holland on 27 October and raided the airfield of Den Helder. ~~200~~ 220 enemy aircraft intruded into the Luftgau Holland during the night of 27/28 October. 12 enemy aircraft intruded Belgium/North France and 25 aircraft intruded into West France during the same night. They dropped bombs on 14 places. 85 aircraft intruded into the Reich's territory. 114 demolition bombs and more than 140 incendiary bombs were dropped mainly on the Luftgau VI, IV, and IX.

(.....)

In conclusion, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff points out that in view of the intensified reconnaissance and nuisance activities of the British against the shipping traffic in Norwegian waters the execution of the directives issued on 22 October for the deception of the enemy might endanger the transportation activities in these waters.

29 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations /

Staff/National Defense Branch,

29 October 1940

Discussion of the Situation

(.....)

- 106 -

The Chief of the Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch then gives a survey of the German air attacks against England during the month of September. A total of 741 attacks were carried out of which 268 were directed against London. During these attacks, 6223,92 tons of demolition bombs and 8546 BSK * were dropped on London and 1096,55 tons of demolition bombs and 1723 BSK ** were dropped on the rest of England.

(.....)

30 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

Staff
tions ~~Luftwaffe~~/National Defense

Branch, 30 October 1940

Discussion of the Situation

(.....)

Navy

The Chief of Group I ~~Luftwaffe~~ of the National Defense

Branch reports that the British give their losses of shipping space during the week from 20 to 27 October as 198 000 gross register tons. 8 to 10 German submarines are always engaged in combat operations

.....

Notes: * BSK :

** BSK :

- 107 -

(.....)

As a result of the apprehension voiced by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on 28 October and of the telephone conversation with the Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Commander Norway which took place on the same day the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence/III is directed^{not} to exploit, for the time being, the troop transportation movements ~~to Norway~~ still running to North Norway at the present time for deception purposes according to the new guiding principles issued on 22 October. This ~~directive~~ was directed in order not to endanger these transportation movements. Information on the reinforcement of the troops stationed in Norway should not be made leak through to the enemy intelligence service ~~now~~ before these movements will have been completed. Such information should be made leak through to the enemy to make the latter believe that the Island of Britain is threatened from the area of Norway and to relieve the offensive action of the Navy in the Atlantic.

(.....)

31 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 31 October 1940

Discussion of the Situation

The Chief of the Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense

- 108 -

Branch : (...)

(.....) Subsequently it was reported that bomber aircraft of the Italian air corps dropped 92 bombs (11 tons) on the harbor installations of Ramsgate in the afternoon of 29 October. (.....)

According to a report of the Economic and Armament Office
the USA is said to have delivered 743 aircraft to England during the first year of the war. About 250 of this figure are said to have been delivered in August and more than 100 in July.

(.....)

1 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

(.....)

1 November 1940

Discussion of the Situation

(.....)

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch reports on a conference of the Military Attaché in Rom with Marshal Badoglio in the afternoon of 30 October. (.....)

At that occasion, Marshal Badoglio expressed his satisfaction at the great successes achieved by the submarines during the last days and declared that the best way to force England to surrender would be to cut off her supplies. (.....)

(.....)

- 109 -

Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (.....) He then gave

the following information:

The Fuehrer does not at all approve of the Italian action against

Greece and considers the prospect of this action for success as

negative in every respect. Consequently, he has lost any inclina-

tion for a close military cooperation with Italy. It is, therefore

questionable whether the planned commitment of German troops in

Libia will actually be realized. A decision on this question, how-

ever, will not be taken until after the Commander in Chief of the

Army together with Generalmajor Ritter von Thoma reported to the

Fuehrer on 2 November and after the planned conference between the

Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and Marshal Badoglio has taken

place. If it should be decided to desist from a commitment of Ger-

man troops in Libia, this could, though only to a small extent,

be compensated by launching a thrust from Bulgaria to the Aegean

Sea. In addition, the Fuehrer now wants to carry out the attack

against Gibraltar in coordinated action with Spain but, if possib-

le, without participation of Italy. Furthermore, he contemplates

the occupation of the Atlantic Islands and, if necessary, also

that of Portugal.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch comments on these

plans as follows:

The intentions for the continuation of the war during the

- 110 -

winter are not satisfactory. The intensified air war against England is considerably impaired by the ~~unfavorable~~ weather conditions which are expected to last through the winter. In case it will be decided not to commit German troops in Libya, the Italian offensive against Egypt will hardly lead to a decisive success nor will the much desired restoration of the situation in the Mediterranean be achieved. Thus, the Italian battle fleet will continue to be tied up in the Mediterranean and ~~will~~ its commitment in the Atlantic jointly with the German heavy naval forces against the British battleships will not be possible.

On the other hand, the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command declares that German air forces should be committed against Egypt as planned. In addition, the employment of aerial-delivered mines against Alexandria and the Suez-Canal is planned and the commitment of dive-bomber aircraft from Syria against the British Alexandria under consideration. Squadron is ~~intended~~. It is also expected that the fall of Gibraltar will have repercussions on the Eastern Mediterranean. The military cooperation with France was discussed only in broad outlines during the negotiations of the Fuehrer with Marshal Pétain and Foreign Minister Laval.

The further discussion of this question with the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command who just arrived reveals that in the future France will,

- 111 -

towards Germany, adopt the attitude of a friendly neutral power but that she will not declare war on England. France will tolerate on the territory under ~~her~~ jurisdiction measures taken by the German military command against England and will, so far as necessary, support such measures by making use of her own means of defense. France fully realizes that this attitude ~~might~~ ^{might,} ~~negativise~~ for ~~exist~~ a number of French colonies or even ~~at~~ ^{for} the whole French colonial empire, develop into some sort of a state of war with England.

(.....)

Referring to the apprehension voiced by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on 28 October the Chief of the National Defense Branch reports to the latter that the Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Commander Norway had asked him ~~inxx~~ telephone ~~xxx~~ ~~xxx~~ for a strong protection to be provided by the Navy and Luftwaffe for the troop transportation movements running at present to Norway. To prevent these transportation movements from being endangered he (the Chief of the National Defense Branch) then directed the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence/III on 30 October not to exploit these transportation movements for deception purposes according to the new guiding principles issued on 22 October and to desist from having information on the reinforcement of the forces in Norway leak through to the enemy intelligence.

- 112 -

service until these transportation movements are completed. (See under
28 and 30 October.)

(.....)

3 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 3 November 1940

Report on the Situation (No discussion of the situation)

(..... The report of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff on the
situation, dated 3 November, reveals that 4 of the
bomber aircraft which operated against London at night
and were partially iced while flying through storms,
gusts, and rain showers have not returned to their
bases)

(.....) According to press reports, the British Food Ministry
now stores food supplies all over London in churches, movie halls,
and other buildings to prevent famine in those districts cut off from
traffic as a result of the German air attacks.

(.....)

4 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 4 Novem-

ber 1940

- 113 -

(.....)

As a result of today's conference of the Fuehrer with the Commander in Chief of the Army and the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff issues the following orders for the directive to be prepared by the National Defense Branch for the ~~farther~~ conduct of the war:

(.....)

The preparations for the operation "Seelöwe" will be continued energetically, since ~~now~~ it is possible or even necessary that this operation will be carried out in springtime.

(.....)

Moreover, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff orders that a list be made of the questions to be discussed in the imminent conference of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command with Marshal Badoglio. (.....) ~~These questions have been discussed above~~

The Italian air units committed at the Channel coast should be withdrawn to Italy for the winter. (.....)

5 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense

(.....)

Branch, 5 November 1940

The National Defense Branch submits the outline for Directive No. 18 prepared according to the guiding principles of the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff to the latter.

- 114 -

The first point treated in this outline is the operation "Seelöwe".

This first passage reads: I adhere to the intention to carry out the landing during the first half of the year 1941 as soon as a situation favorable for such action ~~xxxxxx~~ develops. The three high commands will ~~make~~ efforts to improve the basis for the conduct of such an operation in every respect. Guiding principles for these efforts will be issued."

6 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 6 Novem-

ber 1940

Discussion of the Situation

(.....)

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch

reports that it is estimated that the number of divisions stationed in Great Britain amounts to 34 and a half compared to 39 divisions in August 1940. The lacking 4 and a half divisions have presumably been transferred to abroad, mainly to the Near East. 18 of these 34 and a half divisions probably belong to the Coastal Defense Force 12 and a half of these may belong to the Mobile Defence Force, 1 of them is ~~thought~~ probably stationed in North Ireland, and 2 of them are reported in the process of being activated. The whereabouts of 1 of these divisions are ~~xx~~ unknown.

- 115 -

(.....)

When asked by the Chief of the National Defense Branch whether a decision has been taken ~~already~~ ^b on the outline, submitted yesterday, ~~xxxxx~~ of a new directive on the conduct of the war, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff declares that a considerable modification must be effected only in respect to the operation "Seelowe", since the priority given to this operation by the National Defense Branch ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ conforms to the opinion of the Army but does not ~~meet~~ with the approval of the Fuehrer.

Upon the remark of the Chief of the National Defense Branch that the operation "Seelowe" should still be regarded as being of decisive importance for the overall war effort the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff admits this fact but emphasizes that the ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ for the sure ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ the basis ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ success of this action must be created before the actual conduct of the operation can be taken into consideration.

This opinion ~~has~~ led to the formulation used by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff for the passage covering the operation "Seelowe" and ranking last in the directive. This passage now reads: "Since, ~~xxxxx~~ changes in the overall situation, it may become possible owing to or even necessary that in spring 1941 the operation 'Seelowe' will be actually carried out, the three branches of the Wehrmacht should make

- 116 -

serious efforts to improve the preconditions for such operation in every respect" (See the formulation of the National Defense Branch in the outline submitted on 5 November). The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command approved this formulation.

7 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 7 Novem-

(.....)

ber 1940

A new outline for the Directive No. 18 is submitted to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. In this new outline, the changes effected by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff in the old outline are taken into account. (See under 6 November).

The outline is approved by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and forwarded to the high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht even before ~~xxx~~ being signed by the Fuehrer. The outline is to be used, for the time being, as a basis for the planning of the Army and Luftwaffe General Staffs and of the Naval Operations Staff.

(.....)

The Reich's Minister for Arms and Ammunition, Dr. Todt, is notified by a letter of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command that the Fuehrer desires that bomb-proof shelters for submarines be^{quickly} built by the Organization Todt in the submarine bases in the occupied western areas.

- 117 -

(.....)

8 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

8 November

Discussion of the Situation

(.....) In the afternoon of 7 November, a dive-bomber unit of 20 aircraft escorted by strong fighter forces attacked a convoy of 14 ~~naval~~^{air} craft cruisers ~~xx~~ in Thames Estuary. 1 steamer of 4 to 5000 gross register ~~xx~~ tons was sunk and 2 further steamers and the cruiser were damaged.

(.....)

In the Atlantic 23 Italian submarines are operating at present. Some of them are stationed at Bordeaux. Two submarines on their way to this port were attacked by British destroyers with water bombs in the Strait of Gibraltar. They had to touch at the port of Tangiers to repair the damages incurred during this attack. The armored cruiser "Admiral Scheer" unexpectedly encountered ~~xx~~ a British convoy in the North Atlantic and sunk a number of steamships with a total ~~of~~ tonnage of 85 000 gross register tons.

(.....)

9 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

- 118 -

Staff/National Defense Branch,

(.....)

9 November 1940

According to the data on losses and expenditures compiled by the Group I M 2 of the National Defense Branch for the period from 10 May to 31 October 1940 the personnel losses of the flying units of the Luftwaffe committed at the front amounted, in October, to 36 officers and 111 enlisted men killed, 14 officers and 94 enlisted men wounded, and 93 officers and 293 enlisted men missing.

The losses of aircraft including those employed in the zone of the interior amounted to 578 aircraft of which 371 were ~~xxxxxxxx~~ lost. completely
984 new aircraft were put into service. The situation concerning personnel replacements is satisfactory. A shortage exists in respect to Ju-88 and twin-engine fighter crews.

(.....)

As a result of the attitude adopted by the Army High Command on the outline for the Directive No. 18 and of the time-schedule for the operation "Felix" submitted ~~xxxxxxxx~~ simultaneously with the letter of the Army High Command the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations

it is suggested to Staff ~~suggested~~ that the Directive No. 18 be modified. The suggested modifications are approved by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff and by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command.

(.....)

11 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

- 119 -

Staff/National Defense Branch,

11 November 1940

Discussion of the Situation

(.....)

(.....) A total of 783 air attacks were carried out against England. ~~September~~ in October; 333 of these attacks were directed against London.

The torpedo boat "T 6" was lost due to being hit by a mine during an operation against the coast of East ~~Scotland~~ Scotland.

(.....)

12 November 1940

(.....)

The Directive No. 3 is issued to the high commands of the Wehrmacht after being signed by the Fuehrer. (See under 9 November/5)

(.....)

13 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 13 November 1940

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff submits the evaluation of the situation prepared by him for the imminent conference between the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and Marshal Badoglio in Innsbruck and approved by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command.

This evaluation of the situation begins as follows: "The war

- 120 -

has been won, it cannot be lost any more, it just has to be brought to an end. For this purpose it is necessary to convince England by force that she has lost the war". The directive continues with the statement that at the beginning of 1941 Germany will, in all fields, be stronger than she was at the beginning of the war or at the beginning of the operations in the West. The German Army will not be confronted with any problem in Europe owing to its strength of about 230 divisions of first-wave divisions, which 185 are ~~in combat position~~ 20 of the latter are armored divisions. Furthermore, the Army has 4 armored units with captured enemy equipment, 12 motorized divisions and stocks of ammunition sufficient ~~for~~ to meet the requirements of large-scale combat action lasting 2 to 3 years. By the beginning of the new year, the Navy will have recovered from the damages incurred and replaced the major part of its losses. The Navy will be able to commit a steadily increasing number of subs against the enemy and to ~~in combat position~~ step up the production of submarines ^{up to} 25 submarines by the end of the year. The Luftwaffe, too, will, by springtime, be stronger in respect to quantity and quality than it was at the beginning of the battle against England.

After a brief discussion of the effects of the air and sea war against England and some remarks on the attitude of Russia and the USA as the only powers from which England still hopes ~~for~~ support, the situation in the Mediterranean as the topic proper of the conference is treated in detail. During the treatment of this question it is stated that according to German opinion it is desirable for military

- 121 -

reasons
~~XXXXXX~~ to confine the warfare in the Balkans to Greece. British attacks against the oil production area of Rumania only could justify the commitment of German troops in the South East. To support the Italian offensive against Egypt primarily the commitment of German air forces against Alexandria and the Suez-Canal should be taken into consideration after the capture of Marsa Matruh for which German troops would not be needed according to the opinion of both parties. Gibraltar could be taken without difficulties by especially trained German troops provided Spain should ~~XXXX~~ decide to enter the war rather soon. As regards the cooperation with France, Germany should, in view of the great importance of the French colonial empire in Africa for the continuation of the war against England, endeavor to tighten this cooperation as closely as possible.

It is desirable that this necessity be fully recognized also by all military authorities in Italy.

Regarding the immediate cooperation of Italian air and naval units with the corresponding German branches of the armed forces Marshal the view taken by Badioglio is shared. Badioglio is of the opinion that it would be more economical and better strategy to employ the Italian air units stationed in Belgium in the Mediterranean during the winter. On the other hand, however, it is requested that the Italian submarines employed in the Atlantic be left in this area as a valuable support for the siege of England.

(.....)

- 122 -

14 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

(.....)

14 December 1940

Finally, the Chief of the National Defense Branch inquires what political guiding principles are envisaged in case Ireland, attacked by England, calls for German support. Ambassador Ritter, ~~xxxxxxxx~~ wants to know what ~~xxxxxxxxxxxx~~ the Wehrmacht could do in such case. The Chief of the National Defense Branch declares that any effective support could not be provided; airborne troops could not be committed. The conduct of Luftwaffe and Navy operations only could be taken into consideration. Ambassador Ritter thinks that in such case the utmost effort on the part of the Wehrmacht would be demanded by the Fuehrer.

(.....)

19 November 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

(.....)

Branch, 19 November 1940

Upon the question of the Chief of the National Defense Branch whether the Fuehrer has ever voiced his opinion about what should be done in case Ireland, attacked by England, would call for German support the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff replies that the Fuehrer has not yet given this problem any thought.

(.....)

- 123 -

Eventually, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff declares
that now the Fuehrer again gives considerable thought to the operation
"Seelöwe".

(.....)

Notes on the period from 1 to 4 December

The Chief of the National Defense Branch calls on the Fuehrer
for verbal report and consultation in the afternoon of 3 December.

(.....)

At this occasion, the Chief of the National Defense Branch
submits the note on Ireland in addition to a survey of the stocks of
captured English arms.

(.....)

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff (.....)
As regards the airborne corps, the Fuehrer has ordered that the
22nd Division be placed under the command of the 7th Air Division.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch no longer upholds his
intention to have the operational principles of the 22nd Division exa-
mined because of this new assignment of this division, since the Fuehrer
pointed out emphatically that this assignment would be only temporary
in nature.

(.....)

3 December 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch ,

- 124 -

3 December 1940

reports to

At 16:30 hours, the Commander in Chief of the Navy ~~xxxxxxxx~~

the Fuehrer on the situation while the Chief of the Wehrmacht High

Command, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, and Commander

von Puttkamer are present. He gives the following report:

It has become more and more clear that the utmost harm is inflicted upon the British by the destruction of their industrial and harbor installations by the Luftwaffe in connection with the disruption of the sea supply service by submarines in coordinated action with the Luftwaffe. For this reason, these operations should be continued in a concentrated manner and interruption or impairment of this action should be tolerated. These operations might, in the long run - maybe as early as this winter - have a fatal effect on the enemy. Any loss of prestige resulting from an operation involving an excessive risk must be carefully avoided. Such loss of prestige could prolong the war and, above all, influence the attitude of the USA in a manner detrimental to Germany. Further operations should be carried out against England with the objective to relieve the pressure on Italy and to capture Gibraltar for the purpose of ~~xxxxx~~ clearing the Mediterranean of enemy forces.

for Ireland against Britain
Regarding the problem of the support ~~xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx~~

tain, the dispatch of an expeditionary corps and the occupation of the Island of Ireland would not be possible owing to the superior enemy sea power, the unfavorable geographical conditions, and the impossibility to move in supplies.

If left without supplies of rations, arms, and ammunition, the troops landed in Ireland would, sooner or later, be crushed by an enemy whose continuous reinforcement could not be prevented. It will be possible during the winter months to move individual blockade breakers with arms and ammunition into Irish ports and bays as long as no hostilities between Ireland and England exist and provided the Irish cooperate.

The Fuehrer agrees to this evaluation of the situation and declares that any provision of support to Ireland could be taken into consideration only if that country would call for German help. At first, it must be established by the German Ambassador in Dublin whether or not de Valera wants support or any reinforcement of his armament by the provision of captured English arms and ammunition which could be delivered to him by single steamships. Ireland would be very important for the Luftwaffe as a jump-off base for attacks against the ports of North-West England. The possession of Ireland could bring about the end of the war. Inquiries have to be made first.

The Commander in Chief of the Navy then reports that the cruiser "Hipper" operates in the Arctic Ocean to break through into the Atlantic to reach Brest. The battleships and destroyers would follow at the end of December. 160 000 gross register tons were sunk by submarines on 2 December. Two submarines are operating off Free-town.

- 126 -

and mining
The coast-defense specialists requested by Bulgaria are ready for dispatch. The Navy is prepared for the operation "Felix". Negotiations on the fortification of the Canary Islands are conducted with the Spanish.

Moreover, the Commander in Chief of the Navy declares his attitude on the employment of the aerial torpedo. In this connection he calls the attention to a directive issued on 26 November by the Luftwaffe Operations Staff to the General of the Luftwaffe with the Commander in Chief of the Navy. According to this directive, the commitment of aerial torpedoes was to be discontinued immediately in view of the special purpose ordered by the Fuehrer (~~organization~~ commitment of a torpedo air group to be newly formed and to be equipped with ~~torp~~ the aircraft types "He-111/He-5" and "Do-217" in the Eastern Mediterranean. This measure is unacceptable for the Naval Operations Staff.

Commander ~~in~~ thinks it necessary to Therefore, the ~~in~~ in Chief of the Navy ~~for~~ demand the instantaneous release of the aerial torpedoes for ~~xxx~~ employment by the units of the Commander of the Air Forces with the Commander in Chief of the ^Navy. The torpedoes are to be used in operations ~~xxx~~ against the enemy merchant fleet and for the formation of modern air torpedo squadrons to be equipped with "He-111" aircraft and to be assigned to the Commander of the Air Forces with the Commander in Chief of the Navy. Furthermore, modern reconnaissance aircraft must be provided to the Commander of the Air Forces with the Command

- 127 -

in Chief of the Navy for the submarine warfare and the ampler employment of aerial mines off the ~~xxxxx~~ ports of West England, above all in the Firth of Clyde, would be necessary.

The Commander in Chief of the Navy ~~gives~~ the Fuehrer a memorandum on the conduct of the combat operations against England.

In this memorandum, the concentration of the means of combat of the Navy and the Luftwaffe against the British supply lines is given as

the primary operational objective of the ~~war against England~~ conduct of the operations

against England. According to this memorandum, it is absolutely necessary to make available the means of combat required for this purpose

decisive with utmost energy and speed. Of ~~utmost~~ importance for the increase

of the effectiveness of the submarine warfare would be an extensive

air reconnaissance which is conducted in ~~whichever~~ closest cooperation

with the submarine forces. Such air reconnaissance must be placed

Navy which must be provided with top-quality under the control of the ~~Naval~~ aircraft for

~~to accomplish~~ this purpose.

The Fuehrer directs the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command

consider to ~~maximum~~ these questions without taking prestige factors into account.

Memorandum
~~Notecard file~~ :

The aerial torpedoes have hitherto been dropped from aircraft of the naval air units (He-115). As far as the normal military activities and the supply are concerned, the latter are under the

- 128 -

command of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, whereas they are, in the opinion of the Navy, ~~placed~~ under the operational control of the Commander in Chief of the Navy, which, however, applies only to reconnaissance operations according to the view taken by the ~~Luftwaffe~~ Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe. The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe prohibited the employment of aerial torpedoes on 26 November in order to save the limited stocks aerial torpedoes available for a special purpose (commitment against the elements of the British fleet in the ports of Gibraltar and Alexandria). In addition, he ordered the organization of an own air-torpedo group. The Commander in Chief of the Navy during raised objections against this project ~~and informed~~ of a personal report to the Fuehrer on 3 December. During this report, he voiced the opinion that the aerial torpedo commitment against England must not be discontinued and that, owing to the peculiar nature of this arm, could the aerial torpedoes ~~ever~~ be brought to bear effectively only by personnel with a specialized training. Such personnel is available only in the naval air units which were partially formed by the Navy.

Notes on the Commitment of the Naval Air Units during the Period from

4 December to 6 January 1941

The Chief of the Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch

prepares a note to be used for a verbal report. In this note the question of the aerial torpedoes is discussed. At the same time he under the date of 5 December, submits to Admiral Fricke the outline for an order to the following effect:

- 129 -

806th

1.) Reassignment of the Coast Air Group to the Navy.

2.) A directive to the Commander in Chief of the Navy to continue the

combat operations with aerial torpedoes with utmost energy.

3.) Equipment of the multi-purpose squadrons with modern torpedo aircraft

4.) Sea reconnaissance over the Atlantic. The Commander in Chief of the

Luftwaffe examines the possibility of making available Do-17 aircraft

for the urgent improvement of the reconnaissance potentialities in

the Atlantic.

5.) Employment of the armament of the coast air units. The current re-

equipment of the coast air groups with standard-type bomber aircraft

offers the possibility of employing arms against water-borne targets

and of exploiting unique opportunities also in such cases in which

bomber units of the Luftwaffe cannot be committed early enough. On

this ground, the air units of the Commander in Chief of the Navy

shall be, on principle, permitted to bring to bear all types of arma-

ment (torpedo bombs) against water-borne targets.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff directs the Natio-

nal Defense Branch to examine this outline of an order (Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch/

Group I Luftwaffe No. 001085/40 Top Secret Military Document, dated

5 December 1940). Thereupon the Chief of Group I Navy of the National

Defense Branch draws up, on 6 December 1940, a note designed for a ve

bal report ^{dealing with} ~~and which~~ the equipment and missions of the naval

- 130 -

air arm. The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch likewise draws up a note for use during a verbal report.

On 19 December, the Navy High Command ~~communicates~~ ~~xxxxxxxx~~ to Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch the attitude of the Naval Operations Staff on a letter of the Luftwaffe General Staff directed to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff.

On 28 December, the branches of the Wehrmacht receive an order of the Fuehrer to the effect that, pending a definite decision on the contestable question of the organization of the long-range reconnaissance, the 806th Coast Air Group is reassigned to the Commander in Chief of the Navy. In addition, the detachment of 4 reconnaissance squadrons (long-range) which are needed for independent long-range reconnaissance operations of the Army High Command and of three army groups, is to be contemplated by the Luftwaffe.

The Commanders in Chief of the Army and the Navy will examine to what extent they will be ~~not~~ able to organize mobile army and static navy antiaircraft batteries using 88-mm antiaircraft equipment available to the Luftwaffe and to man these batteries with their own personnel.

On 2 January 1941, the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe requests that the 806th bomber group be re-assigned to the Luftwaffe since ~~this~~ bomber group is to be committed in the coming full-moon period.

- 131 -

On 4 January, the Naval Operations Staff communicates the following information to the National Defense Branch:

- 1.) The efforts made by the Luftwaffe to utilize Type Fw-200 aircraft of the 1st Group/40th Bomber Wing for antisubmarine operations are appreciated.
- 2.) Systematic reconnaissance conducted by naval command staffs ~~far~~ exclusively for purposes ~~in~~ of the naval warfare in the Atlantic is necessary. The 806th Bomber Group is provided with personnel adequately trained for such action. It is requested that the 806th Bomber Group ~~recon-~~ be equipped with external tanks (to increase the range of the ~~recon-~~ naissance).
- 3.) A further close cooperation between the 1st Group/40th Bomber Wing and the Commander of the Submarine Forces in the form of armed reconnaissance operations would effectively supplement the action against the enemy supply service.

On 4 January, the Navy High Command (Naval Operations Staff) had requested anew that the 806th Bomber Group be immediately re-assigned to the Navy for employment in sea reconnaissance operations. The reason given in this request had been the situation caused by the icing of the North Sea air bases. This request is submitted to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on 6 January.

On 6 January, the Fuehrer takes the following decision:

- 1.) The losses of merchant ships and the resulting steady decrease

of British imports constitute, according to what all reports say unanimously, the heaviest burden on England.

Two factors which must not impair one another reduce British strength:

a) The commitment of submarines,

b) the air action against England.

2.) Therefore, the following order is issued:

The 1st Group/40th Bomber Wing is placed under the command of the Commander in Chief of the Navy(FW-200 aircraft).

The 806th Bomber Group is re-assigned to the Commander in Chief of

the Luftwaffe as of 7 January in order to be available again for commitment against England during the next period of moonlit nights.

The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe, however, will insure that

the requests of the Navy regarding the observation of the British fulfilled.

Home Fleet and its movements in coastal waters will be ~~made~~ ~~insured~~

This applies particularly to times when operations of heavy naval

forces are imminent or in process. The rapid exchange of the recon-

naissance results between the other agencies concerned will be regu-

lated by an agreement between the Commanders in Chief of the Luft-

waffe and Navy.

5 December 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

(.....)

5 December 1940

- 133 -

The stipulation in Directive No. 18 that the prerequisites for the operation "Seelöwe" should be improved in every respect was the reason that all three branches of the Wehrmacht and the General Transportation Chief of the Group for Motor ~~Veterinary~~ of the General Army Office General von Schell, occupied themselves with the development of transport ships. Most of this development was given top priority.

A conference held at the Cavalry School of Kramnitz in the afternoon of 5 December and attended by the Chief of Group I Army, Lieutenant von Lessberg, as the representative of the Wehrmacht High Command/National Defense Branch, the Chief of Group I Navy, Lieutenant Commander Junge, also a representative of the National Defense Branch, furthermore by Lieutenant ~~Max~~ Colonel Dr. Schulz as the representative of the Army High Command/General of the Engineer Forces, and by the Captains von Montigny and Kiderlen of the Navy High Command, brought the following results:

the final blueprint
The Navy is developing a barge ~~which will be completed~~ of which ~~will be ready~~ will be ready by the middle of December. This new barge will represent a considerable improvement compared to the craft used so far. Under certain conditions (recognition of top construction priority, provision of BMW-engines by the Luftwaffe) a maximum of 500 such barges could be constructed within 5 months. They alone, however, would not be sufficient for the operation "Seelöwe". In addition, tow-boats and naval craft of all types would have to be employed, even though on a considerably smaller scale

- 134 -

than hitherto.

The Army is attempting to replace the landing craft used so far by ~~steel~~ and concrete vessels equipped with a propulsion ~~truck~~ unit and to construct a new barge of steel and concrete with or without a propulsion unit. In the case of the former the heavy specific weight causes a lot difficulties. The latter is, according to unanimous reports from the Army and Navy High Commands, suitable only for employment in best weather conditions and in every respect inferior to the barge developed by the Navy.

The Navy High Command reports that the Luftwaffe develops huge ~~bargen~~ ferry-boats which are primarily designed to carry anti-aircraft artillery guns and are intended to be used for artillery action against airborne and coastal targets.

General von Schell ordered the experimental construction of two glider-barges with wing-type attachment for the transportation of tanks. On 5 December, these two barges were transferred to the Navy for testing their usefulness.

In conclusion, the Chief of Group I Army, Lieutenant Colonel von Lossberg, establishes that the Navy has made the greatest progress in the experiments and that the decision of the Fuehrer according to which the Navy is to be the competent authority in respect to these experiments has not yet taken effect. Should the Fuehrer ~~maxim~~ make up his mind to force a decision of the war

- 135 -

by conducting the operation "Seeloswe", it would be advisable to form a special staff with the Navy High Command which would have to insure the availability of the transport fleet at a specific date.

The Commander in Chief of the Army and the Chief of the Army

General Staff give a verbal report to the Fuehrer in the Reich's Chancellery at 15:00 hours while the Chiefs of the Wehrmacht High Command and of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff are present.

The Commander in Chief of the Army makes the following statements: (.....)

Asked by the Commander in Chief of the Army whether he considers the German Luftwaffe strong enough to ~~continue~~ continue the air war against England in addition to the campaign in the East, the Fuehrer declares that the British Air Force will, in the spring of 1941, not be stronger than it is today and will therefore not be able to carry out daytime attacks against Germany. On the other hand, the German Luftwaffe will, in view of its negligible losses at the present time, be stronger in the spring of 1941 than it is today. Consequently, the defensive air warfare against England would be insured even if strong elements of the fighter and antiaircraft artillery units would be committed in the East. Thus, the continuation of major nuisance raids at night against England would be possible during a short campaign in the East.

(.....)

- 136 -

The campaign in the East would begin at the earliest in the middle of May provided the winter would be normal. The Fuehrer does not consider the conduct of the operation "Seelowe" possible any more.

(.....)

6 December 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 6 Decem-

(.....)

ber 1940

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff then briefs the Chief of the National Defense Branch in detail on the result of yesterday's conference of the Fuehrer with the Commander in Chief of the Army.

(.....)

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff explains in detail this plan (operation in the East) and the comments of Hitler on this operation (see under 5 December). He informs the Chief of the National Defense Branch also on the views taken by the Fuehrer regarding the prospects of the air war^v for success in case strong ~~zirkus~~ are committed in the East. (See under 5 December).

Moreover, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff serves notice that the operation "Seelowe" is no longer taken into consideration and that the material preparations for this operation can therefore be discontinued. No measures should be taken in respect to Ireland until the exchange of views with the Irish government has

brought about any results.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch suggests that measures to be taken to counteract any British attack against Ireland could be considered as early as now if any systematic support ~~should~~ not be provided to that country. (....)

(....)

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff verbally reports to the Fuehrer on the questions of the employment of aerial torpedoes and of the equipment and commitment of the naval air units.

After the verbal report of the Commander in Chief of the Navy to the Fuehrer on 3 December (see under 3 December) the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Navy High Command, Admiral Fricke, handed the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff ~~xxx~~ an outline for an order on 4 December in which the demands of the Navy were specified as follows:

- 1.) The employment of aerial torpedoes^v should be continued with utmost energy.
- 2.) An aircraft type (He-111/H-5) suitable for aerial torpedo commitment in daytime operations should be placed at the disposal of the Commander in Chief of the Navy for the reequipment of certain multi-purpose squadrons. The ~~multiplex~~ operations should be conducted only by coast air units because of the limited stocks of torpedoes.

- 3.) The 606th Coast Air Group (Do-17 Z) temporarily placed at the disposal of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe according to a directive of the Wehrmacht High Command of 13 September 1940 should be re-assigned to the Navy for commitment in reconnaissance operations over the North Sea area and for providing support for the submarine warfare in the sea area north-west of England.
- 4.) To improve the reconnaissance potentialities in the Atlantic, some elements of the coast air units should be equipped with the aircraft type Do-217 which will be employed at the front before long and shows a superior performance.
- 5.) The air units of the Commander in Chief of the Navy should be, on principle, permitted to bring to bear all their armament (torpedoes and bombs) against water-borne targets.

In his verbal report to the Fuehrer the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff declares himself in favor of a decision on the equipment and commitment of the naval air units as suggested by the Navy. In relation to the intention of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe the Navy to commit against the British naval units in the Mediterranean an aerial torpedo group to be newly organized, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff points out that the British Warships ~~are~~ at Alexandria and Gibraltar mostly lie in the ports rather than at moorings outside the port and thus could be hit by aerial torpedo raids owing to inadequate depth of the water. Therefore, these raids could

- 139 -

be directed only against those ships moving into or out of the base.

But even in such cases the prospects for success would be too slight.

The Fuehrer decides that the preparations of the Luftwaffe for the torpedo commitment in the Mediterranean are to be discontinued for the time being and wants that the Chiefs of the Luftwaffe and the Naval Operations Staffs jointly report to him verbally as soon as possible on the question of the equipment and commitment of the naval air units.

Subsequently, the Fuehrer makes the following statements to the Chiefs of the Wehrmacht High Command and the Wehrmacht Operations Staff:

Each such controversy between two branches of the Wehrmacht like that just brought before him proves anew the necessity of a strong Wehrmacht High Command. Such controversies show that there is a discrepancy of opinion in many questions which cannot be ~~xxx~~ settled by conferences between the branches of the Wehrmacht concerned. If there were no superior authority ~~which~~ to make a decision there would be the danger that, for instance in this case, the launching of torpedoes from aircraft would not be developed further or would even be given up completely since both branches of the Wehrmacht could not agree as to which of them should tackle this task. Such a state of affairs, however, would be irresponsible. It would be completely immaterial for the outcome of the war whether the Luftwaffe or ~~id~~

- 140 -

the Navy would employ the aerial torpedoes, but it would be of decisive importance that the aerial torpedoes would be employed by that branch of the Wehrmacht which could achieve the maximum success by such employment.

Another lesson to be learned from such controversies is that the top-level command of the Wehrmacht must tighten the reins of command to ~~insure~~ effect the optimum commitment of the forces of all the three branches of the Wehrmacht. To insure this optimum commitment is the mission of the Wehrmacht High Command. This is true already today when his - the Fuehrer's - authority always makes it possible to arrive at a decision, after all

In view of the future a steady strengthening of the position of the Wehrmacht High Command is especially necessary. His - the Fuehrer's - place could some day be taken over by ~~a~~ man who might be the best politician but might not have his knowledge and ability in the military field. Such a man would need a strong ~~Wehrmacht~~ Wehrmacht High Command. Otherwise, the great danger would exist that the forces of the three branches of the Wehrmacht would fall apart instead of being concentrated for a common effort. In such case, the Wehrmacht would never be able to show an optimum performance. Such state of affairs would be irresponsible during a war in which the existence of the Reich is at stake.

The Navy and Luftwaffe High Commands are informed on

- 141 -

the decision of the Fuehrer regarding the employment of aerial torpedoes in the Mediterranean and on his desires expressed after the common verbal report of the Chief of the Naval Operations Staff and of the Luftwaffe General Staff on the problem of the equipment and ~~max~~ commitment of the naval air arm.

(.....)

7 December 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

(.....)

7 December 1940

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff is informed in detail on the progresses made by the three branches of the Wehrmacht in the development of transport ships for the operation "Seeloewe".

These progresses were established in a conference held by the National Defense Branch on 5 December (see under 5 December). The following statement is released by the National Defense Branch:

The barge developed by the Navy will, if constructed in adequate numbers, improve the prospects for success of a landing carried out in a broad front on the coast of South England. Since, however, it has been decided already that no serious preparatory measures shall be taken for the operation "Seeloewe" for the time being, it would be useless to burden the armament program with such additional constructions by which other projects would necessarily be impaired.

- 142 -

For this reason, it would be necessary to maintain the preparations made sofar and to develop test models which could be used for 1942 if necessary (large-scale program beginning in the autumn of 1941).

A directive to the branches of the Wehrmacht ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ to the effect that the construction projects for the operation "Seeloew" should be adequately limited and be taken care of by the Navy will be submitted. The reconsideration of the armament program on the basis of the same objective has been initiated.

(.....)

10 December 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

Staff
tions ~~xxxxxx~~/National Defense

Branch, 10 December 1940

In addition, the Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch submits to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff an outline of an order of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command to the high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht according to which the development of transport vessels suitable for employment in the operation "Seeloewe" is delegated exclusively to the Commander in Chief of the Navy. However, the construction projects are to be confined to the development and testing of single experimental vessels to prevent any further burdening of the armament program (see under 5 and 7 December).

- 143 -

The order is ~~un~~signed by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Com-

mand and sent out to the high commands of the branches of the Wehr-

macht still on the same day (Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense Branch/Group I 33398/40 Restricted Top

Secret, dated 10 December ~~xx~~)

(.....)

12 December 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 12 December 1940

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch sub-

mits an outline of the Directive No. 21 (Operation "Fritz" - operati~~n~~

in the East) (.....) to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations

Staff.

(.....)

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch sub-

mits to the Chief of the National Defense Branch an evaluation reques

ted by the latter of the situation which may develop in the case of a

two-front war against England and Russia. This evaluation of the

is prepared from
situation ~~in~~ the angle of the Naval warfare and arrives at the

conclusion that Germany should not engage in
~~start~~ a military conflict with

Russia because of the ~~inevitable~~ impairment of the naval warfare

inevitable in such case as long as Germany is under the necessity to

-144 -

to employ all her forces to defeat England. The Chief of the National Defense Branch reserves to himself the right to forward this evaluation to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff.

14 December 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

(.....)

14 December 1940

Moreover, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff

asks General von Rintelen to communicate again to General Cavallero the request of the Reichsmarschall that the Italian air forces stationed in Belgium be employed in the Mediterranean during the winter

In addition to the reasons frequently quoted the fact should be ~~xxx~~

taken into consideration that the German Luftwaffe placed the best

concrete airfields at the disposal of the Italian units. These air-

fields, however, are now urgently needed^v by the German Luftwaffe,

for its own units, since the heavy types of its bomber aircraft can

many of
no longer take off from^v the soggy airfields.

17 December 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

(.....)

17 December

The Chief of Group II of the National Defense Branch is to

submit an outline of an order based on the principle that the installations

- 145 -

most important for the warfare against England should not be utilized until further notice
~~for the time being~~ and that the military personnel of these installations

should be considered as reserves at the disposal of the Fuehrer. (.....).

(.....)

18 December 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

(.....)

Staff, 18 December 1940

then

The Chief of the National Defense Branch hands the Chief of

the Wehrmacht Operations Staff the modified outline of the Directive

No. 21 "Barbarossa" (see under 17 December). This directive is submitted to the Fuehrer still on the same day, is signed by him and ~~xx~~ sent to the branches of the Wehrmacht.

(.....)

31 December 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Sta

National Defense Branch/ 31 De-

cember 1940

Upon the request of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe of 30 December for a basic directive for the action to be taken by the Luftwaffe in the event of a British surprise attack against ~~Irel~~ land, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff serves notice, ~~xxd~~ after

- 146 -

the Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch has given him a verbal report, that it is not planned by the Wehrmacht High Command to issue any directive on this question for the time being. However, the Luftwaffe may naturally feel free to attack, in the case of any British action against Ireland, British naval craft in Irish ports and British troops on Irish territory. During such attacks however, Irish should be spared as far as possible. The Wehrmacht Press Office is to prepare leaflets for use in Ireland.

The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe is verbally informed on this decision by the Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch.

9 January 1941

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 9 January 1941

At 12:15 hours, the Fuehrer confers with the Commander in Chief of the Army ~~xx~~ at the Berghof in the presence of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, the Assistant Chief of Staff I, the Chief of the Army General Staff, the Chief of the Operations Branch of the Navy High Command, and the Chief of the Luftwaffe Operations Staff.

The Fuehrer makes the following statements:

(.....)

- 147 -

When the conference is continued at 13:45 hours, the Fuehrer presents, in the presence of the Reich's Foreign Minister, the following overall evaluation of the situation:

(.....)

A landing in England would not be possible ~~now~~ unless the full air supremacy is achieved and England is paralysed to a certain extent. Otherwise, such an operation would be a crime. The final British war objective is the defeat of Germany on the continent. However, her own means are not adequate to reach this objective. The British Navy is weaker than ever before owing to its commitment in two theaters of war ~~now~~ widely separated. Its reinforcement to a decisive extent would not be possible. The British Air Force is extremely adversely affected by the bottleneck situation in the British ^{supply of} raw materials ~~now~~ resulting from the interruption of the imports (mainly aluminum) and by the effects of the German air and naval warfare against the British industry. The aircraft industry suffered such damages that a decrease rather than an increase of the production was caused. This disruption of the aircraft industry by the German Luftwaffe must be continued even more systematically than it has been done so far. The British Army, after all, will not be able to carry out any invasion.

What sustains England is the hope for American and Russian support, since the destruction of the British homeland is inevitable in the long run. England, however, hopes to be able to hold her own

- 148 -

until she has formed a powerful continental block against Germany.

The diplomatic preparations for the formation of such a block can be clearly recognized.

Stalin, the potentate of Russia, is a prudent thinker; he would not overtly operate against Germany, but it must be expected that he will, to an increasing extent, cause difficulties in situations precarious for Germany. He wants to lay claim on the inheritance of impoverished Europe, is in need for successes, and is yearning for the West. He also fully ~~realizes~~ realizes that after an overall victory of Germany the situation of Russia would become very precarious.

The British are sustained by the possibility of a Russian participation in the war. They would not give up the race until this last hope on the continent is crushed. Hitler does not believe that the British are "completely crazy". They would give up as soon as they no longer see any chance to win the war. If they lost the war, they would no longer have the moral strength to hold together their empire. If, however, they could hold their own, raise 40 to 50 divisions, and get support from the USA and Russia, a very difficult situation would develop for Germany. This should not happen.

Up to now, he has acted according to the principle to crush always the most important enemy positions to get one step forward. For this reason, Russia has to be crushed now. Either the British

- 149 -

would give in then or Germany would continue the war against Great Britain under ~~most~~ favorable circumstances. The destruction of Russia would also enable Japan to direct all her effort against the USA. This fact would prevent the latter from entering the war.

(.....)

The destruction of the Soviet Union would mean a great relief for Germany. In such case, only 40 to 50 divisions would have to ~~remain~~ strength remain in the East, the Army could be reduced, and the entire armament industry could be utilized for the Luftwaffe and Navy. Thereupon fully adequate ~~fighter~~ antiaircraft artillery defenses would have to be built up and the most important industries would have to be transferred into areas not endangered. Germany could then never be attacked.

(.....)

10 January 1941

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense

Branch, 10 January 1941

serves notice
The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff ~~communicates~~

by teletype message from the Reich's Chancellery in Berchtesgaden that the Fuehrer took the following decisions on 9 January:

(.....)

2.) The preparations for the operation "Seeloewe" should also be

- 150 -

discontinued provided they do not serve the development of special equipment and the deception of the enemy.

(.....)

The high commands of the branches of the Wehrmacht will be informed on the previously mentioned ~~decisions~~ of the Fuehrer by a directive of the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command.

18 January 1941

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense

Branch/ 18 January 1941

In the evening of 17 January, the Chief of the National Defense Branch goes to Berchtesgaden and ~~verbally~~ to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff in the Reich's Chancellery in Berchesgaden in the morning of 18 January.

(.....) During this report he points out that 20 transport ships are still being held for ~~xxxx~~ use in the operation "Seelowe". He suggests that this number of ships be reduced and ~~xxxx~~ that ~~xxxx~~ be made ~~xxxx~~ the shipping space thus released available for the sea traffic to Norway.

(.....)

22 January 1941

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff,

National Defense Branch, 22 January 1941.

- 151 -

The Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command sends a note on his conference with the Italian General Guzzoni in Berchtesgaden on 19 January 1941 and a brief report on the statements made by the Fuehrer during the concluding conference with the Duce at the Berghof on 20 January 1941.

(.....)

On 20 January at 11:00 hours, the Fuehrer was informed by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff in the presence of the Military Attaché in Rome on the results of the military conferences with the Generals Guzzoni and Gandin. Subsequently, at 12:00 hours, he explained to the Duce his views on the situation. This conference was attended on the German side by the Reich's Foreign Minister, ~~xxxx~~ Envoy Schmidt, an interpreter of the Foreign Office, the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, General von Rintelen, Colonel Schmundt, and Commander von Puttkamer. On the Italian side, the conference was attended, in addition to the Duce, by Foreign Minister Count Ciano and by the Generals Guzzoni, Marras, and Gandin.

(.....)

(The Statements of Hitler:)

The overall situation in the East can be correctly evaluated only if the situation in the West is first taken into account. The attack against the Island of Britain is the ultimate objective.

- 152 -

In this respect, Germany's situation may be compared with that of a man who has but one single bullet in his rifle. If this bullet fails to hit the target, the situation would be considerably worse than before. The landing could not be repeated, since ~~too much~~ matériel would get lost ~~in the event of failure of~~ if the operation should miscarry. In such case, England would not have to worry about any landing any more and would be able to commit the majority of her forces anywhere at the periphery of the area to be protected. However, as long as the attack has not yet taken place, the British have to expect it continuously. The landing would be possible only in certain weather conditions which did not exist last fall.

(.....)

Moreover, the Fuehrer commented on the air war and on the ratio between the German and British air attacks. An extremely powerful antiaircraft artillery with a lot of ammunition would be needed, since the time could come when the war would be conducted exclusively by the Luftwaffe and the Navy. The dive-bomber aircraft only could achieve success in operations against strongly armed ships.

(.....)

29 January 1941

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

29 January 1941

- 153 -

(.....) The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
declares on the outline submitted by the National Defense Branch
on 25 January for the Directive No. 23 for the warfare against the
British war economy (see under 15 January) (no entry there!) that
the guiding principles laid down in this directive by the Fuehrer
which provide for an increased operational mobility of the Luftwaffe
have not been adequately taken into account. Therefore, this
outline requires further reconsideration which he intends to effect
himself. (See under 6 February).

In this connection the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations
Staff serves notice that the Luftwaffe has submitted a suggestion
for the conduct of the air reconnaissance over sea. According to
this suggestion, the reconnaissance over the southern North Sea,
over the Skagerrak, and in the entrances into the Baltic Sea as well
as the protection of convoys by air units max the Channel up
to Cherbourg should remain the mission of the Navy, whereas the
reconnaissance operations over the northern North Sea, in the
Channel area, and over the Atlantic should be delegated to the
Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe (see 22 February). The suggestion
of the Luftwaffe will be submitted to the Fuehrer before long
and then be handed over to the National Defense Branch for compliance
jointly with the Navy (see 4 February).

(.....)

- 154 -

3 February 1941War Diary of the WehrmachtHigh Command/Wehrmacht Opera-tions Staff/National Defense

(.....)

Branch, 3 February 1941

Conference of the Fuehrer with the Commander in Chief of the Army
and the Chief of the Army General Staff at the Berghof on the opera-
tion "Barbarossa" and the operation "Sonnenblume" (sun flower). The
conference ~~was~~ also attended by the Chief of the Wehrmacht High
Command, the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, and the Chief
of the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff.

The Chief of the Army General Staff gives a verbal report
on the planned conduct of the operation "Barbarossa". He makes the
following statements: (.....)

During the concentration of the 4th Concentration Echelon (German:
Aufmarschstaffel) ~~which~~ scheduled to last from 25 April to 15 May
such strong forces would be withdrawn from the West that the con-
duct of the operation "Seeloewe" would then no longer be feasible.

The concentration of the forces in the East would then be clearly
recognizable. (.....).

(.....)

4 February 1941War Diary of the Wehrmacht HighCommand/Wehrmacht Operations StafNational Defense Branch, 4 FebruarIWA

- 155 -

(.....)

Commander in Chief of the Navy
(.....) In the afternoon, the ~~Raeder~~ gives a verbal report
to the Fuehrer in the presence of the Chiefs of the Wehrmacht High
Command and the Wehrmacht Operations Staff.

(.....)

The Commander in Chief of the Navy ~~Eckardt~~ (.....) finally
comments in detail on the missions to be assigned to the Luftwaffe
for the disruption of the British supply lines and on the organiza-
tion and missions of the coast air units. He submits a memorandum of
the Naval Operations Staff.

When the Fuehrer discloses that the Commander in Chief of the
Luftwaffe has
the Luftwaffe also submitted a new memorandum on this question, the
Commander in Chief of the Navy requests that this question be further
considered by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff with the
Chief of the Naval Staff and the Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff
on the basis of both these memoranda and a final decision be taken.

The most important fact disclosed during the further discuss-
sion of a number of problems is that, according to a statement of the
Commander in Chief of the Navy, would ~~require~~ require 6 months for the
entire preparation of the operation "Seelöwe" as a military action
starting out from the present state. This preparation would include
the barge-construction program. Not including the latter, the Navy
would need 2 months.

In this connection, the Fuehrer points out that the deception of the enemy must be maintained precisely in spring.

6 February 1941

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

(.....)

Branch, 6 February 1941

The cleaner copy of
the revised version of the Directive No. 23 for the warfare
against the British war economy which was prepared by the Chief of the
Wehrmacht Operations Staff and sent to the National Defense
Branch on 5 February is re-submitted to the Chief of the Wehrmacht
Operations Staff, signed by the Fuehrer, and, still on 6 February,
issued
~~forwarded~~ to the commanders in chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht
and to the Chief of the Economic and Armament Office.

The main reason for the issuance of Directive No. 23 was the
as a result
fact that ~~swings~~ of the events in the Mediterranean and in view of
the imminent operations "Marita" and "Barbarossa" more and more
strong elements of the Luftwaffe have to be withdrawn from commitment
against the British Isles and those forces still available for
such commitment have to be concentrated more closely and to be mainly
directed against such targets the destruction of which will produce
effects similar to those brought about by the sea warfare against the
British merchant fleet, i.e. primarily against the most important
British import harbors, the British shipping space, and the key

- 157 -

establishments of the British air armament.

(.....)

15 February 1941

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

15 February 1941

A basic directive is issued to the branches of the Wehrmacht for the protection of the coastline against British offensive action in case major operations are conducted in eastern theaters of war. To prevent British successes, even successes of prestige, the Fuehrer directs that in the event of landings operations against the occupied western areas the Commander in Chief West appointed by the Commander in Chief of the Army will be responsible for the repulsion of such enemy action. The forces occupying the British islands in the Channel are to be reinforced to such an extent that these islands can be defended without any support by combat units of the Luftwaffe. The reinforcement of the coastal defenses in Norway is of particular importance. Particular attention has to be devoted to Narvik, the Kola Polar coast, as well as to all those places where the roads running along the coast can be interrupted by naval action or by small-scale landing operations. It must be expected that the British would employ even battleships for such operations. In addition, dive-bomber, single-engine, and twin-engine fighter units have to be steadily kept available.

- 158 e

in Norway to repulse enemy attacks in the air or at sea. To economize on forces, the formation of mixed squadrons or the establishment of schools or courses may be taken into consideration. From springtime on, the stationing of our naval forces ~~should~~ ^{also} must be based on the assumption that not the German Bight but Norway and the coastline of the occupied western areas will be the objectives of enemy naval action.

(.....)

17 February 1941War Diary of the Wehrmacht HighCommand/Wehrmacht Operations ~~NSC~~Staff/National Defense Branch,

(.....)

17 February 1941

- The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff gives the Chief of the National Defense Branch the following information:

1.) The Fuehrer wants the preparation of a study on the concentration of forces in Afghanistan for action against India following the operation "Barbarossa".

(.....)

A report comes in from the Chief of the Special Staff "HNK"*, Admiral Groos, on the conferences the latter has had, since his report of 23 January (see 29 January), with the Chief of the Japanese Navy Mission

.....
Note: * HNK:

- 159 -

Vice Admiral Nomura . In the meantime, the latter was appointed a member of the Military Commission of the Three-Power Pact.

Admiral Nomura summarizes the concepts which the Japanese Navy intends to present in the framework of the Japanese Navy Mission as well as of the Military Commission of the Three-Power Pact as follows:

(.....)

(.....) Moreover, the Japanese Navy is extremely interested in obtaining, in German, information on the further development of the war situation, the German air and submarine war, the possibilities of a landing in England, the Italian operations in the Mediterranean, and on the extent of the German support for Italy. The Japanese Navy fully realizes that Germany can hardly specify a date for the landing in England but it would like to know whether Germany hopes that Japan would conduct some operation in the Pacific Ocean in connection with such a landing.

On this point, the Chief of the National Defense Branch makes the following statements:

According to the report of the Special Staff H/K it seems to be sure ~~xx~~ does not want any military conflict with the USA and would be ready to engage in any action against England only when Germany is about to strike the final blow at that country. In the meantime, Japan would spare no effort to increase her readiness for engagement in the war with German support.

(.....)

26 February 1941

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/

National Defense Branch, 26 Februa-

ry 1941

Regarding the conduct of the air reconnaissance opera-
tions over the North Sea, over the Channel area, and over the Atlan-
tic, the Commander in Chief of the Navy did not make any specific
suggestions for the limitation of the reconnaissance sectors when
he declared his attitude on this problem on 24 February. The Chief of
Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch declared in a telephone
conversation with the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff on
25 February at noontime, that the memorandum of the ~~Commander~~ in Chief
of the Navy contains an argument which could refute the conviction of
the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff that the recognized ~~needs~~
requirements of the Navy could be met even in the case of the planned
settlement of this question. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff
promises to consider this problem thoroughly and he also is
ready to fulfill the request of the Chief of Group I Navy of the Na-
tional Defense Branch to submit ~~to the Fuehrer~~ the letter of the Com-
mander in Chief of the Navy and the memorandum of the Naval Operation
Staff to the Fuehrer before the latter signs the Fuehrer Directive.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch suggests that

a) the limitation of the reconnaissance areas be based on the ranges

- 161 -

of the units under the tactical control of the Commander of the Air Units and that the cooperation be insured by obliging the "Reconnaissance Commander Norway" and the "Air Commander Atlantic" to comply with the directives of the Navy Group Command North;

- b) the responsibility for the entire northern area be delegated to the Navy in contradiction to the temporary decision of the Fuehrer to provide the former with the possibility of gathering experience

(.....)

27 February 1941

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht ~~xxxx~~

Operations Staff/National

Defense Branch, 27 February

1941

According to the Report No. 537 of the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe (Operations Staff - Intelligence Officer) on the situation, dated 27 February, the strength of the British

Air Force in the home area amounts ~~xxxx~~, on 27 February, to

1.) about 70 fighter squadrons containing approximately 700 aircraft (550 of which are day fighter aircraft and 150 are night fighter and 2nd-class fighter aircraft);

2.) 65 to 70 bomber squadrons containing about 1100 aircraft (of which 750 are ^{1st-class} bomber aircraft);

3.) 28 to 30 long-range reconnaissance squadrons containing about

- 162 -

land-based
350 to 400 aircraft (about 300 to 330 of which are aircraft and
and 50 to 70 are flying boats);

- 4.) 17 to 20 squadrons short-range reconnaissance ~~squadrons~~, army
aircraft, transport, and special purpose squadrons containing
a total of 350 to 400 aircraft.

lst-class
It can be expected that by the end of March 1941 about 350 fighter
have been
and 300 1st-class bomber aircraft of American production will ~~be~~ ^{be} formed
assigned to
~~now~~ the units of the Royal Air Force.

The Chief of Staff of the Royal Air Force, Air Chief Mar-
shal G.F.A. Portal, is said to have the intention to organized a bombe
force well prepared for action and with an adequate striking power.
This force is to be systematically committed against Germany during
periods of good weather conditions.

For this purpose, about 14 wings (British wings!) consisting of about
said
2 squadrons each are to ~~be~~ ^{be} formed have been formed. These wings may
be mainly equipped with Wellesley and Hampden aircraft while 30 per
cent of them may employ American aircraft types.

The relative quiet air situation over the British industrial
cities which came about in the middle of December owing to weather
conditions enabled the British air armament industry to recover to
an undesirable extent. After missing spare parts and heavy aircraft
engines had arrived from the USA, the ~~aircraft~~ construction of the
which
aircraft ~~was~~ ^{had} been completed to 50 and 75 per cent during the
preceding months could be finished.

- 163 -

The following types of air-drop ammunition are employed by the Royal Air Force:

- 1.) High-explosive bombs with thick casings and with weights of 95, 200, and 460 kilograms.
- 2.) Long-delay time fuze bombs which cannot be disarmed by removing the fuze.
- 3.) Armor-piercing bombs with weights of 110 and 220 kilograms; with their fuzes. lately, such bombs ~~were dropped~~ set at a delay of about 1 second were dropped on residential areas. They penetrated down to the air raid shelters where they produced their effects.
- 4.) Incendiary bombs which, in contrast to the German Bl E 1, have been developed to show a better penetration performance whereby, however, their burning duration and effect are reduced. Some of the small-size incendiary bombs are provided with an additional blasting charge which produces a detonation and a fragmentation effect after a certain burning period ~~which follows~~.
- 5.) Liquid incendiary bombs, which fail to detonate comparatively often and produce a relatively limited effect.
- 6.) Small incendiary plates which can cause damage in the open terrain only in adequate weather situations.

(.....)

8 March 1941

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

- 164 -

National Defense Branch, 8 March

1941

In the morning of 7 March, the Chief of the National Defense Branch goes to Berchtesgaden and gives a verbal report to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff in the morning of 8 March.

(....)

In the further course of the verbal report the Chief of the National Defense Branch gives an account of the the result of the conference x respect on the deception of the enemy in ~~respect~~ to the operation "Barbarossa" high commands of the and suggests the approval of the measures intended by the branches of the Wehrmacht and that the civilian agencies participating in certain preparations for the operation "Barbarossa" be informed to the same effect by a latter. (National Defense Branch/Group IV).

(.....)

13 March 1941

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

(.....)

13 March 1941

The Chief of the National Defense Branch asks the Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament Office, Major Rudelsdorf, to let the Chief of the Economic and Armament Office know that:

- 1.) In relation to the imminent operations the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command ordered that the experts on the British economy

- 165 -

intended by the Economic and Armament Office in autumn of 1940
for employment in the framework of the operation "Seeloewe"
in the usual form
be notified anew ~~now~~ that they will be called up for service be-
fore long. The purpose of their draft should, as far as necessa-
ry, be hinted in the same form as in the autumn of 1940. It
would be advisable to send out these notifications still in the
course of this month.

(.....)

(.....)

(The entries end with the 24 March 1941)

No. 2

Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

Discussions of the Situation Conducted by the Natio-

nal Defense Branch

Copies of excerpts of the hand-written notes of ~~the~~ Ministerialrat
(high-ranking civil servant) Helmuth Greiner on the discussions on
the situation conducted by the National Defense Branch during the
period from 8 August 1940 to 25 June 1941.

The original material comprises 213 pages with text on both sides
of the size 150 X 210 mm.

- 166 -

Prefatory Notes:

1) The following excerpts contain only those passages which are of direct or indirect interest for the operations "Seelöwe" and the "Air Battle of Britain".

2) The only dates quoted are those ~~of the days~~ under which entries were taken from the original.

8 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

8 August 1940

Staff

Location: ~~xxxxx~~ train "Atlas", stationed at the railroad station of Berlin-Grunewald. The Wehrmacht Operations Office is renamed Wehrmacht Operations Staff as of this date.

Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: At present, the

strength of operational aircraft of the Luftwaffe amounts to 949 bomber, 869 single-engine fighter, 268 twin-engine fighter, and 336 dive bomber aircraft. The total strength thus amounts to 2422 aircraft.

(.....)

Staff Conferences: The Chief of the National Defense Branch has requested the Chief of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence (Captain (Nav) Buerkner) to conduct an investigation to find out where the British Empire is vulnerable to attack. Those vulnerable spots are to be taken into consideration in case the operation "Seelöwe" will have to

- 167 -

be postponed. In such event Egypt and Gibraltar are to be left out of the picture. Moreover, he asked the Chief of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence for information on the Russian war potential. The reports on the experience of the campaign in Norway are to be evaluated for the operation "Seelöwe".

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch submits a survey of the naval forces ready for engagement in the war on 15 September 1940 and on 15 April 1941. At present, 9 destroyers are available 1 of which is in the ship-building yard. New destroyers will be added to this force from October on. At the beginning of the war, 56 submarines were available. In addition the Submarine UA built for Turkey was available. 26 submarines were lost up to 31 July 1940. 25 submarines were newly built during the same period of time. Consequently, 56 submarines including the Submarine UA are available now. In addition, we possess the captured British Submarine Seal - UB and both the former Norwegian Submarines UC and UD. About 73 more submarines will be added to this force during the next six months.

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch reports that the overall program of the intensified air war is not feasible owing to weather conditions and should, therefore, be reduced from 4 to 3 attacks. It is to be feared that the Reichsmarschall will order the premature discontinuation of the attacks. No decision has yet been taken as to whether and when the operations are to be conducted.

It is intended that an attack be conducted by the bomber forces escorted by strong fighter units against the airfields of London on the second day.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: The conferences of the Chief of Staff of the Navy High Command with the Operations Branch of the Army General Staff in Fontainebleau are still in progress.

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: As a result of the directive of the Naval Operations Staff that the plans should not be modified to provide for a landing on a broad basis the Luftwaffe gave its permission for mine-laying operations along the coast of South England up to and including Eastbourne. No progress is being made in the solution of the question of the commitment of Italian air units against England. The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff promised to the Chief of the National Defense Branch that he would urge a basic decision of the Fuehrer on the cooperation with Italy. Difficulties were encountered in the cooperation of the Army and the Navy with the Luftwaffe in respect to the operation "Seelöwe". Regarding the order for "Build-Up East" (codename for measures against the Soviet Union) the Luftwaffe requests information from the Army for the build-up of its ground organization in the occupied eastern territories.

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

9 August 1940

Yesterday, the Fuehrer, ~~escorted~~ only by his aide, went to the Berghof where he intends to stay until the beginning of the intensified air war ~~against~~.

The Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff requests more detailed information on the alleged Russian concentrations of troops at the Finnish border.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch yesterday conferred with the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Branch on the question of the support to be provided by the Italian Navy and Air Force to the Navy and Luftwaffe during the intensified sea and air war. The chain of command of the Italian submarines committed in the Atlantic is to be established ~~immediately~~ according to the wishes of the Commander in Chief of the Navy.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: Admiral Schniewind left Fontainebleau yesterday without any agreement on the basis for the landing being reached.

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: According to latest reports, the losses of the British civilian population due to German air action in July amount to 258 killed and 321 injured.

(.....)

- 170 -

10 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

10 August 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The losses of the British Civilian population during the period from 17 June to 17 July amount to 336 killed and 476 injured.

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament Office: submits the report on the situation in the field of war ~~economy~~ for the month of July 1940. There are only two priority categories now. The beginning of the production of the consumer goods industry ordered by the Fuehrer is not yet possible. Armament production is still ranking first. The 60-hour week will lead to ~~max~~ an impairment of efficiency.

(.....)

Staff Conference: The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe reports that the beginning of the intensified air war was postponed again yesterday owing to the ~~bad~~ weather situation. The decision of the Reichsmarschall to be taken today is not yet known.

The problem of the transportation and supply organization for the operation "Seelowe" is discussed. Will it be necessary to establish a special organization? The branches of the Wehrmacht report to the Navy ~~max~~ their requirements for naval transportation. The Navy decides on the

- 171 -

order of succession of the transportation. The same method is employed in the case of air transportation. In the latter, the air ~~transport~~ transport space is divided into tactical and supply transport space. On the other hand, it is suggested that Wehrmacht Transportation and Supply Branch be responsible for the decision on the priority and the order of succession of the transportation. The three following solutions may be taken into consideration: 1.) Decentralization, the responsibility rests with the commanders in chief of the branches of the Wehrmacht. 2.) Centralization, direction by a central authority of the Wehrmacht. 3.) Laissez faire.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch suggests that no new organization be established but that this mission be delegated to the Chief of Wehrmacht Transportation, General Gercke.

12 August 1940 (No discussion on the situation War Diary of the

on 11 August)

Wehrmacht High Command/Wehr-

macht Operations Staff/Natio-

nal Defense Branch, 12 August

1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The Third Air Fleet carried out a successful attack^{on 11 August} owing to the initiative of General feldmarschall Sperrle ~~modifications~~. 230 bomber and 620 fighter aircraft were committed. The prospects for favorable weather conditions are good. For this reason, the order for a large scale attack may be expected.

- 172 -

(....)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence (....

.....) England is concerned about the situation in the Mediterranean and in North Africa. The British attach great importance to the mastery of the Western Mediterranean. (.....)

(....)

13 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

rations Staff/National Defense

se Branch, 13 August 1940

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence: The people are unanimously determined to hold their own. The crisis caused by the first German air attacks at the end of June has been over-come by now. The Dunkirk-fighters are not ~~invading~~ ^{inclined to make} peace either (V*-man report). (.....)

Staff Conference: The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense

Branch: Owing to deteriorating weather conditions today's at-

conducting by ^{on} attack, ~~were~~ 1000 aircraft was stopped prematurely. A new decision

will be made by the Reichsmarschall at 14:00 hours. The Second Air

Fleet was not committed at all. The Fuehrer returns from the Berghof

Note: * V-man:

- 173 -

to Berlin this morning at 11:20 hours.

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch: yesterday
with each other compared the controversial views of the Army and the Navy ~~and those of the~~
broad or ~~and~~ small basis to be chosen for the operations "Seelöwe" in a
note prepared for a verbal report. No decision has yet been taken
as to when the operation is to be carried out. As soon as the day
has been decided on, the Navy will determine the hour. It will be
submit a suggestion the next task to ~~suggest to the Navy and the~~ for the reconciliation of ~~the~~
these views deviating from each other. The Navy is ~~ready to~~ agree to
a new suggestion after it has been decided to employ 500 motor-boats
of various types and with different speed performances at the extreme
left wing. This action is called the "Green Movement". What conclu-
sions should be drawn regarding the "Blue Movement"? Capacity of the
motor-boats: 6000 men. The losses might amount to 1000 men, the rest
would thus amount to 5000 men. Consequently, stronger parachute for-
ces would have to be employed. During the crossing, the Luftwaffe
^{missing} will have to replace the artillery. This suggestion of the Chief of
the National Defense Branch is to be submitted to the Chief of the
Wehrmacht Operations Staff in the Reich's Chancellery still ~~today~~
this evening.

14 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations ~~Branch~~

Staff/National Defense Branch,

14 August 1940

- 174 -

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The

offensive air action of the Second and Third Air Fleets started as

planned on 13 August. The operations of the Second Air Fleet, howe-

ver, had to be soon discontinued owing to bad weather conditions.

One bomber group only carried out its operations but suffered heavy

losses owing to lack of fighter cover. Thereupon, the Reichsmarschall

issued, at 11:00 hours, a new order for the resumption of the ~~offense~~

attack at 14:00 hours. However, also this attack was not carried out

to the full extent by the Second Air Fleet. At 19:00 hours, the ~~Reichs~~

^{ns} Reichsmarschall issued a new order for the resumption of the operati

on ~~xxxx~~ 14 August. This order, however, was modified in the evening

on account of the weather conditions.

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence: The

German Military Attaché in Moscow, General Koestring, reports that

~~xxxxxxxx~~ treatment and information ~~xxx~~ provided by the Russian com -

mmand staffs have improved.

The Chief of the National Defense Branch: (..... concerning

WStK* and the Economic and Armament Office)

Staff Conference : The Chief of the National Defense Branch: (.....

Note: * WStK:

- 175 -

A new suggestion for the operation "Seeloewe" is made by the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. He also advocates the broad basis. Should the Navy High Command think it impossible to conduct the landing operation on a broad basis, the landing would have to be foregoed at all. Carried out on a small basis, such a landing would be desperate act and its failure would have considerable military and political consequences. There are other ways to force the British on their knees. For such purpose, however, a closer cooperation of the Axis-Powers, an intensification of the submarine warfare (40 Italian submarines based at Bordeaux), and the capture of Egypt and Gibraltar would be necessary. The British will to resist would have to be broken by next spring.

15 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 15 August 1940

The Chief of **Group I Luftwaffe** of the National Defense Branch: The operations of the Second and Third Air Fleets scheduled to be conducted in the morning of 14 August were called off owing to weather conditions. A number of single aircraft was committed in the afternoon. Heavy losses were partially incurred due to weather conditions. The losses of the friendly forces amounted to 16 aircraft, those of the enemy amounted to 18 aircraft and 7 barrage balloons. The latter will

- 176 -

still be increased by a number of aircraft destroyed on the ground.

Today, single aircraft only will be committed at first, if the weather improves, the commitment of whole formations will be ordered.

The Chief of Group III of the National Defense Branch: The WStK*

submits a report on the activities of General de Gaulle. The latter has at his disposal more than 2000 to 3000 ground troops and negligible naval forces ~~in England~~ (2 old battleships and ~~several~~ light modern naval units of greater strength) in England.

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence: Ra-

dio address of Eden: The War has hardly begun for England. Approximately 200 000 men were saved at Dunkirk. Firm confidence in a British victory. - (.....) The Russians apparently do not intend to invade Finland on 15 August.

(.....)

The Chief of the National Defense Branch: (.....) Norway:

Concentration of the Mountain Corps (2nd and 3rd Mountain Divisions and 181st Division) in North Norway. Transfer of the 196th Division to Brønnøysund to occupy the northern sector of Finland in the event of a Russian invasion in that country. Adequate supplies will have

.....
Note: * WStK:

- 177 -

to be stocked in North Norway.

16 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

16 August 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

Daytime events on 15 August: The aircraft were initially not permitted to take-off. At noontime, two dive-bomber groups of the Second Air Fleet were committed. In the afternoon, all three air fleets (Second, Third, and Fifth Air Fleets) engaged in offensive action. 55 friendly and 108 enemy aircraft were shot down. The results were not so favorable since fighter aircraft could not take off owing to weather conditions or lost contact in the haze so that the bomber aircraft were exposed to heavy attacks by British fighter forces. The British dropped incendiary tubes during the last days. Lately, they even dropped wadding bundles with vermins. The German forces dropped parachute bags simulate to ~~initiate~~ the landing of parachute forces. This caused a great excitement in the British press. A large-scale attack is scheduled to take place today. The aircraft, however, have been unable to take off ~~yesterday~~ so far because of the weather conditions. The Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe takes a new decision at 11:00 hours. Milan and Torino were attacked from bases in England during the night of 14/15 August. The distance from England to Goerlitz is longer,

but nevertheless this was a good aeronautical achievement because the aircraft had to fly across the Alps.

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence:

(.....) The Russian-Finnish tensions seem to be reduced.

No considerable reinforcements were reported along the Finnish border. The Finnish Army consists of 5 corps with 15 divisions but is ~~and~~ equipped with small artillery forces and has almost no aircraft at its disposal. The attitude taken by the American press is satisfactory according to a telegram sent by General von Boetticher

19 August 1940 (No discussion on

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

the situation on 17

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

and 18 August)

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 19 August 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: On

18 August, the Second Air Fleet attacked after 14:00 hours and in

the afternoon. The Third Air Fleet conducted but one attack. The

British fighters did no more appear in such great numbers, they

are not so aggressive any more. A minor mishap occurred over the

area of Portsmouth: The friendly dive-bombers sustained losses

since they were not provided with fighter protection. Total losses

147 friendly and 49 enemy aircraft. Operational intentions for 19

August: Attacks after improvement of the weather conditions. Today

- 179 -

the Fifth Air Fleet attacks Newcastle. The British use antiaircraft artillery ammunition which releases wire cables after detonation. The Fuehrer ordered the extension of the antiaircraft artillery defenses all over Germany. For this purpose, captured enemy guns ~~should be used~~ and the industry in occupied France should be exploited for the production of gun-platforms. The enemy losses during the period from 8 to 18 August amounted to : 656 aircraft ~~shot down~~ and 81 aircraft destroyed on the ground. The losses of friendly aircraft amounted to 261.

The Chief of Group III of the National Defense Branch: (.....)

The Fuehrer has decided that Italy should have the decisive vote in all questions of armistice in the Mediterranean.

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence:

(.....) General von Poetticher (Military Attaché in Washington) requests better information on the air war against England.

The Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament Office: The losses of mineral oil due to British bombing are of no decisive importance.

21 August 1940 (No discussion) War Diary of the Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff, 21 August
on the situation took place
on 20 August owing to the
absence of the Chief of the
National Defense Branch, 21 August
National Defense Branch)

- 180 -

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

Owing to weather conditions, a number of single attacks only was carried out by the Second and Third Air Fleets against British airfields on 20 August. The aggressiveness of the British fighters varied. The pilots committed had received only a short-term training ~~showed no audaciousness~~ for this reason, the command ~~was considerably~~ seemed unsure. The prospects for good weather are poor at present. Friendly bomber units are committed only on a small scale for the time being.

(.....)

Staff Conference: During yesterday's discussion with the Chief of the

Wehrmacht Operations Staff the Chief of the National Defense Branch suggested the employment of long-range artillery during the offensive action of the Luftwaffe and that the Army High Command be ~~permitted~~ given permission by teletype message to open^{up} long-range artillery fire.

Army's General Jeschonnek asked General Jodl for information on the concept ~~abstimmung~~ on the commitment of parachute forces during the operation "Seelowe". The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch suggests the occupation of the Isle of Wight by airborne forces in order to capture the coast batteries. The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch points out that ~~then~~ during the winter the landed forces cannot be ~~supplie~~ provided with supplies by air. He reports that, regarding the "Build-Up East", the establishment of the ground organization in the East would, in the opinion

- 181 -

of the Luftwaffe, not be possible without knowledge of the overall intentions.

23 August 1940 (No discussion of War Diary of the Wehrmacht High
the situation took place on 22 Command/Wehrmacht Operations
August because the Chief of the Staff/National Defense Branch,
National Defense Branch was visi- 23 August 1940
ted by the Chief of the Operations
Branch of the Army General Staff.)

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The
air operations are on both sides impaired by bad weather. There
is a prospect for an improvement of the weather conditions during
next week.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch evaluates
the importance of the lending of 50 American destroyers to England.
as follows: Considerable reinforcement of the British convoy escort
forces. These forces are provided with adequate artillery to opera-
te against submarines. 5 battleships of the British home fleet are,
supported from the area of Clyde, ready to repulse German forces.
7 battleships are stationed in the Mediterranean. The "Revenge" is
committed in convoy operations in the North Atlantic. The "Queen Elisabet"
during the
has not yet appeared ~~throughout~~ whole war. At the beginning of the war
she was in the dock-yard. The "Resolution" operating always in the
Gibraltar area has presumably incurred damage. The "Hood" and "Vali-
ant" left Gibraltar to protect convoys.

- 182 -

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence: As a result of its own information and after consultation with the Branch for Foreign Armies West of the Army General Staff the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence arrives at the conclusion that 22 fully combat-ready British divisions (among them 1 to 2 armored divisions) and 12 1/2 divisions not yet fully combat-efficient are stationed in the British Homeland. (....)

The Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament Office: The priority categories are to be further subdivided. Top priority is given to the preparation of the operation "Seelöwe". The fuel supplies stocked at the Belgian-French coast are endangered by the British air attacks. The dispersion of these supplies has been completed at the Belgian and Dutch coast.

Staff Conference: The Chief of the National Defense Branch: (....)

This morning, Admiral Fricke ~~xxxxxxxxxx~~ informed the Chief of the National Defense Branch by telephone that during the "Green Movement" 25 steamships will move straight ahead and 25 will be directed to the East for the crossing in the Strait of Dover. The approval of the Commander in Chief of the Navy is to be sought today. - Certain limitations are still in force in spite of the unrestricted air war. The methods to be employed in the prohibited American zone (300-sea miles border) along the American coast and other restrictions are to be listed in a new directive of the Wehrmacht High Command.

- 183 -

The Liaison Officer of the Wehrmacht Press (Major von Wussow) is notified by the Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch that, at the beginning of the intensified air war, England had at her disposal 900 modern and 200 old-type fighter aircraft. 650 of these aircraft were in operational condition. It is estimated that England still possesses 450 - probably 600 - fighter aircraft and, in addition, 200 such aircraft in reserve. At noontime, Major Deyle (General Staff Officer assigned to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff) telephones from Berchtesgaden and communicates that the National Defense Branch will probably follow up still in the evening of 23 August.

(The Fuehrer has been at the Obersalzberg since 17 August, the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command was there on 18/19 August and ~~extremely~~ moved, ^{at} Berchtesgaden on 21 August, to the Reich's Chancellery together with the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff, Major Deyle, and the Chief of Group I Luftwaffe 1, Major Quisiner). At 16:00 hours, the order for the departure of the National Defense Branch comes in. The train "Atlas" leaves the railroad station of Berlin Grunewald at 19:55 hours and arrives at the main station of Salzburg on 24 August at 09:45 hours. At this station,

it is placed beside the train of the Reich's Foreign Minister ("Heinrich Lieutenant") The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch (~~Aberstdienst~~ Colonel ~~Max~~ von Lossberg) left by airplane for Brussels and Fontainebleau together with Captain Dr. Borner to consult with the Army High Command and with the army commands committed at the Channel coast. No discussion

on the situation is held on 24 August.

25 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 25 August

1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

Weather situation: Commitment of air units in closed formation probably not possible.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: Battleship

"Bismarck" is commissioned on 24 August.

(....)

(....)

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch: Surprising

news come in on concentrations of Russian troops on the Pruth River.

The ~~risk~~ danger of an invasion exists. The former Finnish Military Attaché

in Oslo called on Generaloberst von Falkenhorst to feel out the German

attitude in the case of a new Russian attack. The situation of

Finland is precarious.

Staff Conference: The Chiefs of the Groups I Army and I Navy of the

National Defense Branch are to prepare a map showing the disposition

of the shipping space concentrated for the operation "Seelöwe" at

the different ports, the shipping routes, defenses of the flanks,

and the landing and assembly areas of the 10 divisions of the Sixte

teenth and Ninth Armies.

The principal movement to be carried out is called the "Blue Movement". The Unit 800 intended for special employment (Regiment Brandenburg) is to be committed either in England or with the Italians.

26 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 26 August

1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

British night air raid against the eastern section of Berlin. The losses of the German Luftwaffe since 10 May 1940 have amounted to: 147 reconnaissance aircraft of the Army (146), 439 fighter aircraft (630), 240 twin-engine fighter aircraft (280). (The figures within parentheses represent the replacements). The total losses including the training aircraft amounted to: 3298 aircraft. 2239 of them were completely destroyed and 2436 aircraft were delivered as replacements.

The Chief of Group IV of the National Defense Branch: (....)

Concentrations of Russian troops in the Northern Bucovina.

Staff Conference: At 10:00 hours in the morning, the Chief of the National Defense Branch accompanied by the Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch submitted ~~outline~~ to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command and to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff a map showing the intentions of the Navy and the Army in respect to the operation "Seelöwen".

- 186 -

The Army advocates the maintenance of the division of the area of

attack into sectors, since each division is subdivided into regi-

tal combat groups which will be followed by the rest of the forces.

During the past night, the Navy High Command submitted a request
regarding the strengths of the forces to be transported during the
movements "Blue" and "Green".

27 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 27 August

1940

During the past night, Berlin was on air alert for 45 minutes. A
night attack of strong friendly air forces was directed against
Plymouth. Changeable weather conditions. Intentions for 27 August:
The Second Air Fleet will rest, the Third Air Fleet will operate on
a limited scale.

(.....)

Staff Conference: Yesterday, the Fuehrer did not take any decision
on the date for the beginning of the operation "Seelöwe". However,
he maintains the decision that the operation will be carried out.

The Army will have to adjust its plans to the potentialities of the
Navy. When will the x-order have to be issued? According to the Army
this order will have to be issued 12 days ~~unserstens~~ in advance.

The Chiefs of the Operations Groups I Army, I Navy, and I Luftwaffe

- 187 -

have to ascertain the opinions of the branches of the Wehrmacht on this question. A time-table is to be prepared which must contain also the date at which the operation still can be called off without lifting the concealment of the concentration of the forces. All basic data for a directive for the conduct of the operation "Seelöwe" have to made available. The most essential information can be taken from Directive No. 16.

Supply: An agency of the Navy will have to be established at each port. All these agencies can be placed under a central control within the framework of a field army. The Army units will submit their requests to these agencies. Both field armies will be independent. Each of them will be assigned a sector with a number of ports. The ships will systematically return to those ports from which they had left. The Chief of the National Defense Branch holds that the field armies should have some sort of a staff in the zone of the interior. The Chief of Group III of the National Defense Branch is to prepare the corresponding basic principles. The decentralization should be as extensive as possible. The requirements of the Luftwaffe will have to be reported to the field armies.

29 August 1940 (A brief discus-

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

sion on the situation only was

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

held on 28 August under the di-

National Defense Branch, 29 August

rection of the Chief of Group

1940

III of the National Defense Branch, Lieut. Col. (GSC) Priess.

- 188 -

During an operation over Greater Berlin in the night of 28/29 August, four bombs were dropped on the area of the Goerlitzer railroad station. 16 persons were killed and 28 were injured, some woodworks of the roofs of them seriously. The ~~attack~~ of a number of buildings caught fire. Changeable weather over England, already foggy.

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament Office: The number of railway cars to be made available daily has been increased from 150 000 to 155 000. The majority of the locomotives employed in the occupied territory has been withdrawn, since Belgium, Luxembourg, and Alsâce-Lorraine have their own stocks of railway material again. The effect of the operation "Gesloewe" on the inland navigation amounts to 10 per cent. The freighters withdrawn from that navigation cannot be used any more later owing to their ~~explosive~~ built-in reinforced concrete bottoms. The fuel supplies are shipped out of the endangered zones. 98,7 per cent of the Rumanian oil production and refineries are located in the area of Ploesti.

The Chief of Group III of the National Defense Branch: (.....)

The Fuehrer returns to Berlin in the evening because of the British ~~xix~~ air attack against Berlin which took place during the past night. The special train "Atlas" (National Defense Branch) leaves Salzburg at 20:45 hours. The train arrives at the station of Berlin Grunewald on 30 August at 10:00 hours. The order for the departure of

- 189 -

the train arrived from the Reich's Chancellery at Berchtesgaden on
29 August at 15:30 hours.

30 August 1940

War Diary of the
~~Wehrmacht High~~ Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 30 August

1940

Offensive air operations are impaired by weather conditions. A large-scale attack is carried out against Liverpool-Birmingham.

(.....)

(.....)

(.....)

31 August 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

(The conference is held by

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

Lieutenant Colonel Priess in

National Defense Branch, 31 August

the absence of the Chief of the

1940

National Defense Branch who holds

a lecture to the foreign military

attachés.)

British air attacks are conducted against Berlin during the night of 30/31 August. The main effort of these attacks is directed against the section of Siemensstadt. Considerable conflagration is caused.

In some cases, the production is interrupted for a period of about 14 days.

(.....)

- 190 -

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence:

It can be said that the tenseness in the Balkan situation has ~~increased~~ lessened. It was hinted to the Italians, apparently by the Fuehrer himself, that they were to desist from any action at the Albanian-border. Communist agitation in unoccupied France. Government unstable.

2 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

(No discussion on the
situation on 1 September)

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 2 Septem-

ber 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

On 1 September, attacks against airfields around London. At night, the main effort of the attacks was directed against Bristol. No bombs were dropped on Berlin and surroundings during the night of 1/2 September. British prisoners complain about overstrain and report on great effects of the German attacks. A British feint maneuver was carried out: British Spitfire with Me 109 painted on the wings. Sometimes still strong British fighter defenses. Employment of American aircraft is said to be imminent. High-pressure weather zone over South and Central England. This weather is expected to last a few more days.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: Three Ita-

lian submarines operate from bases in Italy in the Atlantic.

- 191 -

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

The Italian Air Force inspected its operational airfields at the Channel coast. The Italian air units will arrive during the second half of September. Their headquarters will be stationed at Alost.

(.....)

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence:

(.....) General von Boetticher reports that an American commission has been sent to England to gather information on the British defense effort for a report to Roosevelt. This commission is said to have got a very favorable impression.

The Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament Office: 1000 ~~xxxi~~

freighters have been withdrawn from inland navigation for employment in the operation "Seelowe".

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch: Italy has

74 divisions at her disposal. 28 of these divisions are stationed along the Yugoslavian border and 14 of them are stationed in Libya.

The Finnish Army consists of 5 army corps with 16 divisions. The

~~present~~ total strength of the Finnish forces amounts to 140⁰ to 150 000 men. Finland possesses 600 aircraft. These forces are confronted with

15 to 20 divisions on the Russian side. The Russians improve the railroad network in the newly gained Finnish territories. -

The disposition of the British forces: 16 divisions are employed

- 192 -

for coast defense purposes, 19 1/2 divisions are kept as strategic reserve. The whereabouts of 3 divisions are unknown. The British losses of materiel in France ~~including~~ amount to the following percentages: guns 65 per cent, armored vehicles 33 per cent. For this reason, a new armored vehicle has been developed by improvisation in England. 180 to 200 aircraft per month are delivered from the USA. The French troops in England wear British uniforms with a sleeve band with the inscription: "France".

Staff Conference: 1.) The plan of the organization of the forces and the time-schedule for the operation "Seelöwe" which were requested by the Army came in this morning. The time-table is to be set up under the direction of the Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch. The basic principles for the supply ~~operations~~ ^{activities} during the operation "Seelöwe" are to be established by the Chief of Group III of the National Defense Branch. A conference with the ~~Chief~~ of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff will be held in the afternoon.

2.) South-East: (....). 3.) Italy: General von Rintelen reported on 29 August that Marshal Badoglio was happy about the German rejection of the Italian measures planned to be taken against Yugoslavia. He will notify the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command that the action planned against Yugoslavia and Greece has been called off.

The water ways in the Eastern Mediterranean are controlled by Italy to an increasing extent. The preparations for the operations against

- 193 -

Egypt have been completed. The offensive against Egypt will be carried

out as soon as the first German battalion has landed on British soil.

In Libya, there is no great inclination to attack. The armed forces

and the people of Italy want to have the war brought to an end soon.

(Both the last sentences reflect the opinion of General von Rintelen)

4.) Finland: (.....). 5.) The note prepared by the Chief of Group

I Navy of the National Defense Branch for a verbal report on the com-

bined commitment of German and Italian battleships against England

~~apparently~~ impressed the competent circles in the Reich's Chancelle-

ry and apparently also the Fuehrer. ~~Indecky~~, the ~~Wehrmacht~~ High Com-

mand is counting on 19 rather than 19 British battleships.

3 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/

National Defense Branch, 3 Septem-

ber 1940

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch: The 1st

Armored Division will be transferred to East Prussia.

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: 65

tons of explosives were dropped on England during the night of 1/2

September. 33 tons of this amount were dropped on Bristol. The opera-

tions against the British fighter defenses were resumed on 2 Septem-

ber; these operations are to be continued on 3 September. During the

night of 2/3 September, enemy aircraft approached Berlin but changed

- 194 -

their course before reaching the city. The population of Berlin had hide in air raid shelters for 8 1/2 hours during the period from 25 August to 1 September. The objective of the friendly offensive air action during the month of August was to gain the air supremacy by operating against the enemy fighter forces. The losses of the Royal Air Force since 8 August have amounted to 1115 fighter and 92 bomber aircraft, whereas the losses of the Luftwaffe have amounted to 252 fighter and 215 bomber aircraft. 1140 demolition and numerous incendiary bombs were dropped on England during August. 18 air fields were destroyed and 26 were damaged. 10 per cent of the ground installations ~~intended~~ to repair fighter aircraft have been destroyed. It has not yet been possible to inflict considerable damage on the British bomber force. Attacks were carried out against 8 aircraft, 3 aluminum, and 19 airframe factories. A considerable number of the British aircraft reported by us as shot down can certainly be reconditioned very fast. According to calculations of the Luftwaffe the British had, on 1 July, more than 900 fighter aircraft and a reserve of 250 aircraft. On 1 September, the British Air Force had more than 660 fighter aircraft of which 420 were in operational condition and an industrial output of 100 aircraft as reserve. The British antiaircraft artillery now seems to be concentrated in the southern part of the country. The achievements of this artillery are, in general, bad. The British barrage balloons fly at an altitude of 4000

- 195 -

meters with intervals of 400 meters. The German aircraft fly over and between them. The British bomber forces have not carried out any major daytime operation as yet. They have more than about 600 aircraft at their disposal. At the most 100 of the available 500 German night aircraft have been operationally committed sofar. The losses sustained by them were negligible. It has not been possible to hit the British shipping space. The British supply stocks, therefore, have grown. The output of the British industry in July amounted to 300 bomber and 300 fighter aircraft. The American production will not get going until the middle of 1941. From all this the conclusion can be drawn that the British fighter defenses are heavily battered and that the continuation of the German offensive operations against the British fighter force during September in favorable weather conditions may weaken the British fighter defenses to such an extent that the air attacks against the British production centers and port installations can be intensified to enough considerably ~~maximum~~ to impair the British supply activities. It is questionable whether England will carry on fighting under such ~~circumstances~~ circumstances.

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament Office: The Wehrmacht spending during the first year of the war amounted to 38 billion Reichsmark of ~~which~~ which 20 billion were spent for armament production.

- 196 -

Staff Conference: 1.) Operation "Seelöwe": As a result of a suggestion of the Navy High Command a brief outline for a directive on the time-schedule including the dates was submitted to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff this morning. The order to be issued on S-Day minus 10 days must provide for the beginning of the measures to be taken to deceive the enemy. The views of the Army and the Navy on the "green" and the "blue" movements still deviate from each other. A settlement of this controversy is to be brought about by the two high commands concerned on the basis of the directive of the Wehrmacht High Command. The directive of the Army High Command ~~in~~ the concentration of the forces has been submitted. 2.) (....) The practice of having the military attaches report only through the ambassadors should be modified.

4 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

4 September 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: Air

attacks were carried out against the area south-east of London to hit the British fighter force. The ratio of aircraft shot down has considerably changed in our favor. During the night of 3/4 September the main effort of the British air attacks was directed against the northern section of Berlin(10 demolition bombs). No attacks were

- 197 -

directed against the center of the city. Attacks against London have not yet been permitted by the Fuehrer. A dive-bomber group has been assigned to the Italians by us.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: The decision for the lending of the 50 American destroyers to England has been taken definitely. These destroyers will represent one third of the British strength. The Italian Supreme Command decided against the employment of the Italian battleships.

(.........)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence: Great Britain leases Newfoundland, the Bermudas, and the West Indies to the USA in return for the lending of the 50 destroyers.

(.........)

Staff Conference: 1.) (....) 2.) Operation "Seelowe": In addition to the time-schedule an order for the conduct of the operation is to be issued on 11 September. Data have to be provided ~~for~~ the Fuehrer as a basis for his daily command decisions. A method of presenting a picture of the daily event on a map is developed.

The Luftwaffe has not yet submitted a suggestion for ~~for~~ the commitment of the parachute forces. The following locations have been selected for the command staffs: Gisela (Giessen) or Felsenfest (Muenstereifel). 3.) (....).

(.........)

- 198 -

5 September 1940War Diary of the Wehrmacht HighCommand/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch, 5 September

(.......)

1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The Luftwaffe units which penetrated into enemy territory yesterday encountered only negligible enemy fighter defenses. During the past night, the enemy conducted air attacks the main effort of which was directed against Osnabru~~e~~ck. 7 bombs were dropped on Potsdam. The antiaircraft artillery defenses of Berlin are reorganized: 31 heavy, 17 light, and 11 searchlight batteries are employed. The eastern territories of Germany should also be protected again. Weather conditions are good all over North-West Europe, a number of bad weather zones exist.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: The first Italian submarine moved into the port of Bordeaux on 4 September.

(.......)

Staff Conference: (.......) The forces stationed in the East will be reorganized by 24 October as follows: Army Group B with the ~~Army~~ Twelfth, ~~Command~~ Fourth, and Eighteenth Army Command Staffs will contain a total of 35 divisions of which will be 6 armored, 3 motorized, and 1 cavalry divisions. - Colonel von Witzleben reported yesterday that

- 199 -

the ~~XII~~ Group has already started their deception measures for the operation "Seelowe". The time-schedule prepared by the Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch still needs some supplementation. The Chief of Group I Army suggests the coordination of the large-scale attack against London with the operation "Seelowe". The Fifth Air Fleet will be transferred to Holland during the next few days for the large-scale attack on London. The Italian air units will be operationally committed in about three weeks. The Reichsmarschall is not interested in the preparations for the operation "Seelowe", since he does not think that the operation will be actually carried out. (....)

6 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations ~~XII~~

Staff/National Defense Branch,

6 September 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The strength of the British fighter squadrons decreased from 12 - 15 to 5 - 7 aircraft. The population of London spent 7 1/2 hours in the air raid shelters during the past night. About 80 British aircraft penetrated into Germany at night. Operational intentions for today: Air units should penetrate to London and operate against the British fighter defenses. The Third Air Fleet had to transfer all its single-engine and twin-engine fighter aircraft to the Second Air Fleet. During the

month of ~~June~~ June, the British Air Force dropped bombs on 1315 places,

- 200 -

during July on 854 places, and during August on 884 places within the Reich's territory (not the number of bombs!). The British air action against the Ruhr Area and the Rhineland lessened. The enemy air action over the rest of the Reich's territory, however, was ~~increased~~ intensified. The air-raid-shelter map shows that ~~increased~~ the number of hours spent by the population in the air raid shelters in the different places of the Reich's territory had considerably increased in August. The following air attacks were carried out against Great Britain: 122 attacks in June, 271 in July, and 691 in August. A total of 3085 tons of bombs were dropped on England in August. The amount of bombs to be dropped will be increased in September.

(.....)

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament Office: The industrial production suffered shortcomings owing to the frequent air raid alerts during August; the armament industry, however, did not suffer any stoppage in the production process. In August, 236 aircraft were delivered by the USA to England.

Staff Conference: Colonel von Witzleben reports by telephone that changes in the directive of the Army for the concentration of the forces for the operation "Seelöwe" will be effected as a result of requests submitted by Army Group A, the Ninth and the Sixteenth Armies.

(.....)

- 201 -

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: During the operation "Seeloewe", measures to deceive the enemy will be carried out by the Navy from the German Bight, from the Skagerrak, and from Norway on S-Day minus 2 days. The heavy cruiser "Hipper", escorted by two tankers, will move into the Atlantic on S-Day minus 3 days.

7 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense
~~5000000~~

Branch, 7 September 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: A heavy air attack was carried out against Berlin again during the past night. The London docks were attacked during both the past nights.

Attacks against the eastern and western sections of London are planned to be conducted this afternoon and tonight. The Japanese Air Attaché in London reported to his government on the goddeffects of the German air raids. The Japanese Air Attaché in Berlin reported to Tokio that the British air raids against Berlin brought about but little effects.

(.....)

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence: (...

.....) The weekly fats ration in England consists of 170 grams of

- 202 -

which 113 grams were butter.

Staff Conference: (.....) The Chief of Group I Navy of the

National Defense Branch submits a memorandum of the Navy on the

operation "Seeloewe" which provides for the following order of

succession: At first motor-boats and motor-sailing boats, then

1.) Tugs with barges. 2.) Steamships with barges. 3.) Steamships
with empty barges.

9 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

(No discussion on the

Command/Wehrmacht Operations' Staf

situation on 8 September -

National Defense Branch, 9 Septem

Sunday).

ber

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

During the past night, enemy air forces intruded 56 times. The main

effort of the enemy air action was directed against Hamburg. The

British did not reach Berlin owing to bad weather. The attacks ~~were~~

planned to be conducted against London yesterday were called off

because of the bad weather. During the night, however, attacks were

carried out. A strong incendiary effect was produced. A major air

raid was conducted against London in the afternoon of 7 September.

A deterioration of the weather conditions over London is to be ex-

pected from tomorrow on.

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence:

- 203 -

A retelegram of General von Boetticher arrived. This telegram contained information on the results of the German air raids against England up to the afternoon ~~of~~ 8 September. The morale of the British people is said to be strongly shaken. Symptoms of tiredness can be noticed. The optimism is gone. The effect in the central section of London was like an earthquake. Considerable damage was inflicted on the public utilities (gas, electricity, water). (....)

Staff Conference: The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter

Intelligence: (....) General von Boetticher communicates and request endorses the ~~desire~~ of the US-Armed Forces that the American military attaches be given permission to visit the ~~front~~ units of the German Army and Luftwaffe at the front. The branches of the Wehrmacht are to be notified that the Wehrmacht High Command attaches great importance to the fulfilment of the American request.

Operation: "Seelöwe": The last date at which the operation still can be called off is S-Day minus 1 day i.e., 24 hours in ~~xx~~ prior to the time set for the landing. The "Hipper" will probably put out to sea as early as on S-Day minus 8 days.

(....)

10 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

10 September 1940

- 204 -

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The main effort of the German air attacks on 9 September and during the night of 9/10 September was directed against London again. During the night, 190 aircraft were committed in operations. The following was the operational intention of the Second Air Fleet for 10 September: 1 wing was to attack London, the rest of the forces was to raid airfields and the air armament industry. The Navy ~~claims~~ that Boulogne was not attacked from the air but was fired at from the sea.

(.....)

Staff Conference: (.....) The Chief of the Luftwaffe General Staff, General Jeschonnek, demands to have the projected German air bases at the Atlantic coast of North Africa, Casablanca and Dakar, protected by German ground forces. Any decision on this question will not be made pending the completion of the operation "Seelöwe".

(.....) (Report of the Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch, Major Freiherr von Falkenstein, on his interview at the Luftwaffe Headquarters in France on 9 September).

11 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 11 September 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The daytime attacks conducted yesterday were considerably impaired by the weather situation. Therefore, no concentrated attack was carrie

-205-

out against London. At night, about 40 aircraft operated over London. 50 operations were conducted against the Reich. 10 enemy aircraft raided the government area of Berlin. 2 persons were seriously, 2 were slightly injured. There were 5 air raid alerts in London yesterday. Last night, the air raid alert lasted 8 hours and 13 minutes. During three days and two nights up to the morning of 10 September, 1220 tons of demolition bombs and 1490 BSK* were dropped on London. The antiaircraft artillery defenses of Berlin were reinforced from 19 to 29^vbatteries. In addition, 14 light and 11 search-heavy light batteries were employed there.

(.....)

Staff Conference: (.....) The order for the operation "Seeloewe" will not be given today. The warning order will not be issued until 14 September to initiate the beginning of the operation as late as on 24 September. The outline of Directive No. 18 prepared by the National Defense Branch has been submitted to the Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff. The antiaircraft artillery will be assigned to the Army during the period of time provided for in Directive No. 16. Last night, the high commands were notified by teletype message on the postponement of the decision on the operation

Note: * BSK:

"Seeloewe".

12 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 12 September 1940

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch: Army Group B will be shipped to the East during the period from 17 to 19 September.

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: An air raid against London was planned to be conducted yesterday afternoon. This raid, however, could not be fully carried out owing to the weather situation. About 200 tons of explosives were dropped. 148 aircraft took part in the offensive action. The damages caused seemed to be considerable. The British attacked Calais, Boulogne, and Ostend. In addition, about 90 operations were conducted against the Reich's territory. The plans for today provide for concentrated attacks of the Second and Third Air Fleets against London and, in the case of bad weather, the conduct of nuisance raids. The prospects for favorable weather conditions are not very good. It is still planned to move in the Fifth Air Fleet for a large-scale attack against London. The transfer of this air fleet, however, has not yet been ordered.

(.....)

-207-

The Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament Office: Before the war, the British tonnage amounted to 18 million tons. Now, ~~this~~ it amounts to 25 million tons.

Staff Conference: Captain Fett returned from Fontainebleau yesterday. The Army High Command fears that the deception measures to be taken from bases in Norway will be started too early. The Army has agreed to the plan of having parachute forces land only near Dover. (.....) Yesterday, Admiral Fricke, upon orders of the Commander in Chief of the Navy, called on General Jodl to inform the latter that the Commander in Chief of the Navy has agreed to the delegation of the sea-air reconnaissance to the Commander in Chief of the Luftwaffe in the case of the operation "Seelöwe".

13 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

13 September 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The night fighter division will be assigned the mission of patrolling the enemy aircraft enemy airfields and of shooting down ~~including~~ leaving, landing, or starting. The aircraft of this division, however, will also be equipped with incendiary and demolition bombs to attack alternate targets. The range of these aircraft is considerable. The attacks conducted yesterday were impaired by bad weather. Yesterday afternoon, 20 aircraft were committed against London, while 40 aircraft

- 208 -

were committed at night. The changeable weather will probably last.

Weather permitting, London will be raided ~~again~~ this afternoon.

The British civilian population suffered heavy losses during the past nights.

(.....)

Staff Conference: (.....) Churchill delivered a speech. He seemed to be remarkably well informed on the German intentions regarding the operation "Seelöwe".-

(.....)

14 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

14 September 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: A number of nuisance raids only was carried out yesterday owing to the weather conditions. The operational intentions for today: Continuation of the nuisance raids. The Military Attaché in Washington has sent a detailed report on the effects brought about by our air attacks on the British population. The British intensify their reconnaissance activities over the Belgian-French Channel coast. Therefore, the number of enemy aircraft penetrating into the Reich's territory decreases.

(.....)

Staff Conference: (.....) Yesterday, the new Generaloberste
dined with the Fuehrer. The latter made very optimistic statements and
declared that in the present favorable situation he would not run
any risk like the landing in England. The Fuehrer promised to place
30 000 tons of shipping space at the disposal of Generaloberst von
Falkenhorst.

16 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

(No discussion on the
situation on 15 September)

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

16 September 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

During the night of 14/15 September, a number of nuisance raids
was carried out. On 15 September, the Second and Third Air Fleets
attacked London. During these operations, major air battles deve-
loped over London. The German units sustained heavy losses owing
to the lack of fighter ~~defence~~ protection (50 friendly against 79
enemy aircraft). The intensity of the attacks against the Reich's
territory have considerably decreased. Operational intentions for
today: Continuation of the large-scale attack against London in
the case of good weather conditions, otherwise nuisance raids.

(.....)

- 210 -

17 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

17 September 1940

+

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: No

enemy aircraft intruded into the Reich's territory during the night

Owing to the closed cloud cover, only nuisance raids were carried

out against London yesterday. New attack were conducted at night.

General von Boetticher reports on the improvement of the morale of

the population of London as a result of the reinforcement of the

antiaircraft artillery defenses. On the other hand, however, he also

mentions the low spirits of the population owing to the effects of

the long-delay time fuzes.

Operational intention for today: Continuation of the nuisance raids

If the weather improves, closed flying formations under extremely

strong fighter escort will be committed. During the last week, the

population of London had to stay in the air raid shelters ~~for~~ 74

hours and 45 minutes (as compared to 23 hours in Muenster as the

maximum on the German side).

(.....)

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch: Captain

Fett reports on the organizational structure of the British Army:

20 divisions are employed for coast defense purposes. 14 of these

- 211 -

ns
divisions are in full operational condition. 14 and a half divisions

of which 4 are in full operational condition, are kept as strategic reserve.

Staff Conference: (.....) The Luftwaffe built a large dum-

my installation near Kremmen in the Mark Brandenburg which, howe-

ver, will operate only at^{dark} nights from this day on.- We have not yet

succeeded to destroy the ~~enemy~~ British fighter force. At the end of the month

the Italian air units will be committed in operations at the ~~Channel~~

Channel coast. They will arrive during the period from 20 to 23 Sep-

tember coming via the Brenner ~~River~~. The Luftwaffe wants that, in

the case of the conquest of Gibraltar, that one of the Canary Islands

(Las Palmas) be taken by Germany for the establishment of an air

base.

18 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

(In the morning, the Chief of

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

the National Defense Branch and

Staff/National Defense Branch,

the Chief of Group III leave for

18 September 1940

an inspection tour. They go to

Den Haag and Brussels to visit

the Sixteenth and the Ninth Armies

and then to Fontainebleau).

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

London was attacked again yesterday. The plan of the Commander in

- 212 -

Chief of the Luftwaffe to attack London with strong units could be carried out only partially owing to weather. ~~weather~~ Further intentions operational ~~intention~~: Continuation of the nuisance raids and of the attacks by closed flying formations against London to an extent permitted by weather conditions. New Build-up of the anti-aircraft artillery defenses in the East. The air raid alert in London on Monday, 16 September, lasted almost 14 hours. Owing to bad weather conditions, enemy aircraft intruded only into the western areas of the ~~London~~ Reich.

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Branch/Counter Intelligence: last In his ~~new~~ speech, Churchill drew the attention to the damages which had been inflicted on the German shipping space and which should not be underestimated. During the first half of September, the British civilian population suffered ~~losses~~ amounting to 2000 persons killed and 8000 persons wounded. New British warning methods: Previous warning, warning by especially trained observers.

(.....)

19 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 19 Sep-

tember 1940

- 213 -

Chief
The ~~Liaison Officer~~ of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense

Branch: Vivacious fighter combat developed near London during which the British fighters carried out fierce attacks. Strong British air raids against the Channel coast, 80 barges sunk, an ammunition train with 500 tons of explosives blown up. At present, only small British air units intrude into Germany. The Torpedo Boat T 11 received two hits the T 3 sunk last night owing to a bomb hit.

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence: The British Air Minister claims that the British losses of aircraft since the beginning of the intensified air war have amounted to 621 aircraft.

(.....)

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch: (Lieutenant Colonel von Lossberg) ^b submits, at 15:30 hours, to the Chief of the Wehrmacht High Command the study on the operations to be conducted in the East which was prepared by the National Defense Branch.

(Wehrmacht High Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/National Defense Branch No. 33290/40 Restricted Top Secret, dated 15 September) .

20 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff/

National Defense Branch, 20 Septem-

ber 1940

- 214 -

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The offensive operations conducted by the Luftwaffe yesterday were again impaired by the weather conditions. Summarized evaluation of the attacks against London up to 19 September: During the period from 6/7 September to 13/14 September 1927,40 tons and 2425 BSK were dropped on London. From 14 to 19 September in the morning, 3259,80 tons and 4482 BSK were dropped on London. Thus, a total of 5187,20 tons and 6907 BSK were dropped in 13 night and 12 days. The British antiaircraft artillery fires parachute-net-rockets which apparently prove to be ineffective. In the course of 12 days London there were 131 hours of air raid alert in London. 1 BSK (Brandschuettkasten)* represents the equivalent of 36 incendiary bombs of 1 kilogram each.

(.....)

21 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

21 September 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: Weather

conditions were bad yesterday. Therefore, only single aircraft ~~operated~~ operated

in daytime (20 aircraft). Strong units operated at night. No British

Note*: BSK: Brandschuettkasten. English translation:

- 215 -

aircraft intruded during the day. At night, heavy enemy attacks were again directed against the Channel ports. Enemy aircraft intruded intruded into the western areas of the Reich's territory.

(.....)

23 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

(No discussion on the situation

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

was held on 22 September. The Chief

tions Staff/National Defense

of the National Defense Branch and

Branch, 23 September 1940

the Chief of Group III of the National

Defense Branch returned in the evening

of 21 September. The Chief of the Natio-

nal Defense Branch fell sick).

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: Yester-

day, the Luftwaffe had to struggle against bad weather again. America

delivers helium gas to England for use in barrage balloons. This gas

is inflammable and escapes when the balloon is hit. The balloons can

be patched. Operational intention for today: Attacks against London

and Southampton, feint attacks against Portland. Last night, British

aircraft operated over Berlin. They dropped nothing but flare bombs.

(.....)

The Chief of Group III of the National Defense Branch: He reports on

his trip with the Chief of the National Defense Branch which took them

from Amsterdam to Le Havre. The preparations for the operation "Seelöwe"

- 216 -

have not yet progressed ~~south~~ to such a degree that the operation

could have been carried out on 21 September.

(.....)

24 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

24 September 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The attacks during the night of 22/23 September were again concentrated against London. On 23 September, nuisance raids only were conducted. Some of them had to be discontinued owing to weather conditions. 250 bomber aircraft operated over London during the night of 23/24 September. 150 enemy missions were flown into the Reich's territory during which 60 bombs were dropped. About 45 aircraft operated over Berlin. They dropped bombs on 17 places.

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Branch/Counter Intelligence:

(.....) General von Boetticher reports on the impression of the American General Strong in England: England is decided to fight the war to the bitter end.

Staff Conference: Regarding the military mission for Rumania the

Reichsmarschall declared that he would by no means approve any

subordination of the air force mission ~~south~~ to the Army mission.

(Our warfare now seems to consist of nothing else but consideration to
the Reichsmarschall and the Italians).

25 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

(The Chief of the National

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Defense Branch has recovered

Staff/National Defense Branch,

from his sickness).

25 September 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: Last

night, 7 demolition and about 30 incendiary bombs were dropped on

Berlin-Siemensstadt. Yesterday, nuisance raids only were again conducted against England because of the weather conditions. Operational intentions for

today: Attacks, covered by fighter forces, ~~xxxxx~~ directed against

London. ~~xxxxx~~ If weather conditions should be unfavorable, nuisance

raids will be carried out. The British fighter defenses are concentrated in the South.

(.....)

Staff Conference: The Reich's Foreign Minister is piqued because

he did not know about the ~~xxxxxx~~ the employment of Italian submarines

at Bordeaux and of Italian air forces at Alost. He is kept informed by the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence. At the beginning of

September, an Italian commission headed by General Fougger comes

to Alost and Karinhall. Italian air forces are placed under the

command of the Second Air Fleet. Their operational commitment can

~~xxx~~ be expected at the beginning of October. (.....)

- 218 -

The Chief of the National Defense Branch suggests the dispersion
of the shipping space in the port areas and the embarkation in the
those ports chosen to effect such dispersion for the operation
"Seelowe" (direction of 19 September). He reports that the civi-
lian population in Rotterdam and Antwerp is able to watch the pre-
parations, that the barges are massed in certain port areas, and
that the preparations of the Luftwaffe for the operation "Seelowe"
bases, as a result of a conference
are far behind schedule. The Navy ~~knowing nothing of preparations~~
of General Jodl with Admiral Fricke, its preparations on the assump-
tion of S minus 15 time. The Army requests the same time-schedule.
The Navy is of the opinion that the Army has abandoned the plan to
land at dawn. On the other hand, the Ninth and Sixteenth Army Com-
mand Staffs still think that a landing could be taken into consid-
eration only when carried out 20 minutes after the beginning of day-
break. The Chief of the National Defense Branch orders the Chief of
Group I Army of the National Defense Branch to contact the Chief
of the Wehrmacht Press on the question of the propagandistic measu-
res to be taken in case the operation "Seelowe" will be called off
(.....)

26 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

26 September 1940

- 219 -

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: During

the night, 256 tons of bombs were dropped. During the day, only ~~xxxi~~

one single aircraft operated over London, no attack was carried out.

No major fighter combat has taken place ~~during~~ the past eight days.

The British fighter forces seem to recondition their aircraft. During

air
the night of 24/25 September, strong British forces raided the Cham-

nel coast. These raids interrupted the entire water supply ~~for~~ Le Hav-

re. Last night, 63 enemy missions were flown against the Reich. 4

bombs were dropped on Berlin which was on air alert for 5 hours.

There is a good prospect for an improvement of weather conditions.

The Luftgau (Luftwaffe administrative organization) has been reinfor-

ced by 3 heavy and 8 light antiaircraft artillery battalions. In addi-

tion, 1 night fighter squadron and 1 flight of 4 night fighter air-

craft has been transferred to Berlin.

(.....)

yesterday
• Staff Conference: (.....) The efforts made^y by the Chief of the

National Defense Branch to obtain some information at the Reich's

Chancellery led to some success. (.....) 3.) Until lately, the

Fuehrer had no faith in the French. He did not change his attitude

until the incidents at Dakar occurred. He now aims at making use of

France to the largest possible extent. He intents to have the former

French Ambassador Francois-Poncet call on him and to have a meeting^y

with Pétain.

- 220 -

4.) Operation "Seeloewe": The decision that the warning order be issued on S-Day minus 10 days is not changed. The order will not be issued without prior consultation with the branches of the Wehrmacht whether this period of time would be sufficient. The Chief of the National Defense Branch called the attention to the difficulties which will be encountered in taking the propagandistic measures necessary in case the operation "Seeloewe" will be called off. This question is to be further considered by the Wehrmacht Press.

27 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 27 Sep-
tember 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

Since the beginning of the attacks, 4865 tons of bombs and 7336 BSK* have been dropped on London. Owing to bad weather conditions, 3 aircraft only operated over London yesterday. During the night, 160 aircraft operated over London. 28 missions were flown against the Reich. 23 bombs were dropped during the past night. The night before last, Karinhall was attacked with demolition and incendiary bombs. The French air attacks against Gibraltar seem to have caused

Note: * BSK:

- 221 -

considerable damage.

(.....)

28 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 28 September

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch: East:
Army Group B is at present in Berlin, from 6 to 10 October it will
be at Poznan. ~~The~~ Twelfth Army Command at Krakow, Fourth Army Com-
mand at Warsaw, Eighteenth Army Command at Bromberg, later Koenigs-
berg. Total strength: 35 divisions of which 30 are stationed in
East Prussia and in the Government General (25 infantry, 1 cavalry,
3 armored, 1 motorized divisions). In addition, the XXXX Army Corps
(2 armored and 1 motorized divisions) near Vienna. 11th Rifle Bri-
gade reorganized into 11th Armored Division, 60th Division is conve-
ted into an armored division. First Air Fleet is transferred from
Berlin to Koenigsberg.

Luftwaffe

The Chief of Group I of the National Defense Branch: Yesterday's

losses: 42 friendly, 89 enemy aircraft. Operational intention for
today: Concentrated commitment of forces penetrating to London,
provided weather conditions permit such action. No British aircraft
were observed yesterday. During the night, 12 enemy missions were
flown into the Reich and 4 bombs were dropped. Now, the British

- 222 -

fighter aircraft again oppose the German units over the Channel.

(.....)

Staff Conference: (.....)

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: Transport

space for the operation "Geeloeve": On the whole, everything that is

needed is available. Dispersion of the shipping space ~~overconcentrated~~

~~parts~~: Orders regarding Rotterdam and Antwerp already issued, dispersion elsewhere not possible.

30 September 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

(No discussion on the situation

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

on 29 September).

Staff/National Defense Branch,

30 September 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: During the night, 87 missions were flown into the Reich. The enemy aircraft penetrated to the southern outskirts of Berlin and dropped 35 demolition and 70 incendiary bombs. Yesterday, London was attacked through a closed cloud cover. Further attacks were carried out at night. At times, the British fighters showed little aggressiveness.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: (.....)

The Italian air forces arrived in Belgium jointly with the major

d
part of the bomber force on 28 September. Italian submarines are based at Bordeaux.

(.....)

- 223 -

The Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament Office: The butter-

per week ration in England amounts to 57 grams in addition to 170 grams of fats.

Staff Conference: A report arrived from the 22nd (AirLanding)Division

on its commitment in the Fortress Holland. The Wehrmacht High Command

will Request the opinion of the Army High Command on this report to

be able to form ^a ~~independent~~ judgment of its own.

(.....)

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: He reports

on the dispersion of the transport space for the operation "Seeloewe".

This dispersion is under way. The Chief of the National Defense Branch

points out that, owing to this dispersion, the warning order can no longer be given on S-Day minus 10 days. The Chief of Group I Navy

of the National Defense Branch further reports that the Commander in

Chief of the Navy suggested to the Fuehrer on 26 September that the

decision on the operation "Seeloewe" be postponed up to 15 October.

The operation should, in his opinion, be called off entirely if no

decisive results would have been brought about by the air operations

by that date.

1 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

1 October 1940

- 224 -

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: 103

enemy missions were flown into the Reich's territory, 9 demolition bombs were dropped on Berlin. London and Liverpool were raided yesterday.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: The first

4 destroyers arrived at England from the USA.

(.....)

The Chief of Group IV of the National Defense Branch: The Fuehrer

has ordered that summer time will be continued until further notice. (.....)

The Chief of the National Defense Branch: The handing over of Amer-

ican Flying Fortresses (heavy bomber aircraft) seems to be imminent.

(.....)

The Chief of the National Defense Branch: The Commander in Chief

does not
of the Army approves/ the report of the 22nd (Air Landing) Division
and requests that this report be handed back. The Chief of the
National Defense Branch will give the Chief of the Wehrmacht Opera-
tions Staff a verbal report on this question.

2 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

2 October 1940

- 225 -

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The air operations against England still are impaired by the bad weather. Over South England some breaks in the cloud cover. Map ~~XXXXXX~~ providing information on air raid alerts: During the period from 16 to 22 September, Berlin was next to Muenster, on air alert for the maximum period of time during which the population had to stay in the air raid shelters. 516 demolition bombs were dropped on Germany in the course of the past week.

(.....)

The Chief of the National Defense Branch: The Fuehrer wants that be maintained and the present air raid warning system ~~immediately~~ the regulations for the behavior of the population during air alerts be further complied with; he established these basic principles himself.

The Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament Office: The economic orders placed by the Russians have been ~~put~~ into the priority category No. Ia.

(.....)

3 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff
~~XXXXXX~~/National Defense Branch,

~~XXXXXX~~
3 October 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

The offensive air action is further impaired by the weather situation.

- 226 -

Plans for today call for the continuation of the attacks against London and the British air armament industry, above all against the Spitfire-factories near southampton. The Weather situation is bad.

British
On 1 July 1940, 1250 fighter aircraft were available. 900 new aircraft were added to this strength by 30 September. 2079 aircraft were reported as shot down. However, only 1470 aircraft were shot down not including 10 per cent crash landings so that the total losses might amount to 1650 aircraft. Thus, the British Air Force had more than 500 aircraft of first class at its disposal on 30 September. A total of 32 squadrons exists of which 18 are stationed around London and 4 in South England. About 500 fighter aircraft are daily in operational condition. It cannot be expected that the strength be considerably increased in October. Personnel: 1250 fighter pilots were available on 1 July 1940. This strength was reinforced by 300 pilots by 30 September. The losses during the same period of time amounted to about 1000 pilots. The figure of 500 still fighter aircraft and 500 fighter pilots is a very high one. Any similar calculation for the British bomber forces is not available.

(.....)

Staff Conference: (.....) Yesterday in the afternoon, the ~~xx~~
Chief of the Wehrmacht Operations Staff was informed by the Chief ~~m~~
of the National Defense ^Branch on new objections raised by the Luftwaffe to the further assignment of the Squadron 1/106 to the Navy.

- 227 -

regarding
The Fuehrer yesterday signed a directive ~~on~~ this question in ~~favor~~
favor of the Navy. (....)

4 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

4 October

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

A number of single aircraft only operated yesterday owing to the weather situation. The aircraft attacking from the clouds attained

a good score. The Second Air Fleet did not conduct any attack

during the night. The Third Air Fleet committed 38 aircraft.

1 British mission was flown into the Ruhr Area yesterday, 13 Bri-

British aircraft appeared in the area of Bergen. No enemy aircraft

intruded during the night. The operational intentions are still ~~in~~

the same. Weather conditions are bad. The barrage balloons in Eng-

land fly at altitudes from 4000 to 5000 meters with great inter-

vals. They easily break from their moorings. A map of the night

fighter operational areas shows that a total strength of 1 group

and 1 squadron and, near Berlin, 1 flight of aircraft are committed

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence: Han-

derson replaced Chamberlain who had resigned. The decisive predomi-

nance of the Conservative Party thus no longer exists.

(....)

- 228 -

Staff Conference: Regarding the question of air alerts the Chief of the National Defense Branch points out that no more than 1 bomb dropped may be calculated per 1 intruding aircraft. - A conference took place ~~hastenam~~ yesterday between General Jodl and General Jeschonnek. The former pointed out how fast and well the US-press is informed on British air attacks against Berlin and how badly the friendly authorities are informed on damages caused in London. In the future, the foreign press in Berlin should no longer be provided with such good information.

5 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

5 October

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: Daytime attacks on London were carried out yesterday by a number of single aircraft. The major portion of this action was directed against alternate targets. Night attacks were directed against London. British aircraft intruded into the coastal area, 4 aircraft penetrated into the Reich's territory. No enemy aircraft intruded during the night. The antiaircraft artillery effort at Rotterdam, Ostend, Calais, Dunkirk, Boulogne, Brest, Cherbourg, and Lorient has been intensified. 45 heavy, 24 light, and 18 searchlight batteries are employed at Berlin. These antiaircraft artillery forces of Berlin

- 229 -

will not be reinforced.

The major part of the reinforcements consists of newly activated forces. Antiaircraft artillery corps still exist~~s~~ in view of the ~~xx~~ operation "Seeloswe". The American press reports the intention to provide the British with four-engine flying fortresses (1000 horse powers, maximum speed of 400 kilometers per hour, cruising speed of 330 kilometers per hour, 3 machine guns with a caliber of 127~~7~~ millimeters, 2 light machine guns, climbing altitude of 6500 to 8900 meters, cruising range of 4300 kilometers with a bomb load 1000 kilograms). British flying boats: Maximum speed of 325 kilometers, cruising range of 6000 kilometers without bomb load, 3600 kilometers with a bomb load of 1800 kilograms. Both types can easily evade attack. The German type "Condor" is approximately equivalent. The latest model of the type "Condor" is to be equipped with 4 rigid and 6 movable machine guns as well as with 4 cannons. Weather prospects are bad.

(.....)

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch: (.....)

The Fuehrer went to the Berghof for a few days to be able quietly to consider the new political concept.

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The Luftwaffe reports that it had dropped aerial mines ~~xxix~~ with the new Type-Fab fuze only over the sea and not over London or any other part of the country. The Reichsmarschall is very excited about the

- 230 -

formulation of the directive regarding aerial mines. He intents to call on the Fuehrer today and considers this formulation as an unjustified reprimand raised by the Navy against the Luftwaffe. He insists on the employment of aerial mines over London, since these mines produce the maximum effect. General Speidel is appointed as the Chief of the Luftwaffe Mission in Rumania. General Jeschonnek calls for a further reduction of the information provided to the American diplomats and press on the air war.-

Air alert: This question was broached again during the recent conference with the Reichsmarschall. The Reichsmarschall wants to discuss this subject once more with the Fuehrer. 76 Italian aircraft have arrived in Belgium, 15 are still ~~en route~~ en route, and the Italian fighter aircraft are still beyond the Alps owing to weather conditions

7 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

(No discussion on the situation
took place on 6 October).

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Staff

National Defense Branch, 7 October

1940

The Chief of Branch I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: During the past two days, London was reached only by a number of single aircraft because of the unfavorable weather conditions. No British aircraft intruded into the Reich's territory. The weather is not so bad that they could not intrude, but they would encounter difficulties during the landing owing to ground fog. (.....)

-231 -

The Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament ~~Office~~: A conference of the office chiefs with Goering ~~involves~~ on the fuel supply problem took place on 4 October. It was decided to transfer fuel depots to areas not endangered by air attacks, since shortcomings of the production had occurred owing to enemy air raids.

(.....)

8 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 8 October 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: During the night of 6/7 October and on 7 October the offensive operations against London were discontinued owing to bad weather. During the night of 7/8 October, 180 aircraft were committed of which 140 operated against London. On 7 October, the British committed air forces over the coastal area in operations ~~into the Reich's territory~~. During the night, 110 missions were flown into the Reich's territory of which 54 were conducted to Berlin. The heaviest attack on Berlin ever conducted took place. During this attack, 50 demolition and 48 incendiary bombs were dropped and 25 persons were killed, 50 persons were injured. Changeable weather situation. The bomb loads dropped on England and Germany during September amounted to: 387 tons dropped by the British on the Reich's territory, 7415 tons dropped by the Germans on Englan

- 22 -

5818 tons were dropped on London. This amount equals almost that dropped on Warsaw. In addition 332676 incendiary bombs were dropped
(.....)

9 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

9 October 1940

The Chief of the National Defense Branch went to Brussels to attend conferences.

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: Owing to weather conditions, only nuisance raids and attacks against alternate targets were carried out. A number of single British aircraft intruded. At night operations against Berlin were started. These operations, however, were apparently discontinued in England owing to bad weather conditions. Bombs were dropped on Emden, Bremen, and Hamburg. Weather conditions deteriorate in France, South England, and Germany. Map showing air alerts: During the past week, the population of Muenster had to stay in the air raid shelters for 12 hours and 45 minutes, while the population of Berlin had to stay in the shelters 8 hours and 30 minutes.

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence: In

- 233 -

a speech, Churchill mentioned that 8500 persons were killed and 13000 persons were wounded in London. - (....)

10 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

10 October 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

Weather conditions were bad yesterday; for this reason, single aircraft only attacked London by day and by night. During the night British attacks were directed against the Rhineland and the Ruhr Area. German fighter aircraft are to be used as bombers, since they are less heavy and more maneuverable than bomber aircraft.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: Disposi-

tion of the heavy British naval forces: 5 battleships in the home area, the "Revenge" in the North Atlantic, 5 units at Alexandria, the "~~Renown~~ Renown" at Gibraltar, 2 units damaged at Dakar. Aircraft carriers: 1 at Aden, 2 at Alexandria, 2 at Freetown.

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence: The

Russians have sent air and military attaches to London. (....)

11 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Ope-

rations Staff/National Defe-

se Branch, 11 October 1940

- 234 -

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

110 missions were flown into the Reich's territory. 88 demolition bombs were dropped on 34 places. Yesterday, 101 bomber aircraft were committed in daytime operations against England and 298 at night. Since the beginning of the intensified air war 3108,64 tons of explosives were dropped on England. In addition, more than 10000 ESK were dropped on that country.

(.....)

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: 10 German

submarines are, on the average, engaged in combat action. The Italians complain about the slight chances for their submarines employed at Bordeaux. The Chief of Staff of the Wehrmacht Commander Norway, Colonel Buschenhagen, called on General Jodl the day before yesterday. As a result, the Fuehrer ordered that the 16 steamships of the Norwegian route which had been made available for employment in the operation "Seelowe" be reassigned to the Navy.

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch: He suggests

the maintenance of the pressure on England during the winter.

(.....)

12 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 12 October 1940

- 235 -

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: During the day, only fighter-bomber aircraft were committed against London. At night, also bomber aircraft were employed. British aircraft operated over the North Sea coast at night. The operational intentions remain the same. Changeable weather situation. The Luftwaffe strength of operational aircraft ready for employment on 1 October amounted

August
to 898 bomber aircraft, (10 ~~September~~: 1015 aircraft, established strength

August
1600 aircraft), 375 dive-bomber aircraft, (10 ~~September~~: 346 aircraft),

August
730 fighter aircraft, (10 ~~September~~: 933, established strength: 1171),

th
174 twin-engine fighter aircraft, (10 August: 375, established strength

448 aircraft). The emphasis of the production is placed on the following types: Me-109 and Me-110 fighter aircraft, Ju-88 bomber aircraft

Ju-87 dive-bomber aircraft. The Luftwaffe Headquarters is established in a train stationed at Beauvais.

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence: Accor-

ding to diplomatic reports from London the British Air Force intends

to concentrate its attacks against nearby objectives in North and

West Germany.- (.....)

The Chief of the National Defense Branch: (.....) An outline for

a directive for the discontinuation of the operation "Seeloewe" is to

be prepared.

- 236 -

14 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

(No discussion on the
situation took place on
13 October)

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch/

14 October 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

Single fighter-bomber aircraft attacked London during the day and
about 200 bomber aircraft raided the city at night with good obser-
vation of the ground. During the past night, enemy aircraft penetra-
ted into the Reich but were re-called prematurely. The operational
intentions remain the same; both air fleets commit strong bomber
forces in night operations against London.

(....)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence:

(....) American correspondents present a drastic picture of
the increasing destruction in London yet stress the determination
of the people.

Staff Conference: (....) Operation "Seelöwe": The Chief
of the National Defense Branch suggests a half year's rest.

23 October 1940 (As a result of
an information trip of the offi-
cer in charge of the war diary
to Belgium and France from 15 to

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations Stf

National Defense Branch, 23 Oc-

tober 1940

20 October no entries for this
period are available).

- 27 -

The Chief ~~fix~~ of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The West coast of England has been mined by the 30th Bomber Wing of the 9th Air Division operating from West France. Yesterday, London was attacked by a number of single aircraft. Enemy aircraft intruded into the coastal area. No enemy operations^{were conducted} into the Reich's territory, apparently owing to fog in England.

(.....)

The Chief of Group I M of the National Defense Branch: Circles of the Congress in Washington are said to have declared that the United States will not place any super-bomber aircraft at the disposal of England.

(.....)

The Liaison Officer of the Economic and Armament Office: According to a report of a V-man from London, the effects of the German attacks on London and the British industry were not very strong during September. During October, however, the effects are said to have been stronger.

The British people is said to be fatalistic. The people, however, ~~is~~ does not appear demoralized.

Staff Conference: The Chief of the National Defense Branch: General Jodl thinks it possible that the Fuehrer told the Duce at the Brenner that he agreed to the attack against Greece without informing his military advisers correspondingly.- Order for the dispersion of the forces intended for the operation "Seelöwe": Long periods of time

- 238 -

will, in the future, be required to get the operation going. The three branches of the Wehrmacht are to report on this point. The measures to deceive the enemy are to be continued, but the main effort of ~~this work~~ this deception should be directed to Norway. - (.....)

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch: The morale of the flying units is excellent. These units are strained but not overstrained. The tendency to attack with single aircraft becomes more and more predominant. General Jeschonnek hopes to achieve a lot during the winter. The pressure imposed on London at nights is to be continued provided weather conditions permit such action. The replacement situation in respect to personnel and material is good. The opinion that daytime bomber attacks can be carried out only under certain conditions is not ~~disputed~~ undisputed. In general, only fighter-bomber aircraft equipped with 250-kg bombs are to be committed in daytime operations against London or alternate targets. These aircraft are to fly at extremely high altitudes. According to the General Jeschonnek, the damages caused in London are very considerable. The Reichsmarschall has ordered ~~that~~ to raid the British night airfields. All the Italian carry out experimental flights. The fighter have arrived now. They ~~adjust themselves to the conditions existing~~ force is equipped with obsolete materiel. ~~hand-to-flying~~ About 60 Italian bomber aircraft have arrived. - (.....) The Fifth Air Flett has been reinforced by a bomber group.

- 239 -

24 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht

High Command/Wehrmacht Opera-

tions Staff/National Defense

Branch, 24 October 1940

(.....)

(.....) Report of General von Boetticher on the situation in
England up to 21 October: The situation has ~~apparently~~ evidently become more
precarious .
The objective to make life difficult and to disturb the produc-
tion has been achieved. Production has decreased. The traffic situ-
ation is difficult. There is a danger that epidemics might break
out. Reports from the embassies in Lisbon and Sofia agree. An impre-
ssive change has taken place in the tone of the British press.

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: The Ita-
lian submarines have also been employed in the northern sector. At
the present time, 3 German and 4 Italian submarines are engaged in
combat operations.

(.....)

Staff Conference: (.....)

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: The armor-
ed battleship "Admiral Scheer" commanded by Captain Krancke put out
to the Atlantic yesterday.

(.....)

25 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

- 240 -

Staff/National Defense Branch, 25 Oc-

tober 1940

(.........)

The Liaison Officer of the Foreign Group/Counter Intelligence:

official

(.....) A very interesting British report on the disruption of
the German preparations for the invasion is available.

(.........)

Conference with the Chief of the Groups I Army, I Navy, I Luftwaffe,

and IV of the National Defense Branch:

The Chief of Group I Navy of the National Defense Branch: The following ships will be ready for action: The "Bismarck" on 1 April, the "Tirpitz" in the summer of 1941, the "Scharnhorst" and the "Gneisenau" in November 1940, likewise the "Hipper"; the "Luetzow" on 1 April 1941. The auxiliary cruiser 21 expected from Lorient yesterday did not arrive. (.........)

26 October 1940

War Diary of the Wehrmacht High

Command/Wehrmacht Operations

Staff/National Defense Branch,

26 October 1940

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

(.........) On 25 October, 13 Italian bomber aircraft were, for the first time, committed in an operation against Harwich. (.....)

(.........)

- 241 -

29 October 1940War Diary of the Wehrmacht HighCommand/Wehrmacht OperationsStaff/National Defense Branch,29 October 1940

The Chief of Group I Army of the National Defense Branch: Reorganization of the Army: In the West: Generalfeldmarschall von Rundstedt appointed as Commander in Chief West and Commander in Chief of Army Group A. The Army Groups A (Ninth and Sixteenth Armies) and B (First Seventh, and Sixth Armies). In the East: Army Group B (Eighteenth, Fourth, and Twelfth Armies). In the zone of the interior: Army Group C (Second and Eleventh Armies). The Headquarters of the Army High Command will arrive at Zossen on 30 October.

The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National Defense Branch:

11 night airfields in England were attacked in the evening of 27 October. Last night, 80 enemy missions were flown into the Reich's territory and 38 bombs were dropped. The Fifth Air Fleet keeps bomber units ready for supporting the operation "North" (Putting out to sea of the armored battleship "Admiral Scheer"). During September: The population of Muenster was 65, that of Berlin 40 hours in the air raid shelters. A total of 741 attacks were conducted against Great Britain. 268 of them were directed against London. 8300 tons of bombs not including incendiary bombs were dropped. 6000 of them were dropped on London.

(. . . .)

Staff Conference: The Chief of Group I Luftwaffe of the National

Defense Branch: In a conference with Pétain, the Fuehrer disclosed

information regarding the strength of the German Army and stated

that in 1941 25 submarines will be produced per month. Pétain assu-

red him that no American aircraft had sofar arrived in England. The

Fuehrer was highly impressed by Petain. The latter ~~showed~~^{had} a good record.

dignity and splendid military bearing. Laval seemed to be a clever

boy. The Fuehrer was not considerably impressed by Franco. (.....

The studies on the Atlantic Islands ~~were~~ prepared under the

dates of 22 September and 2 October are to be reconsidered and sup-

lemented. The operational possibilities should be examined in detail.

on the basis of the following considerations: 1.) Military-politi-

cal, military-geographical, and purely military information islands.

to what extent can the supply be drawn from resources of the country?

try? 2.) Examination of the operational possibilities at sea and in

the air with special regard to the ground forces to be embarked.

Spain will be willing to provide unofficial support. Portugal will

stay neutral since she is exposed to British pressure. France will

tolerate German measures within the territory under her jurisdiction.

tion and provide indirect support by placing transport ships, air

bases and supply depots at our disposal. 3.) Suggestions for the

preparation: Equipment of transport ships—providing coast batteries

equipment of transport submarines, check-up and equiment of transport

Notes on the Second Part of the French